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 This thesis is designed to explore the patchwork regulatory structure that governs the use 
of facial recognition technology by government and private actors. With minimal federal 
regulation, state and local regulations are an important bulwark against the unregulated use of 
facial recognition technology. The author examines the few state and local regulations that do 
exist, analyzing statutes using a coding protocol created by the author. He then discusses any 
potential First Amendment interests present in the use of facial recognition technology, 
ultimately concluding that facial recognition technology will likely receive some level of First 
Amendment protection under the rule of “information as speech” first stated in Sorrell v. IMS 
Health. Lastly, the author evaluates how a First Amendment interest may hinder state and local 
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In the absence of comprehensive federal legislation restricting the use of facial 
recognition technology, state statutes and local ordinances form the regulatory backbone that 
controls the technology’s use.  What is facial recognition technology and why should we care 
about it? Consider the following two scenarios. First, Candice goes out for a night on the town 
with two friends to celebrate the end of a long week. The trio swing by a bar in town for a 
nightcap on their way home. Hank, a man sitting at the corner of the bar, decides that he is 
interested in Candice and wants to know more about her. When he notices she is in deep 
conversation with her friends, Hank covertly uses his cell phone to take a photograph of her. 
Hank then opens up an application on his phone and inputs his photograph of Candice. Within 
seconds, her face is scanned: Hank hits the jackpot. While Candice nurses her drink and talks 
with her friends, her face is matched with other photographs she has posted on social media sites, 
like Facebook, LinkedIn, and Instagram. Without leaving his seat at the bar, Hank now knows 
Candice’s name, where she works, who her friends are, and other information about her. 
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A second scenario involves Thomas. Thomas is a young student and activist living in a 
major metropolitan area. After the murder of an unarmed man by law enforcement, Thomas joins 
a large group of people peacefully protesting in the streets of their city. Thomas and others 
march through town, chanting for justice and wielding signs calling for systemic change. The 
marchers are eventually involved in a tense standoff with police. Nobody is hurt; the crowd is 
dispersed and sent home. Three days later, Thomas answers the door to find three police officers 
on his front porch. The officers say they want to “ask him some questions” about his 
involvement in the protests. To identify Thomas, an officer ran images from his body-worn 
camera through the department’s facial recognition algorithm, which flagged Thomas’s 
government-issued driver’s license photo as a likely match. The officer did not get a warrant to 
run an image of Thomas’s face through facial recognition technology. In fact, the officer’s use of 
the technology was completely off the books; in other words, it was unauthorized by the 
department and lacked any paper trail.1  
While both of these uses of facial recognition technology may seem troubling, they are 
legal in nearly every state. Without regulation, new developments in facial recognition 
technology make these sorts of uses more likely. In January 2020, the New York Times 
published a front-page article on a “secretive” new facial recognition application developed by 
the small company Clearview AI.2 The technology, which went “far beyond anything ever 
                                               
1 Cf. Craig McCarthy, Rogue NYPD Cops Are Using Facial Recognition App Clearview, N.Y. POST (Jan. 23, 2020), 
https://nypost.com/2020/01/23/rogue-nypd-cops-are-using-sketchy-facial-recognition-app-clearview/ (describing 
NYPD officers using Clearview AI’s facial recognition application on their personal cellphones without 
departmental oversight after the department allegedly decided not to use the application). 
2 See Kashmir Hill, The Secretive Company That Might End Privacy As We Know It, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/18/technology/clearview-privacy-facial-recognition.html. 
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constructed by the United States government or Silicon Valley giants,” was brilliantly simple.3 
While other facial recognition algorithms rely on government-sourced images like driver’s 
license photos to make up a facial recognition database, Clearview AI used more than three 
billion images “scraped” from public profiles on Facebook, YouTube, and other social media 
networks.4 As of August 2020, more than 2,400 law enforcement agencies use Clearview’s facial 
recognition application.5 Clearview now claims they only provide their application to law 
enforcement agencies.6 However, until Clearview changed its policy, private companies like 
Bank of America and Walmart and wealthy individuals previously had access to the facial 
recognition system, making a search like Hank’s closer to reality.7  
Developers and users of facial recognition technology have operated in something of a 
legal twilight zone. There is no comprehensive federal legislation dedicated to either limiting the 
use of facial recognition technology or protecting the data privacy of U.S. citizens. Instead, facial 
recognition use is governed by a patchwork of state and local legislation, allowing government 
                                               
3 See id. 
4 See id. 
5 See, e.g., Kashmir Hill, The Secretive Company That Might End Privacy as We Know It, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18, 
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/18/technology/clearview-privacy-facial-recognition.html (noting Indiana 
police were able to use an image of a gunman’s face to identify a perpetrator who had no driver’s license or criminal 
record “within 20 minutes”); Connie Fossi & Phil Prazan, Miami Police Used Facial Recognition Technology in 
Protester’s Arrest, NBC 6 SOUTH FLORIDA (Aug. 17, 2020), https://www.nbcmiami.com/investigations/miami-
police-used-facial-recognition-technology-in-protesters-arrest/2278848/; Elizabeth Lopatto, Clearview AI CEO Says 
‘Over 2,400 Police Agencies’ Are Using Its Facial Recognition Software, THE VERGE (Aug. 26, 2020), 
https://www.theverge.com/2020/8/26/21402978/clearview-ai-ceo-interview-2400-police-agencies-facial-
recognition.  
6 See Kashmir Hill, The Secretive Company That Might End Privacy as We Know It, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/18/technology/clearview-privacy-facial-recognition.html. 
7 See Nick Statt, Clearview AI to Stop Selling Controversial Facial Recognition App to Private Companies, THE 
VERGE (May 7, 2020), https://www.theverge.com/2020/5/7/21251387/clearview-ai-law-enforcement-police-facial-
recognition-illinois-privacy-law. 
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agencies and private companies to use facial recognition technology with few regulatory limits in 
almost every state. 
Despite a lack of federal regulation, public and industry pressure to regulate facial 
recognition technology is increasing. While the intrusive nature of facial recognition technology 
raises potential privacy concerns, the technology’s decreased accuracy when scanning non-male 
faces and faces of color has also made use of the technology unpopular with scholars and 
activists.8 In the aftermath of George Floyd’s murder and a national reckoning with systemic 
racism in law enforcement, the push for regulation grew stronger. After Floyd’s death in June of 
2020, IBM announced that they would no longer offer or develop facial recognition technology;9 
Amazon quickly followed by announcing a one-year moratorium on law enforcement use of their 
facial recognition software in hopes that the moratorium “might give Congress enough time to 
put in place appropriate rules” for the technology.10 A day later, Microsoft followed suit by 
refusing to sell facial recognition technology to law enforcement until a “national law . . . 
grounded in human rights” was in place to regulate the technology’s use.11 Industry lobbyists and 
                                               
8 See Joy Buolamwini, Gender Shades, MIT MEDIA LAB (2018), http://gendershades.org/ (finding that facial 
recognition algorithms perform better on male subjects with lighter skin); see also Short Waves, Why Tech 
Companies are Limiting Police Use of Facial Recognition, NPR, at 10:10 (June 23, 2020), 
https://www.npr.org/2020/06/22/881845711/tech-companies-are-limiting-police-use-of-facial-recognition-heres-
why (quoting AI policy analyst Mutale Nkonde calling for a ban on facial recognition technology due to algorithmic 
bias). 
9 See Nicolas Rivero, The Influential Project that Sparked the End of IBM’s Facial Recognition Program, QUARTZ 
(June 10, 2020), https://qz.com/1866848/why-ibm-abandoned-its-facial-recognition-program/. 
10 See Karen Weise & Natasha Singer, Amazon Pauses Police Use of Its Facial Recognition Software, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 10, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/10/technology/amazon-facial-recognition-backlash.html. 
11 See Jay Greene, Microsoft Won’t Sell Police Its Facial Recognition Technology, Following Similar Moves by 
Amazon and IBM, WASH. POST (June 11, 2020), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/06/11/microsoft-facial-recognition/. 
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civil society organizations have encouraged the Biden administration to take action.12 Despite 
these calls for regulation, no federal legislation on facial recognition technology has advanced 
past the committee stage.13  
Survey research also indicates that U.S. residents want the use of facial recognition 
technology to be regulated. A 2018 poll from the Brookings Institute found that 50% of 
respondents want limits on the use of facial recognition technology by law enforcement, with 
69% of respondents calling for some government regulation of facial recognition.14 These 
percentages were higher in younger respondents, who tend to report higher level of knowledge 
about facial recognition technology.15 While more than half of the respondents in a 2019 Pew 
poll reported that they trusted law enforcement agencies to use facial recognition technology 
responsibly, that percentage dropped to 36% for technology companies and 18% for advertisers, 
showing that U.S. residents are especially concerned about the use of facial recognition 
technology by private actors.16  
                                               
12 See Tom Simonite, Congress Is Eyeing Face Recognition, and Companies Want a Say, WIRED (Nov. 23, 2020), 
https://www.wired.com/story/congress-eyeing-face-recognition-companies-want-say/ (describing the “range of 
industries” lobbying in Washington, D.C. to influence potential regulation on facial recognition technology). 
13 See Khari Johnson, Congress Introduces Bill that Bans Facial Recognition Use by Federal Government, 
VENTUREBEAT (June 25, 2020), https://venturebeat.com/2020/06/25/congress-introduces-bill-that-bans-facial-
recognition-use-by-federal-government/ (describing a proposed moratorium on facial recognition technology that is 
currently languishing in committee in both the House and the Senate). 
14 See Darrell M. West, Brookings Survey Finds 50 Percent of People are Unfavorable to Facial Recognition 
Software in Retail Stores to Prevent Theft, BROOKINGS TECHTANK (Oct. 8, 2018), 
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2018/10/08/brookings-survey-finds-50-percent-of-people-are-
unfavorable-to-facial-recognition-software-in-retail-stores-to-prevent-theft/. 
15 See id.; see also Aaron Smith, More Than Half of U.S. Adults Trust Law Enforcement to Use Facial Recognition 
Responsibly, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Sept. 5, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2019/09/05/more-than-
half-of-u-s-adults-trust-law-enforcement-to-use-facial-recognition-responsibly/ (finding that younger Americans 
report a higher level of facial recognition technology awareness and knowledge). 
16 See Aaron Smith, More Than Half of U.S. Adults Trust Law Enforcement to Use Facial Recognition Responsibly, 
PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Sept. 5, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2019/09/05/more-than-half-of-u-s-
adults-trust-law-enforcement-to-use-facial-recognition-responsibly/. 
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The news coverage of Clearview AI’s facial recognition application led to significant 
public concern, with technology writers worrying that the app could “end anonymity.”17 Within a 
week after the New York Times article, the first of at least a dozen lawsuits against Clearview AI 
was filed in the Northern District of Illinois, alleging that the company’s facial recognition 
system used Illinois residents’ facial data without notice or consent in violation of the Illinois 
Biometric Information Privacy Act of 2008.18 In response, Clearview AI hired renowned free 
speech litigator Floyd Abrams, who argued that the company’s actions were protected by the 
First Amendment.19 Clearview AI’s First Amendment argument relies on the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s stated “rule” from the 2011 decision in Sorrell v. IMS Health20 that “information is 
speech.” If Clearview’s position is successful, that argument could have major implications for 
future attempts to regulate facial recognition technology by imposing First Amendment barriers.  
The purpose of this thesis is three-fold.  First, this thesis will identify the existing 
regulatory scheme governing the use of facial recognition technology. Second, this thesis will 
analyze the level of First Amendment protection given to “information” and whether that 
protection may apply to facial recognition technology.  And third, assuming arguendo the 
                                               
17 See, e.g., Jennifer Lynch, Clearview AI—Yet Another Example of Why We Need A Ban on Law Enforcement Use 
of Face Recognition Now, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Jan. 31, 2020), 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2020/01/clearview-ai-yet-another-example-why-we-need-ban-law-enforcement-use-
face; Blake Nelson, New Jersey Cops Told to Halt All Use of Controversial Facial-Recognition Technology, 
NJ.COM (Jan. 24, 2020), https://www.nj.com/news/2020/01/new-jersey-cops-told-to-halt-all-use-of-controversial-
facial-recognition-technology.html; Kashmir Hill, Unmasking a Company That Wants to Unmask Us All, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 20, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/20/reader-center/insider-clearview-ai.html. 
18 See Mutnick v. Clearview AI, Inc., Docket No. 1:20-cv-00512 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 22, 2020); see also Biometric 
Information Privacy Act, 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 14/5 (2008). 
19 See Kashmir Hill, Facial Recognition Start-Up Mounts a First Amendment Defense, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 11, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/11/technology/clearview-floyd-abrams.html. 
20 See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 570 (2011). 
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Supreme Court’s ruling in Sorrell is applicable, this thesis will examine whether the First 
Amendment represents a barrier to any regulatory aspect of facial recognition technology.  
Literature Review 
 
 This literature review starts by examining the judicial and scholarly tension between the 
“information is speech” rule from Sorrell v. IMS Health and longstanding conceptions of 
personal data as private information. The literature review will then discuss the relevance of 
facial recognition technology to these conceptions of privacy, before concluding with an 
examination of the current gap in regulation of facial recognition technology. 
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Section I. The Tension Between Information as Speech & Personal Data as Private 
Information 
 
Information as Speech  
 
Over the last quarter century, the definition of “speech” for First Amendment purposes 
has been examined by a judiciary grappling with rapid technological advances.21 In a 2011 case 
discussed further below, the Supreme Court stated in dicta that information is speech. This 
language from the Court implies that the collection and use of information may have speech 
implications, the regulation of which may be subject to First Amendment review.22 However, 
treating information as speech may limit federal and state attempts to protect individual privacy. 
If third-party collection and use of information is considered speech for First Amendment 
purposes, attempts to regulate that collection or use would likely be subject to more than rational 
basis judicial review. It is unclear whether courts would apply intermediate scrutiny of the 
Central Hudson commercial speech test23 or a stricter form of judicial scrutiny from Sorrell.24 
This tension between facial recognition technologists’ speech interests and citizen’s privacy 
interests is especially important as calls for data privacy legislation grow louder.25  
  
                                               
21 See, e.g., Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 552; Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 660-61 (2002) (upholding an injunction on 
the Child Online Protection Act because it likely violated the First Amendment); Elonis v. United States, 575 U.S. 
723, 739 (2015) (finding in a case involving Facebook posts that an individual’s state of mind must be considered 
when determining whether the posts were threats). 
22 See Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 570. 
23 See Cent. Hudson Gas and Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
24 See Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 577 (2011) (stating that the Court’s ruling in Sorrell would be the same whether a special 
commercial speech inquiry or a stricter form of judicial scrutiny is applied). 
25 See, e.g., Peter M. Lefkowitz, Why America Needs a Thoughtful Federal Privacy Law, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2019, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/25/opinion/congress-privacy-law.html; Jerry Jones, Let’s Close the Gap and 
Finally Pass A Federal Data Privacy Law, TECHCRUNCH, July 23, 2020, https://techcrunch.com/2020/07/23/lets-
close-the-gap-and-finally-pass-a-federal-data-privacy-law/.   
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Stating the Rule: Sorrell v. IMS Health 
 
In 2011, the Supreme Court heard a challenge to a Vermont law prohibiting pharmacies 
and other health-related entities from selling for marketing-related purposes information that 
reflected a physician’s prescription practices.26 The Court struck down the law in a 6-to-3 vote.  
In striking down the law, the Sorrell Court applied what it called “heightened” scrutiny, ruling 
that Vermont had imposed both a speaker-based and content-based “burden on protected 
expression.”27 The Court decided not to clarify whether it was applying the intermediate scrutiny 
typical in a commercial speech case or the stricter scrutiny applied to “pure speech,” noting that 
the result would be the same regardless of the level of scrutiny.28 Writing for the majority, 
Associate Justice Anthony Kennedy explained the statute’s prohibition on the use of prescriber-
identifying information for marketing was unconstitutional because it did not properly serve the 
state’s stated interests of (1) protecting physician privacy29 or (2) improving public health.30 
Two statements in dicta from Sorrell could have a major impact on future attempts to 
regulate the flow of information. First, Justice Kennedy suggested that prescriber-identifying 
information may have received more protection if the Court needed to address whether it was 
“pure speech” for First Amendment purposes, stating that Supreme Court precedent has 
established that “the creation and dissemination of information are speech within the meaning of 
                                               
26 See Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 558-59. 
27 See id. at 572. 
28 See id. at 571. 
29 See id. at 572 (noting that pharmacies were still permitted to share the information for any other reason). 
30 See id. at 577 (stating that the Vermont law was an “indirect means” of achieving the state’s alleged policy goals). 
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the First Amendment.”31 Second, since the case was not determined on purely speech grounds, 
the Court did not need to consider Vermont’s request for an “exception to the rule that 
information is speech.”32  
Defining Information and Data 
 
The proposition that “information is speech”33 raises an important question: what exactly 
is “information?” There is no universally accepted definition, but language from the paragraph in 
Sorrell where Justice Kennedy’s rule is originally stated may offer additional insight: “facts . . . 
are the beginning point for much of the speech that is most essential to advance human 
knowledge and to conduct human affairs.”34  This suggests that a majority of the court views 
“facts” as either synonymous with information or, at minimum, an important part of information 
for First Amendment purposes. The positioning of facts within “information as speech” also 
directly refutes arguments in Sorrell that factual information is a “mere commodity” with no 
entitlement to First Amendment protection.35 
Legal scholars have also interpreted the presence of facts as an integral part of 
information. Law professor Jane Bambauer adopts a broad definition of information as “any 
representation of a fact,” but emphasizes that requiring the presence of a fact actually serves as a 
significant constraint on the definition of information.36 Other scholars have argued that this 
                                               
31 See id. at 570. 
32 See id. 
33 See id. 
34 See id. 
35 See id. 
36 See Jane Bambauer, Is Data Speech?, 66 STAN. L. REV. 57, 65 (2014). 
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categorization of information as speech would likely extend First Amendment protection to 
“many areas of law . . . in which the government regulates the communication of facts in a 
content-discriminatory manner.”37 This interpretation suggests that regulations of factual 
information would be subject to intermediate or strict judicial scrutiny. 
In an era where data collected from online platform users are the “world’s most valuable 
resource,”38 how do data fit under the Court’s interpretation of information? The answer is not 
yet clear. Bambauer conceptualizes data as a “fixed record of a fact,” information that an 
individual caused to be “captured and recorded into a . . . man-made format.”39 Under this 
definition, data are a subset of information that ostensibly qualify for constitutional protection. 
At least one systems theorist also interprets data as fitting within information, defining data not 
only as “raw material” but as “adding value to information” by allowing it to be processed by a 
computer.40 
  
                                               
37 See Kyle Langvardt, The Doctrinal Toll of “Information as Speech,” 47 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 761, 766 (2016) 
(mentioning drug labeling, signage at petting zoos, and registration of securities as examples of these categories).  
38 See The World’s Most Valuable Resource Is No Longer Oil, But Data, THE ECONOMIST (May 6, 2017). 
https://www.economist.com/leaders/2017/05/06/the-worlds-most-valuable-resource-is-no-longer-oil-but-data.  
39 See Jane Bambauer, Is Data Speech?, 66 STAN. L. REV. 57, 65-66 (2014). 
40 See Ilkka Tuomi, Data Is More Than Knowledge: Applications of the Reversed Knowledge Hierarchy for 
Knowledge Management and Organizational Memory, HI. INT’L CONFERENCE ON SYS. SCI. (1999). 
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Scholars Grapple with the Rule (and Consequences) 
 
Scholars have differing interpretations of what the rule of “information is speech” means 
and protects.41 On the one hand, recent jurisprudential trends and explicit Supreme Court 
language seem to suggest there is a broad rule that information is speech.42 At least one scholar 
has classified the Court’s language and implication in Sorrell as “quite clear,” concluding that 
the Court would likely treat the disclosure of information not as unprotected conduct but as 
“speech” receiving full First Amendment protection.43 Rather than arguing that the Kennedy rule 
is non-binding or of limited effect, these scholars have suggested that the Supreme Court should 
affirmatively limit the rule through narrow interpretation.44 Since the plain language of the 
Court’s rule is definitive, these scholars are arguing that the Court should change the rule entirely 
or read it so narrowly as to omit “information” that seems to fall within the rule’s stated confines. 
                                               
41 Compare Kyle Langvardt, The Doctrinal Toll of “Information as Speech,” 47 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 761 (2016) 
(disagreeing with a broad interpretation of the rule on policy grounds while admitting courts have relied on that 
broad interpretation), with Neil Richards, Reconciling Data Privacy and the First Amendment, 52 UCLA L. REV. 
1149 (2005) (arguing that the presence of a commercial relationship should negate the treatment of data as speech 
for First Amendment purposes), and Jane Bambauer, Is Data Speech?, 66 STAN. L. REV. 57 (2014) (stating that data 
are clearly speech under the First Amendment). 
42 See, e.g., Ashutosh Bhagwat, Sorrell v. IMS Health: Details, Detailing, and the Death of Privacy, 36 VT. L. REV. 
855, 863-66 (2012); Kyle Langvardt, The Doctrinal Toll of “Information as Speech,” 47 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 761, 775-
76 (2016) (decrying the judicial consequences of the rule but acknowledging that lower courts have adopted it to the 
point that reversing course would be difficult). 
43 See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Sorrell v. IMS Health: Details, Detailing, and the Death of Privacy, 36 VT. L. REV. 855, 
860-65 (2012). 
44 See Kyle Langvardt, The Doctrinal Toll of “Information as Speech,” 47 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 761, 812 (2016) 
(arguing that the Supreme Court needs to create a “inhospitable environment” for future expansions of the rule by 
explicitly limiting First Amendment coverage in a “cursory and dismissive” matter; see also Ashutosh Bhagwat, 
Sorrell v. IMS Health: Details, Detailing, and the Death of Privacy, 36 VT. L. REV. 855, 874, 876-77 (2012) 
(suggesting a “measured approach” that would apply the rule to factual speech and data disclosure “only when the 
speech contributes meaningfully to the democratic process of self-governance”). 
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 Other academics have positioned some “information flows” outside the scope of speech 
protected by the First Amendment.45 Law professor Neil Richards argues that data flows 
resulting from a commercial relationship should be deemed outside the boundaries of First 
Amendment protection.46 This would mean that the Court’s positioning of information as speech 
receiving heightened judicial scrutiny would not extend to commercially-generated information, 
which would receive only rational basis review. Similarly, law and technology scholar Julie 
Cohen acknowledges the difficulty in classifying collection and use of personal data; she notes 
that “in the ways that matter,” data collection and use are not speech in a traditional First 
Amendment sense.47 Her rationale is predicated on the argument that regulations of data 
collection and use are not intended to impose a burden on “direct-to-consumer communication,” 
even if they may indirectly do so.48 
 Scholars have grappled with the scope of First Amendment protection for algorithms and 
their outputs, a category of information which would include facial recognition technology.49 In 
a whitepaper commissioned by Google, legal scholar Eugene Volokh and antitrust expert Donald 
Falk argue for First Amendment protection for search engine results regardless of whether the 
                                               
45 See Neil Richards, Reconciling Data Privacy and the First Amendment, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1149 (2005). 
46 See id. at 1169 (2005). 
47 See Julie Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1418 
(2000). 
48 See id. 
49 See, e.g., Eugene Volokh & Donald M. Falk, Google: First Amendment Protection for Search Engine Search 
Results, 8 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 883 (2012); Josh Blackman, What Happens If Data Is Speech?, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. 
L. HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY 25 (2014); Stuart Minor Benjamin, Algorithms and Speech, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1445 
(2013). 
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results were produced and presented by a human or by an algorithm.50 Though the selection, 
sorting, and presentation of Google’s search results are determined by an algorithm, Volokh and 
Falk claim Google’s algorithms “inherently incorporate the search engine company engineers’ 
judgments.”51 Other scholars have advanced similar arguments to suggest that algorithmically-
created data like facial recognition technology should receive First Amendment protection.52  
 The most direct scholarly argument that information is speech for purposes of the First 
Amendment comes from Bambauer, who states not only that data (and information) are speech 
under the First Amendment but also that data must receive First Amendment protection.53 
Bambauer rejects the “unexamined assumption” that the collection of data is not speech.54 
Though this broad interpretation would challenge much of U.S. privacy law, she argues data as 
speech corresponds with “longstanding social commitments to the free flow of information.”55 
Bambauer also advises against several potential differentiation points that could cabin First 
Amendment protection for data; she argues that both the limiting of First Amendment protection 
for “functional data” and the classification of mechanically-captured information as “non-
                                               
50 Eugene Volokh & Donald M. Falk, Google: First Amendment Protection for Search Engine Search Results, 8 J.L. 
ECON. & POL’Y 883, 883-84 (2012). 
51 See id. at 884. 
52 See Stuart Minor Benjamin, Algorithms and Speech, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1445, 1464-65 (2013) (depicting search 
engine algorithms through the metaphor of a bulletin board and asserting that both would likely be considered 
speech for First Amendment purposes since they communicate a “substantive message” to viewers, which he frames 
broadly to go beyond speakers with a particular point of view). 
53 See Jane Bambauer, Is Data Speech?, 66 STAN. L. REV. 57, 57 (2014). 
54 See id. 
55 See id. at 62. 
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expressive content” creates “unworkable” distinctions when facing heightened judicial 
scrutiny.56  
 Though the Supreme Court’s decision in Sorrell explicitly states that information is 
speech, scholars continue to struggle with defining “information” and drawing the line of First 
Amendment protection.57 Some scholars have argued that information should be treated as 
speech, while others have expressed hesitation or concern that a broad interpretation may 
threaten societal interests in privacy. These privacy issues are discussed in the next section, 
which examines (1) judicial, (2) administrative and legislative, and (3) scholarly conceptions of 
individual privacy. 
Personal Data as Private Information 
 
Judicial Recognition of an Individual Right to Privacy 
 
While courts have taken a broad view of the Sorrell “information is speech” principle,58 
the idea of a potential First Amendment interest for those collecting and using other people’s 
information comes into conflict with scholarly and public conceptions of individual privacy—in 
both a civil and criminal context. There is no explicit constitutional right to privacy; the word 
“privacy” is not mentioned in the Constitution or the Bill of Rights. However, the Supreme Court 
has found within the penumbras of the Constitution rights of individual privacy that protect from 
intrusions by the government. 
                                               
56 See id. at 83-86. 
57 See, e.g., Ashutosh Bhagwat, Sorrell v. IMS Health: Details, Detailing, and the Death of Privacy, 36 VT. L. REV. 
855, 860-65 (2012); Kyle Langvardt, The Doctrinal Toll of “Information as Speech,” 47 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 761, 812 
(2016); Julie Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 
1418 (2000); Jane Bambauer, Is Data Speech?, 66 STAN. L. REV. 57, 57 (2014). 
58 See cases cited infra notes 419-434 in Chapter 3 (finding that lower courts have granted First Amendment 
protection to search engines and computer code and would likely grant First Amendment protection to automated 
license plate reading software). 
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One of the early judicial proponents of a constitutional right to privacy was Associate 
Justice Louis Brandeis. In his 1928 dissent in Olmstead, Brandeis argued against the 
admissibility of evidence illegally obtained through government wiretapping.59 According to 
Brandeis, the drafters of the Constitution conferred via the Fourth and Fifth Amendment a “right 
to be let alone—the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.”60 
The Court’s modern framework for analyzing government searches under the Fourth 
Amendment comes from Justice John Harlan’s concurrence in the 1967 case Katz v. United 
States .61 To trigger Fourth Amendment protection, an individual must show (1) “an actual 
(subjective) expectation of privacy” that (2) “society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.”62 
The Supreme Court and lower courts continues to examine most constitutional privacy issues 
through the “reasonable expectation of privacy” framework.63 
Two Supreme Court cases from the past decade suggest that technological progress may 
lead to a reinterpretation of the Katz privacy standard. While the majority decision in United 
States v. Jones (2012) found a Fourth Amendment violation based in large part on a common-
law trespass theory,64 Justice Sonia Sotomayor’s concurrence outlines the concern that 
“comprehensive” data tracking can reveal a “wealth of detail” about every aspect of an 
                                               
59 See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 471 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see also Samuel D. Warren & 
Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890) (shaping the development of modern privacy 
law). 
60 See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
61 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
62 See id. at 460 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
63 See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012); Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). 
64 See Jones, 565 U.S. at 406 (“As explained, for most of our history the Fourth Amendment was understood to 
embody a particular concern for government trespass upon the areas (‘persons, houses, papers, and effects’) it 
enumerates. Katz did not repudiate that understanding.”). 
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individual’s life.65 The Court’s decision in Carpenter v. United States (2018) found that an 
individual has a “legitimate expectation of privacy in the record of his physical movements.”66 
The majority also stated that an individual may have protection for “what [he] seeks to preserve 
as private” even if it is in an area accessible to the public.67 Though the Court insisted that this 
expansion of Katz is “narrow” and specifically applicable to CSLI (location data collected by 
cellphone towers), at least one federal district court has attempted to expand Carpenter’s 
reasoning to images captured by surveillance cameras.68  
The Supreme Court’s privacy jurisprudence is not limited to Fourth Amendment searches 
by the government. The Court has used other constitutional provisions to embrace a limited right 
to individual privacy. In Griswold v. Connecticut (1968), the Court recognized several “zones of 
privacy” created by “penumbras” from the guarantees in the Bill of Rights.69 Subsequent Court 
decisions have further expanded the “right to privacy” using multiple constitutional 
justifications, including the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments.70 Though a right to privacy 
                                               
65 See id. at 413 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
66 See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018). 
67 See id. 
68 See United States v. Moore-Bush, 381 F. Supp. 3d 139, 145 (D. Mass. 2019), as amended (June 4, 2019), rev’d 
and remanded, 963 F.3d 29 (1st Cir. 2020) (“The Court, however, does not ground its decision on Carpenter’s 
holding but instead on its necessary reasoning; that is, a person does have some objectively reasonable expectations 
of privacy when in spaces visible to the public.”). 
69 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (citing the First Amendment’s right to association, the 
Third Amendment’s prohibition against the quartering of soldiers, the Fourth Amendment’s right to be secure 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, the Fifth Amendment’s right against self-incrimination, and the Ninth 
Amendment’s recognition of non-enumerated rights). 
70 See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (finding that the “right of privacy” first articulated in 
Griswold allows any individual to live “free from unwarranted governmental intrusion” into fundamental matters 
like pregnancy and childbirth); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (establishing a First Amendment right to 
privacy against criminal punishment when possessing or consuming obscene material in one’s own home); Roe v. 
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (acknowledging that the Constitution does not mention an explicit right to privacy 
but reading the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of “personal liberty” as sufficient to protect a woman’s decision 
to get an abortion); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564 (2003) (extending the Fourteenth Amendment protection 
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is not explicitly stated in the Constitution, these decisions show that the Supreme Court has still 
been willing to recognize that right in several different contexts. However, this jurisprudence 
also suggests that these constitutional protections may not protect against many uses of facial 
recognition technology.71  
The judiciary is not the only branch of the federal government that has acknowledged and 
sought to protect a right to individual privacy. The next session will identify federal 
administrative and legislative protections for data privacy. 
Data Protection Laws  
 
While the Supreme Court has used the Constitution to recognize certain privacy rights, 
the United States has also created a limited regulatory framework for civil protection of data 
privacy. The Fair Information Practices (FIPs) first proposed by the U.S. Department of Health, 
Education & Welfare in 1973 have created a “universal privacy touchstone” that conceptualizes 
privacy as control over personal information.72 Though there is no universal data privacy 
regulation in the U.S., there are several sector-specific privacy statutes; most of these statutes are 
based on the principles of notice, consent, access, and reliability outlined in the FIPs.73  These 
                                               
of privacy to individuals engaging in same-sex relationships); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598 (1977) 
(characterizing the constitutionally protected “zone of privacy” as having two distinct dimensions: a person’s 
interest in “avoiding disclosure of personal matters” and, separately, a person’s interest in independent decision-
making). 
71 See Jones, 565 U.S. at 400; Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2206; see also Sharon Nakar & Dov Greenbaum, Now You 
See Me. Now You Still Do: Facial Recognition Technology and the Growing Lack of Privacy, 23 B.U. J. SCI. & 
TECH. L. 88, 104 (2017) (citing Katz and Ciraolo to suggest the Court’s interpretation of a lack of Fourth 
Amendment privacy in public). 
72 See Woodrow Hartzog, The Inadequate, Invaluable Fair Information Practices, 76 MD. L. REV. 952, 959 (2017). 
73 See Suzanne M. Thompson, The Digital Explosion Comes with A Cost: The Loss of Privacy, 4 J. TECH. L. & 
POL’Y 3, 33 (1999) (“Since the development of the Code of Fair Information Practices, much of the subsequent 
privacy legislation enacted has been greatly influenced by these standards.”). 
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sectoral privacy statutes provide protection in areas including health care,74 credit reporting,75 
child privacy,76 and education.77 
The Fair Information Practices have had a far greater effect outside the United States, 
forming the foundation of key international privacy laws like the European Union’s 2018 
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).78 Conversely, other than the sectoral laws 
mentioned above, federal privacy law provides limited protection for individuals in private life.79 
As long as a company is not engaging in “unfair or deceptive acts or practices” under § 5(a) of 
the FTC Act,80 they need only comply with a “notice and choice” system. This minimal 
protection has been criticized as inadequate by privacy scholars.81 The next section summarizes 
key scholarly critics of this federal privacy landscape. 
  
                                               
74 See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), Pub. L. No. 104–191 (1996) (codified in 
scattered sections of 29 and 42 U.S.C.). 
75 See Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681 et seq. 
76 See Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501 et seq. 
77 See Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1232(g). 
78 The GDPR’s comprehensive privacy protections have shaped global privacy practices since the regulation’s 
passage. See Woodrow Hartzog & Neil Richards, Privacy’s Constitutional Moment and the Limits of Data 
Protection, 61 B.C. L. REV. 1687, 1705 (2020). 
79 See id. at 1719. 
80 See Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a). 
81 See Woodrow Hartzog & Neil Richards, Privacy’s Constitutional Moment and the Limits of Data Protection, 61 




Conceptualizing Privacy and Personal Information 
 
Privacy is a “diverse and squishy” concept, as scholars have noted. 82   Privacy is 
inherently contextual and culturally dependent, which makes it difficult to develop a common 
meaning. Cohen argues that the problem of theorizing privacy is two-fold: (1) an inadequate 
conceptual vocabulary, which fails to develop a universal meaning of privacy and relies on 
justifications that often contradict themselves;83 and (2) an inadequate institutional grammar, 
which relies on “grand, inspiring, and difficult to dispute but also operationally meaningless” 
formulations of privacy.84 The perception of privacy as “antiquated and socially retrograde” in 
certain corners of society has also made it more difficult to build a consensus for privacy 
protection and regulation.85 Some academics have conceptualized the individual’s right to 
privacy through the information they create and possess without fear of collection.86 This means 
that a crucial part of individual autonomy is derived through control of personal information.87  
On the other hand, other scholars have suggested that an individual-based conception of privacy 
                                               
82 See Woodrow Hartzog, The Inadequate, Invaluable Fair Information Practices, 76 MD. L. REV. 952, 958 (2017). 
83 Julie E. Cohen, Turning Privacy Inside Out, 20 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 1, 3 (2019). 
84 See id. at 6. 
85 See Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy Is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1905 (2013). 
86 See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling Implications of a Right to 
Stop People from Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1050 (2000) (suggesting that a crucial part of the 
right to privacy is an individual’s right to control communication of personally identifiable information about 
themselves); Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy Is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1906 (2013) (writing that freedom from 
surveillance, either by government or private actor, is “foundational to the practice of informed and reflective 
citizenship”). 
87 See id. 
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is rife with potential problems, like a lack of perspective for the role information privacy plays in 
larger societal functions and interactions.88  
Despite a general lack of privacy-focused regulation, the concepts and laws that do form 
the U.S. regulatory scheme generally view privacy as an individual idea, relying heavily on 
autonomy and consent. While the FIPs are designed to be efficient, universally accepted 
guidelines that create a common conception of privacy, their emphasis on notice and choice may 
create “formalistic exercises” designed to manufacture user consent and insulate platforms and 
corporations from the “risk of loss” for data misuse.89 Reliance on the FIPs also places most 
privacy regulation under the realm of “privacy self-management,” which privacy scholar Daniel 
Solove argues overstates the actual autonomy (both real and perceived) that individuals have to 
manage their data.90 The next section will discuss the privacy concerns around biometric data, a 
subset of personal information derived from an individual’s own body. 
Biometric Data and Private Information 
 
One form of personal information that triggers potential privacy concerns is biometric 
information. Biometric information is the collection of an individual’s biometric identifiers, 
                                               
88 See, e.g., James P. Nehf, Recognizing the Societal Value in Information Privacy, 78 WASH. L. REV. 1, 4 (2003) 
(arguing that the conception of privacy as an individual issue based solely on autonomy ignores the societal value 
information privacy can offer); Daniel J. Solove, Identity Theft, Privacy, and the Architecture of Vulnerability, 54 
HASTINGS L.J. 1227, 1228 (2003) (suggesting that many of the privacy issues caused by advances in technology 
“cannot adequately be remedied by individual rights and remedies alone” and instead proposing an “architectural” 
conceptualization to show that what may appear to be a discrete privacy problem should instead be understood as 
“part of a larger social and legal structure”). 
89 See Woodrow Hartzog, The Inadequate, Invaluable Fair Information Practices, 76 MD. L. REV. 952, 964 (2017). 
90 See Daniel J. Solove, Introduction: Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma, 126 HARV. L. REV. 
1879, 1881 (2013). 
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which come from a person’s physical characteristics.91 Biometric identification long relied on 
either statistical measurements like height and weight or distinctive features like scars, tattoos, 
eye color and skin color.92 However, present-day biometrics technology can process multiple 
individualized data points, creating the potential for increased accuracy in identification or 
verification by lessening the chances of multiple people sharing the same characteristics.93 
 A major part of the appeal of biometric technologies is their perceived reliability. While 
falsifying personal information is relatively easy, it is more difficult for a person to fabricate a 
physical characteristic in a way that would fool an automated system.94 Biometrics are also 
efficient. Their use for identification or authentication purposes can speed up otherwise tedious 
processes on both sides.  Despite these benefits, biometric privacy issues have emerged as the 





                                               
91 See John D. Woodward, Biometric Scanning, Law & Policy: Identifying the Concerns-Drafting the Biometric 
Blueprint, 59 U. PITT. L. REV. 97, 98 (1997) (giving examples of biometric identifiers as facial features, features of 
the eye, (including retina and iris), fingerprints, or hand and face geometry). 
92 See Renu Bhatia, Biometrics and Face Recognition Techniques, 3(5) INT’L J. ADVANCED RESEARCH IN COMP. SCI. 
AND SOFTWARE ENGINEERING 93, 93 (2013). 
93 See id. 
94 See Lucas Introna & Helen Nissenbaum, Facial Recognition Technology: A Survey of Policy and Implementation 
Issues, CTR. FOR CATASTROPHE PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE AT N.Y.U. 1, 9 (2009). 
95 See Matthew B. Kugler, From Identification to Identity Theft: Public Perceptions of Biometric Privacy Harms, 10 
UC IRVINE L. REV. 107, 108 (2019). 
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Section II. Why Facial Recognition Matters 
 
How Facial Recognition Works 
 
Despite the availability of other biometric technologies, facial recognition technology has 
emerged as a desirable tool due to two key features. First, facial recognition can be used to scan a 
target from a distance with a relatively high degree of accuracy.96  Second, the technology may 
be used passively, without knowledge or consent of the subject.97 This is desirable because it 
allows the user of the technology to learn information about the subject without the subject 
realizing that they are being analyzed, which is useful in both a criminal and commercial context. 
Facial recognition is employed in two different ways: the first is verification, called a 
“one-to-one” match, and the second is identification, also known as a “one-to many” match. 98 In 
both methods, the first step is the capture of a face image (known as a “probe image”).99 This 
probe image is acquired by using (1) an existing image collected from a stored photograph or 
still image from a video feed or (2) using a video feed to collect a live image (known as “real-
time” facial recognition).100 The probe image is then analyzed using spatial geometry to create a 
biometric “template,” a mathematical representation of a face’s biometric characteristics which 
can be evaluated against another image.101  
                                               
96 See id. at 129. 
97 See id. 
98 See Renu Bhatia, Biometrics and Face Recognition Techniques, 3(5) INT’L J. ADVANCED RESEARCH IN COMP. SCI. 
AND SOFTWARE ENGINEERING 93, 97 (2013). 
99 See Lucas Introna & Helen Nissenbaum, Facial Recognition Technology: A Survey of Policy and Implementation 
Issues, CTR. FOR CATASTROPHE PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE AT N.Y.U.  1, 11 (2009). 
100 See John D. Woodward., Jr., Biometrics: A Look at Facial Recognition, RAND PUBLIC SAFETY AND JUSTICE 1, 8 
(2003). 
101 See Lucas Introna & Helen Nissenbaum, Facial Recognition Technology: A Survey of Policy and Implementation 
Issues, CTR. FOR CATASTROPHE PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE AT N.Y.U.  1, 11 (2009). 
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From this point, facial recognition technology uses diverge in two categories: verification 
and identification. Verification is used to confirm that an individual is who they claim to be,  and 
it is the simplest task for facial recognition technology systems.102 For verification, the biometric 
template collected by the facial recognition software is compared against a single image in what 
is called a “one-to one” match.103 This image lies within a larger database, but the image is 
filtered by an attributed identifier such as a drivers’ license number or name to ensure only one 
attempted match.104 On the other hand, the more complex and technologically demanding use of 
facial recognition technology is identification, which is used to ascertain, rather than confirm, an 
individual’s identity.105 For identification, the biometric template collected by the facial 
recognition software is compared against an entire database or “gallery” of images in what is 
called a “one-to-many” match.106 While both uses raise potential problems, the use of facial 
recognition technology for identification purposes is problematic, as a larger database of face 
images opens the door to additional concerns about accuracy and data security. The next section 
will explain how facial recognition technology is used by both government and private actors. 
  
                                               
102 See Renu Bhatia, Biometrics and Face Recognition Techniques, 3(5) INT’L J. ADVANCED RESEARCH IN COMP. 
SCI. AND SOFTWARE ENGINEERING 93, 97 (2013). 
103 See id. 
104 See John D. Woodward., Jr., Biometrics: A Look at Facial Recognition, RAND PUBLIC SAFETY AND JUSTICE 1, 9 
(2003). 
105 See id. at 8. 
106 See Renu Bhatia, Biometrics and Face Recognition Techniques, 3(5) INT’L J. ADVANCED RESEARCH IN COMP. 
SCI. AND SOFTWARE ENGINEERING 93, 97 (2013). 
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Use of Facial Recognition Technology 
 
Federal Government Use 
 
Federal agencies use facial recognition technology without significant regulatory 
constraints. The most publicly visible federal use of facial recognition is by Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP) and the Transportation Safety Administration (TSA), who have jointly 
unveiled their “Biometric Entry-Exit” program in at least twenty airports and ports throughout 
the United States.107 The program has reduced wait times for international air travelers, saving as 
much as 10 minutes during the check-in process.108 Both agencies have indicated an intention to 
further expand their use of facial recognition despite questionable statutory authority109 and 
“inconsistent” privacy practices.110 
                                               
107 See Biometric Exit Frequently Asked Questions, Customs and Border Protection (2020), 
https://www.cbp.gov/travel/biometrics/biometric-exit-faqs. 
108 See Linchi Kwok, Will Convenience Outweigh Privacy When It Comes to Using Facial Recognition in Public?, 
MULTIBRIEFS (Nov. 5, 2019), http://exclusive.multibriefs.com/content/will-convenience-outweigh-privacy-when-it-
comes-to-using-facial-recognition/marketing (noting that the use of facial recognition in an Atlanta airport terminal 
saved passengers an average of nine minutes during boarding); see also Jason Kelley, Skip the Surveillance by 
Opting Out of Face Recognition At Airports, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Apr. 24, 2019), 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2019/04/skip-surveillance-opting-out-face-recognition-airports (telling travelers to 
“be vigilant,” as signage that is supposed to clearly articulate an opt-out alternative is often either missing entirely or 
displayed inconspicuously so travelers may miss it). 
109 See, e.g., Davey Alba, These Senators Want Homeland Security To “Pause” Its Airport Facial Recognition 
Program, BUZZFEED NEWS (Mar. 12, 2019), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/daveyalba/these-senators-want-
homeland-security-to-pause-its-facial (writing that TSA released a “Biometrics Roadmap” in 2018 which indicated 
an intention to use facial recognition to verify passengers on domestic flights despite statutory authority only 
seeming to allow the use of biometrics on foreign flights); Jack Corrigan, CBP Plans to Use Facial Recognition For 
‘All Passenger Applications’, NEXTGOV (Aug. 9, 2019), https://www.nextgov.com/emerging-tech/2019/08/cbp-
plans-use-facial-recognition-all-passenger-applications/159086/ (finding that CBP contracts indicate a plan to 
eventually use facial recognition to identify all persons at every land, air, and sea border crossing). 
110 See Kyle Wiggers, GAO Audit Finds Pervasive Problems With U.S. Airport Facial Recognition Program, THE 
MACHINE (September 3, 2020), https://venturebeat.com/2020/09/03/gao-audit-finds-pervasive-problems-with-u-s-
airport-facial-recognition-program/ (reporting that a recent Government Accountability Office report found that 
CBP and TSA failed to “consistently provide[] information to passengers” explaining how the program worked and 
enabling passengers to opt out). 
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The FBI has used facial recognition technology as part of a collection of databases that 
can be accessed in the “hunt for suspected criminals.”111 The images used as part of the FBI’s 
databases are combined with fingerprint data and biographical information from different FBI 
databases and to create detailed profiles of millions of U.S. citizens.112 The FBI’s facial 
recognition search capacity has access to “local, state and federal databases” containing more 
than 641 million face images.113 However, the FBI’s use of facial recognition may raise potential 
due process concerns.114 The ACLU has noted that FBI use of their facial recognition database 
does not require a warrant, probable cause, or even reasonable suspicion.115 In addition, the 
agency has refused to confirm that they always provide notice to criminal defendants that they 
have been matched (or not matched) via facial recognition technology.116 
State/Local Government Use 
 
Police departments in cities throughout the United States have also implemented facial 
recognition technology, though, as discussed below, many departments have been criticized for a 
                                               
111 See Olivia Solon, Facial Recognition Database Used by FBI Is Out of Control, House Committee Hears, THE 
GUARDIAN (Mar. 27, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/mar/27/us-facial-recognition-database-
fbi-drivers-licenses-passports. 
112 See FBI Using More Facial Recognition Technology to Fight Crime, SECURITY MAGAZINE (June 6, 2019), 
https://www.securitymagazine.com/articles/90332-fbi-using-more-facial-recognition-to-fight-crime. 
113 See Drew Harwell, FBI, ICE Find State Driver’s License Photos Are a Gold Mine for Facial-Recognition 
Searches, WASH. POST (July 7, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/07/07/fbi-ice-find-state-
drivers-license-photos-are-gold-mine-facial-recognition-searches/ (noting that the FBI has gained access to DMV 
databases in 21 states through agreements with a single unelected state official that are “often done in the shadows 
with no consent”). 
114 See Neema Singh Guliani, The FBI Has Access to Over 640 Million Photos of Us Through Its Facial Recognition 
Database, ACLU (June 7, 2019), https://www.aclu.org/blog/privacy-technology/surveillance-technologies/fbi-has-
access-over-640-million-photos-us-through. 
115 See id. 
116 See id. 
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lack of public transparency.117 The New York Police Department fought a series of lawsuits for 
more than three years that would force them to reveal how they use the technology; after the 
NYPD accidentally turned over 20 pages of confidential information on facial recognition 
technology use to the Georgetown Center on Privacy and Technology, they successfully obtained 
an injunction preventing the Center from revealing the information in the documents.118 The 
NYPD released a brief facial recognition use policy only after they were revealed as the single 
largest client of Clearview AI’s facial recognition application.119  
 Other police departments have expanded their use of facial recognition technology 
beyond the scope of use for federal agencies.120 Departments have also partnered with private 
companies to expand police surveillance networks. Ring, an Amazon-owned company that sells 
doorbell video cameras, has agreements with more than 400 police departments around the 
country allowing officers to request footage collected by cameras within a specific time and 
                                               
117 See, e.g., Ethan Geringer-Sameth, The NYPD’s Facial Recognition Policy Leaves a Lot of Leeway the 
Department Says It’s Not Using, GOTHAM GAZETTE (July 22, 2020), https://www.gothamgazette.com/city/9608-
nypd-facial-recognition-policy-leeway-department-not-using-black-lives-matter-protests; Erin Einhorn, A Fight 
Over Facial Recognition is Dividing Detroit – With High Stakes For Police and Privacy, NBC NEWS (Aug. 22, 
2019), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/fight-over-facial-recognition-dividing-detroit-high-stakes-police-
privacy-n1045046. 
118 See Neema Singh Guliani, The FBI Has Access to Over 640 Million Photos of Us Through Its Facial Recognition 
Database, ACLU (June 7, 2019), https://www.aclu.org/blog/privacy-technology/surveillance-technologies/fbi-has-
access-over-640-million-photos-us-through. 
119 See Ethan Geringer-Sameth, The NYPD’s Facial Recognition Policy Leaves a Lot of Leeway the Department 
Says It’s Not Using, GOTHAM GAZETTE (July 22, 2020), https://www.gothamgazette.com/city/9608-nypd-facial-
recognition-policy-leeway-department-not-using-black-lives-matter-protests. 
120 See, e.g., Clare Garvie, Garbage In, Garbage Out: Face Recognition on Flawed Data, GEORGETOWN LAW 
CENTER ON PRIVACY & TECHNOLOGY (May 16, 2019), https://www.flawedfacedata.com/ (noting that the NYPD has 
used celebrity lookalikes and composite sketches as probe images despite user guides explicitly instructing police 
officers to use a photo of the suspect); Erin Einhorn, A Fight Over Facial Recognition is Dividing Detroit – With 
High Stakes For Police and Privacy, NBC NEWS (Aug. 22, 2019), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/fight-
over-facial-recognition-dividing-detroit-high-stakes-police-privacy-n1045046 (reporting that police departments in 
Chicago and Detroit have purchased technology allowing them to run facial recognition scans on surveillance 
camera feeds in real time). 
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area.121 Amazon has claimed that facial recognition features “are not in development or in use” 
in conjunction with the Ring cameras, but internal documents revealed Ring’s plans to use 
Amazon’s Rekognition facial recognition software with its camera network to create “AI-
enabled neighborhood watch lists” that automatically identify “suspicious” persons in a 
neighborhood.122  
 State and local police have also used facial recognition technology as an investigative 
tool in the aftermath of nationwide civil unrest following the murders of George Floyd and 
Breonna Taylor by law enforcement officers. After protests in late May, local police departments 
and the FBI asked the public to provide photographs and video footage for law enforcement to 
run through facial recognition systems.123 While some departments submitted images to the FBI 
to use their facial recognition database, other departments have signed their own contracts with 
facial recognition vendors.124  
Non-Government/Private Entity Use 
 
 Use of facial recognition technology is not limited to state and federal government 
agencies. Private use of facial recognition can take several different forms. Some corporations 
have used facial recognition technology in a law enforcement-adjacent fashion, scanning their 
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own workers as they enter the building to identify “high risk individuals.”125 Pop star Taylor 
Swift’s security team has used facial recognition at her concerts to identify potential stalkers,126 
and other celebrities have indicated that they use the technology to assist with security.127 
Companies have also used facial recognition technology for verification purposes.128 
Many smartphone owners use Apple’s FaceID to unlock their phones or authenticate purchases, 
while some laptops use facial recognition as a substitute for entering a password.129 Civic 
organizations have also used facial recognition technology for large gatherings,130 while other 
corporations have tried to use facial recognition technology in ways that may be more invasive 
of individual privacy.131  
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The Potential Harms from Facial Recognition Technology 
 
 The use of facial recognition technology for identification purposes raises privacy and 
security concerns. Though facial recognition technology offers benefits for both government 
agencies and businesses, it can also result in tangible harm to individuals and communities that 
may be exacerbated by unregulated expansion of use into other facets of private life. While 
issues with data security may result in an individual’s biometric information becoming available 
online, a use case like the one described in the introduction—involving Candice (the woman at 
the bar) and Hank (the man who uses facial recognition technology to identify her)—could 
endanger an individual’s safety. Facial recognition technology is increasingly used to make 
important decisions in criminal matters but also for other government programs like healthcare 
and welfare.132 However, issues of accuracy and bias mean that reliance on facial recognition 
technology may disproportionally harm those in marginalized communities who are less likely to 
be accurately identified by a facial recognition system.133 Even if individuals are given the option 
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to consent to use of facial recognition technology, at least two privacy scholars have argued that 
the harms of facial recognition are so great that the technology is “inconsentable.”134 
While a one-to-one match can be done locally without the use of an Internet-connected 
computer, accessing a database for one-to-many matches usually involves either downloading 
the database onto a local device (via Internet) or sending the probe image into the cloud to be 
matched against the database. The technology used for one-to-many matching may be 
susceptible to hackers, foreign governments, and other potentially bad actors. Databases of 
identifying information maintained by the federal government have proven susceptible to 
hacking, leading to the availability of biometric information on the Dark Web.135 Private facial 
recognition technology providers are also vulnerable, with Clearview AI reporting a data breach 
in April 2020 that revealed the company’s client list and source code.136 These hacks could lead 
to an easily available way to identify members of the public without their knowledge or consent. 
Though photographs of individuals are readily available online, the illicit collection of biometric 
information allows hackers to subsequently duplicate that information and hack into devices or 
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accounts that rely on facial recognition technology for authentication purposes.137 Unlike a 
traditional password, the immutability of biometric information means that the information can 
never be changed, leading to the perpetual risk of identity theft.138 
Facial recognition technology has also shown race and gender-based bias. While facial 
recognition technology identifies white men with an accuracy rate that can be as high as 99%, 
the accuracy rate for people of color (especially women of color) is much lower.139 Though the 
discrepancy in accuracy rates may be fixable with advances in technology, the lack of regulated 
minimum accuracy standards for facial recognition technology means truly equal accuracy may 
be a long way away. This discrepancy can be attributed to both the hardware and the software 
used for facial recognition analysis. 
Since facial recognition technology requires photographs of faces, any defects in camera 
lenses or other camera equipment can have a significant effect on accuracy rates. Facial 
recognition systems continue to rely on existing camera hardware to provide probe images, and 
unconscious biases based on a longstanding “international preference for lighter skin tones” 
mean that cameras continue to struggle to portray faces of color with the same clarity as white 
faces.140 Facial recognition technology is also reliant on algorithmic software that processes the 
biometric data of a probe image and attempts to match it with another image. While these 
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algorithms are regularly tested and improved, a lack of transparency in algorithmic development 
and testing may hide inherent biases within the software. 141 While this bias may not be 
intentional, it can affect the accuracy of facial recognition systems at multiple points in the 
algorithm development process.142  
 Disproportionate errors in accuracy can have real consequences. At least three Black men 
have been wrongly arrested due to an inaccurate facial recognition technology match.143 Civil 
society organizations have worked to emphasize the potential harm to marginalized individuals 
and groups. In their lawsuit against Clearview AI, the ACLU focuses explicitly on the harm 
facial recognition technology inflicts on “survivors of domestic violence and sexual assault, 
undocumented immigrants, communities of color, and members of other vulnerable 
communities.”144 Regulation of facial recognition technology could ameliorate these concerns by 
limiting use for certain decisions or by imposing minimum accuracy standards.145  
The mechanics behind facial recognition technology make it difficult for individuals 
scanned by the technology to consent to its use. Since facial recognition is reliant on a camera 
rather than a contact scanner, use of the technology can be “conducted at a distance” without the 
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knowledge or consent of the subject.146 Multiple prominent privacy scholars have rejected the 
idea that legitimate consent to the use of facial recognition technology is possible,147 while 
another has suggested this lack of consent justifies a complete ban on all uses of facial 
recognition technology.148 
Facial recognition technology has become an integral tool for both public and private 
actors. The technology can help police identify suspects and federal agents verify the credentials 
of travelers while also guiding companies in determining the shopping habits and attitudes of 
individual customers. Though facial recognition technology can lead to increased efficiency and 
an arguable increase in reliability over non-technological alternatives, there are also concerns 
about privacy, transparency, and accuracy, with few existing governmental protections to address 
those issues. 
Section III. Identifying the Regulatory Gap 
 
As public and private entities continue to expand their use of facial recognition 
technology, they encounter a patchwork scheme of regulation that provides minimal guidance. A 
lack of dedicated federal legislation targeting facial recognition technology has created a 
regulatory vacuum. Like with other types of data privacy, Congress has struggled to pass 
comprehensive legislation that would regulate the use of facial recognition technology by either 
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governments or private companies. Instead, any existing controls on facial recognition 
technology come from abroad or from U.S. state or local laws. 
The Supreme Court’s illegal search jurisprudence implies that the Fourth Amendment 
may not protect most uses of facial recognition technology. It remains unclear whether the 
Court’s holdings in Jones and Carpenter may broaden the previous understanding of the Fourth 
Amendment as providing limited protection in public.149 No cases have directly addressed the 
issue, and it is an open question whether an individual could successfully argue that they have 
both a subjectively and objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in their own face while in 
public.150 However, the increasing availability of facial recognition technology may suggest an 
impending lack of Fourth Amendment protection.151  
European Regulation  
  
In the absence of explicit federal regulatory guidance on issues of privacy and 
technology, Europe has played a major role in influencing the practices of tech companies. The 
European Union’s passage of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in 2018 instituted 
a privacy-oriented regulatory scheme “not only for the EU, but for the world,” shaping the global 
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conversation around data privacy and forcing U.S. companies to spend billions of dollars to 
comply with new requirements for data processing and security.152  
 In addition to general data privacy regulations, the EU has also specifically addressed 
potential regulatory solutions for facial recognition technology and other forms of artificial 
intelligence (AI).153 In a February 2020 white paper, the European Commission expressed an 
intention to develop a regulatory framework for AI by the end of the calendar year, identifying at 
least five regulatory key features that would create an “ecosystem of trust.”154 The European 
Commission has also considered a specific moratorium on use of facial recognition 
technology.155 
 While Europe has been at the forefront of global data privacy and AI regulation, privacy 
scholars and industry experts have raised concerns about allowing the EU to set the global course 
on privacy. The EU’s recognition of the “fundamental right” of privacy runs counter to the U.S. 
Constitution, which has no explicit right to privacy.156 More fundamentally, Whitman argues that 
the United States and European conceptions of privacy are two fundamentally different 
“cultures”; while the European idea of privacy is based on a right to “respect and personal 
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dignity,” privacy in the United States revolves around “liberty,” especially against “intrusions by 
the state.”157 With a lack of U.S. regulation controlling privacy, artificial intelligence, and facial 
recognition, the European alternative may emphasize aspects of privacy that are more 
characteristic of dignity than liberty. 
State and Local Governments 
 
 The EU’s GDPR is not the only non-federal force exerting regulatory pressure on the use 
of facial recognition technology in the United States. State and local governments have also 
passed regulations restricting or eliminating discrete uses of the technology. Though 
congressional Democrats and Republicans have both criticized facial recognition technology, the 
two sides have been unable to advance legislation beyond the committee state, making state and 
local regulation especially important.158 As discussed below, state and local regulations have 
attempted to fill the gap.  At the state level, regulations of facial recognition technology take two 
forms: (1) bills explicitly addressing facial recognition technology; and (2) bills regulating 
biometric privacy. At the local level, a handful of municipalities have banned use of facial 
recognition technology altogether or formed community review boards to monitor its use. 
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Facial Recognition Legislation 
 
After years of failed regulatory attempts, 2020 saw the first state law explicitly limiting 
use of facial recognition technology by government agencies.159 In March 2020, Washington 
Governor Jay Inslee signed S.B. 6280 into law, setting a July 1, 2021 date of implementation for 
the first state law explicitly targeting and entirely focused on facial recognition.160 The 
Washington law establishes several requirements for government agencies using or planning to 
use facial recognition technology. Before using facial recognition, the agency must develop an 
“accountability report,”161 along with a “clear” use and data management policy.162 The 
Washington law also includes several efforts to increase transparency,163 including two separate 
mandatory yearly reports.164 In addition, the law contains several explicit limitations on use of 
facial recognition technology.165  
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In October of 2020, Vermont passed a bill placing a moratorium on nearly every law 
enforcement use of facial recognition technology (a separate bill allows use of facial recognition 
in drones with a warrant).166 With the bill’s passage, Vermont became the first state to prohibit 
law enforcement use of facial recognition without exceptions for exigent circumstances or court 
orders.167 The bill also establishes a task force to recommend a statewide police for law 
enforcement acquisition and use of facial recognition technology.168 
On December 31, 2020, Massachusetts passed “An Act Relative to Justice, Equity and 
Accountability in Law Enforcement in the Commonwealth,” a broad bill focused on police 
reform.169 The bill was passed by the Massachusetts state legislature in early December with 
what have become the first state ban on all government use of facial recognition technology, but 
Governor Charlie Baker refused to sign the bill into law, arguing the bill “ignore[d] the important 
role [facial recognition] can play in solving crime.”170 After negotiations with the legislature, the 
enacted law limits law enforcement use of facial recognition technology by requiring the agency 
to submit a written request to the registrar of motor vehicles, department of state police or FBI to 
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perform a facial recognition search.171 Additionally, police can only use facial recognition 
technology with a court order signed by a judge or under exigent circumstances.172 
Though Washington, Massachusetts, and Vermont are the only states with legislation 
focused on all law enforcement use of facial recognition technology, other states have 
implemented bans, moratoriums, or other limitations on specific uses of facial recognition 
technology. New Hampshire and Oregon have passed a permanent ban on the use of facial 
recognition technology to analyze recordings collected by police body cameras,173 while 
California has imposed a three-year moratorium on the practice.174 At least one state has imposed 
a warrant requirement on law enforcement use of facial recognition technology in drones,175 
while Vermont has banned the warrantless law enforcement use of facial recognition technology 
on anything other than the “target” of the surveillance.176 
Biometric Privacy Legislation 
 
 Several states have regulated the use of biometric technology by private entities through 
biometric privacy legislation, either by implementing focused biometric privacy laws or by 
expanding existing data privacy legislation to include biometric data. The gold standard for 
biometric privacy protection is the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act of 2008 (BIPA), 
which at the time of its passage represented the first successful attempt by a state legislature to 
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provide protection for biometric data.177 BIPA offers protection for two types of data: “biometric 
identifiers”178 and “biometric information.”179 The protections offered by BIPA apply to any 
“private entity” but notably do not apply to Illinois state or local government agencies.180  
 Under BIPA, any private entity possessing either biometric identifiers or biometric 
information is required to have a written policy creating a “retention schedule,” which states  
how long the entity will retain any biometric data before permanent destruction.181 The private 
entity is required to comply with the established retention schedule unless they receive a warrant 
or subpoena.182 In addition, BIPA places firm limits on what private entities can do with 
biometric identifiers or biometric information in their possession,183 including a complete 
restriction on sales of biometric data.184  
BIPA also creates a private right of action, allowing “aggrieved” individuals to recover 
financial damages for each violation of the Act by a private entity.185 Claims under the private 
right of action rose significantly after a 2019 decision by the Illinois Supreme Court expanded 
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the eligibility of potential plaintiffs seeking to recover for a BIPA violation.186 This decision has 
“opened the door” for an increase in BIPA claims, many of which are class action suits.187 
Notably, a group of Facebook users living in Illinois brought a BIPA class action against the 
company in 2015, alleging Facebook’s short-lived “Tag Suggestions” feature violated the Act by 
enabling the platform to use facial recognition technology to suggest the identity of individuals 
in Facebook photos.188 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit found that Facebook’s use of facial 
recognition technology violated an individual’s “concrete interest” in privacy.189 After the 
Supreme Court denied certiorari, Facebook settled the lawsuit for $550 million, an amount that 
was increased to $650 million after a U.S. District Court judge said the settlement amount was 
too low.190 This “eye-popping” settlement has further magnified the initial increase in BIPA class 
action suits, making the law increasingly relevant.191 
Though the majority of biometric privacy litigation occurs under BIPA, two other states 
have also passed biometric privacy bills. Texas passed the Capture or Use of Biometric Identifier 
                                               
186 See Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entm’t Corp., 129 N.E.3d 1197, 1206 (Ill. 2019) (holding that, though plaintiff made 
no showing that any actual injury occurred as result of a theme park’s BIPA violation, the loss of the individual’s 
ability to maintain their biometric privacy is a “real and significant” injury sufficient to support a claim under 
BIPA). 
187 See Richard R. Winter, BIPA Update: Class Actions on the Rise in Illinois Courts, HOLLAND & KNIGHT (July 22, 
2019), https://www.hklaw.com/en/insights/publications/2019/07/bipa-update-class-actions-on-the-rise-in-illinois-
courts. 
188 See Patel v. Facebook, Inc., 932 F.3d 1264, 1268 (9th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 937 (2020). 
189 See id. 
190 See Katie Surma, Illinois Residents Can Now Apply for Up to $400 From Massive Facebook Privacy Settlement, 
CHI. TRIB. (Sept. 22, 2020), https://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-biz-facebook-settlement-privacy-illinois-
20200922-pjgcyodp4zfxha6bvluyndn6mm-story.html. 
191 See David Oberly, Impact of Facebook $650 Million Patel BIPA Settlement, BIOMETRIC UPDATE (Aug. 20, 
2020), https://www.biometricupdate.com/202008/impact-of-facebook-650-million-patel-bipa-settlement. 
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Act (CUBI) in 2009, one year after Illinois passed BIPA.192 Texas uses the same definition of 
“biometric identifier”; however, CUBI does not include any reference to “biometric 
information”193 and has other key differences from BIPA.194 In addition to being one of only two 
states with focused facial recognition legislation, Washington is the third and final state with a 
biometric privacy law.195 Washington’s law resembles CUBI,196 but with a significant difference: 
notice and consent are not required when the private entity is collecting biometric data for a 
“security purpose.”197 Though only three states have dedicated biometric privacy laws, a handful 
of states have instead included or added biometric data to the definition of personal information 
in data privacy or data breach legislation.198  
                                               
192 See Capture or Use of Biometric Identifier Act, TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 503.001(2009). 
193 See id. 
194 See, e.g., Capture or Use of Biometric Identifier Act, TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 503.001(b) (2009) (referring to 
the capture of biometric identifiers for a “commercial purpose”); Capture or Use of Biometric Identifier Act, TEX. 
BUS. & COM. CODE § 503.001(b)(2) (2009) (requiring notice and consent but not mandating that the consent be in 
the form of a written release); Capture or Use of Biometric Identifier Act, TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 503.001(c)(1) 
(2009) (allowing the sale of biometric data with consent); Capture or Use of Biometric Identifier Act, TEX. BUS. & 
COM. CODE § 503.001(d) (2009) (placing the Texas Attorney General in charge of bringing claims under the Act 
without a private right of action). 
195 See WASH. REV. CODE § 19.375.020 (2017) (prohibiting anyone from “enroll[ing] a biometric identifier in a 
database for a commercial purpose” without notice and consent). 
196 See id.  
197 See id. § 19.375.010(8) (2017) (“[T]he purpose of preventing shoplifting, fraud, or any other misappropriation or 
theft of a thing of value . . .  and other purposes in furtherance of protecting the security or integrity of software, 
accounts, applications, online services, or any person.”) 
198 See, e.g., California Consumer Privacy Act, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(b) (2018) (including an expansive 
definition of “biometric information” within the covered category of personal information, including any 
“physiological, biological, or behavioral characteristics . . . that can be used . . . to establish individual identity”); 
N.Y. GEN. BUS. §899-aa(1)(b)(5) (2020);  Kristine Argentine & Paul Yovanic Jr., The Growing Number of 
Biometric Privacy Laws and the Post-COVID Consumer Class Action Risks for Businesses, JD SUPRA (June 9, 
2020), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/the-growing-number-of-biometric-privacy-62648/ (noting statutory 
changes in Louisiana, Arkansas, and Oregon); David Oberly, Vermont Amends Data Breach Notification Law with 





One approach taken by some local governments has been a ban on the use of facial 
recognition technology. A handful of U.S. municipalities, including cities in California, like San 
Francisco and Oakland, and cities in Massachusetts, like Boston and Somerville, have passed 
ordinances banning the use of the technology by law enforcement and other government 
officials.199 In September 2020, Portland, Oregon became the first city to ban use of the 
technology by both the government and (in a separate ordinance scheduled to go into effect in 
2021) by private companies.200  
 Rather than ban the technology, approximately fifteen municipalities across the United 
States have passed Community Control Over Police Surveillance (CCOPS) ordinances through 
an ACLU-led initiative.201 These ordinances are designed to require transparency for police use 
of surveillance technologies like facial recognition technology. Each law requires community 
feedback, a privacy impact report, and a use policy before either new surveillance technology is 
purchased or the use of existing surveillance technology is expanded by a police department.202  
 Though a patchwork of state, local, and foreign laws exert some level of regulatory 
control over the use of facial recognition technology, there is no comprehensive federal law 
regulating use of the technology. Few states have passed laws explicitly focused towards facial 
                                               
199 See Kate Conger, Richard Fausset & Serge F. Kovaleski, San Francisco Bans Facial Recognition Technology, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 14, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/14/us/facial-recognition-ban-san-francisco.html. 
200 See Jay Peters, Portland Passes Strongest Facial Recognition Ban in the US, THE VERGE (Sept. 9, 2020), 
https://www.theverge.com/2020/9/9/21429960/portland-passes-strongest-facial-recognition-ban-us-public-private-
technology (noting that the dual-factor ban was implemented despite lobbying efforts from Amazon, who spent 
$24,000 trying to convince the city not to pass the ordinance). 
201 See Community Control Over Police Surveillance, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/issues/privacy-
technology/surveillance-technologies/community-control-over-police-surveillance. 
202 See Roshan Abraham, Inside the ACLU’s Nationwide Campaign to Curb Police Surveillance, THE VERGE (June 
14, 2017), https://www.theverge.com/2017/6/14/15795056/aclu-police-surveillance-curb-campaign-nationwide. 
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recognition technology, while approximately twenty-five municipalities scattered across the 
United States have ordinances that limit or ban the use of facial recognition technology by 
government agencies. With a continued lack of action from Congress—despite pressure from 
prominent companies, privacy scholars, and constituents—these state and local laws are the only 
barrier preventing unregulated nationwide use of facial recognition technology. If the First 
Amendment prevents states and municipalities from regulating the use of facial recognition 
technology, the consequences would be significant. 
Research Questions and Methodology 
 
This thesis will answer the following research questions: 
RQ 1: What are the different legislative approaches for regulating the use of facial 
recognition technology? 
 
RQ 2: Is the First Amendment protection given to collection and dissemination of publicly 
available information likely to apply to facial recognition technology? 
a. What legal analysis supports the proposition that use of facial recognition 
technology, which collects and disseminates publicly available information, is 
protected by the First Amendment? 
b. What legal analysis supports the proposition that use of facial recognition 
technology is not protected by the First Amendment? 
 
RQ 3: If First Amendment protection applies to facial recognition technology’s aggregation 
and dissemination of publicly available information, to what extent would different 
regulatory approaches survive constitutional review? 
 
The first research question will be answered by analyzing three sources of regulatory material. 
First, the thesis will evaluate enacted state legislation controlling the use of facial recognition 
technology. Second, the thesis will evaluate enacted local ordinances and regulations controlling 
the use of facial recognition technology. Lastly, the thesis will evaluate any pending legislation 
controlling the use of facial recognition technology that is currently active as of January 1, 2021 
in state legislatures or local municipal bodies. To find state-level legislation, the author will use 
the “Statutes and Legislation” category on Lexis+. After filtering for “bill text” as a subcategory,  
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the author will use the following search string to identify relevant bills: “facial recognition” or 
“facial template” or “facial recognition service” or “biometric data” or “automated analysis” or 
“automated analytics” or “face recognition” or “biometric surveillance” or “biometric 
surveillance system” or “biometric matching technology” or “face geometry” or “biometric 
identifier” or “biometric information” or “face pattern*” or “faceprint”. The author will identify 
local-level legislation through news articles, compilations by civil society organizations, and the 
Municode local ordinance database.203 Relevant bills will be evaluated in an author-created 
Excel database. Through preliminary analysis of the results, the author has identified five main 
categories of facial recognition technology regulation, each with their own subcategories: (1) 
Agents of Use; (2) Limitations on Use; (3) Accountability of Use; (4) Evaluation of Use; and (5) 
Enforcement of Permitted Use. 
CATEGORY WORKING DEFINITION EXAMPLES 
Agents of Use The parties using FRT who are 
targeted by the legislation 
“Private entities” (BIPA), state 
and local agencies (Wash. FRT) 
Limitations on Use Any explicitly stated restraint 
on the use of FRT 
Bans, moratoriums, sector-
specific restrictions (body 
cameras, drones), warrant reqs. 
Accountability of Use Measures designed to increase 
transparency of use 
Use reports/policies, data 
retention and security policies, 
audits, disclosure and notice 
provisions 
Evaluation of Use Measures designed to ensure the 
maximum accuracy in use 




Enforcement of Permitted Use Available remedies for 
statutorily improper use 
Administrative remedies 
(suppression of evidence), 
rights of action, damages  
 
                                               
203 See MUNICODE, www.municode.com (last visited Mar. 10, 2021). 
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The second research question will be analyzed using the “rule” that “information is 
speech” from Sorrell v. IMS Health, its progeny, and related scholarly analysis.  The final 
research question will be answered using the statutes, cases, and legal scholarship compiled in 
Chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis. 
Limitations 
 
 This thesis has three major limitations. First, there are no court decisions ruling explicitly 
on First Amendment challenges to the regulation of facial recognition technology. Second, this 
thesis focuses on Sorrell’s rule of “information is speech.” While scholars have generally 
accepted that the rule seems to exist, and lower courts have interpreted Sorrell’s rule as binding 
on their decision-making, the rule is technically in dicta. Third, the thesis will only examine 
pending legislation as of January 1, 2021. Considering the evolving nature of facial recognition 
technology both in public discourse and within legislative bodies, states and municipalities will 
likely continue to try to regulate facial recognition.  
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CHAPTER 2: THE STATE- AND LOCAL-LEVEL REGULATORY LANDSCAPE FOR 
FACIAL RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY 
 
Discussion of Method and General Information 
 
 In the absence of comprehensive federal legislation restricting the use of facial 
recognition technology, state statutes and local ordinances form the regulatory backbone that 
controls the technology’s use. Before analyzing any potential First Amendment barriers to the 
regulation of facial recognition technology, this thesis examines the different legislative 
approaches to regulating the use of facial recognition technology. These approaches are collected 
and categorized through three different sources of legislative material: (1) enacted state 
legislation controlling the use of facial recognition technology; (2) enacted local ordinances 
controlling the use of facial recognition technology; and (3) proposed state-level legislation 
controlling the use of facial recognition technology. Each of these sources of legislative material 
were evaluated using an Excel-based coding protocol developed by the author.204 
                                               
204 See Evan Ringel, Facial Recognition Technology Regulation Database (Jan. 21, 2021) (unpublished Excel 
spreadsheet) (on file with author). 
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 To collect state statutes, the author used the “Statutes and Legislation” category in the 
commercial database Lexis+. Both proposed and enacted statutes were identified using the 
following search string: “facial recognition” or “facial template” or “facial recognition service” 
or “facial recognition system” or “facial recognition technology” or “face surveillance” or “face 
surveillance system” or “biometric data” or “automated analysis” or “automated analytics” or 
“face recognition” or “biometric surveillance” or “biometric system” or “biometric technology” 
or “biometric security” or “face geometry” or “biometric identifier” or “biometric information” 
or “face pattern*” or “faceprint.”  
State bills from the 2020 calendar year were identified by using the Lexis+ “bill text” 
filter for each of the fifty states with a date filter from January 1, 2020 to December 31, 2020. 
This search method identified each applicable state bill which received some form of legislative 
action during the calendar year, including introduction, amendment, passage through a state 
Senate or House committee, passage through one or both houses of a state legislature, veto by a 
governor, and enactment of legislation. The final search of state bills from the 2020 legislative 
















session returned 579 results. After removing pre-filed bills (part of the 2021 legislative session) 
and duplicate bills without substantive differences (many bills appeared multiple times in the 
search results as they passed through each stage of the legislative process), the author collected a 
total of 292 unique results, including 290 proposed statutes, one executive order205, and one 
ballot initiative.206 No filter for relevance was used. Each statute that contained one of the search 
terms was coded and added to the database.  
The final count included bills at each stage of the legislative process, including forty-four 
enacted laws. 178 bills did not proceed beyond introduction, meaning that they died in a 
legislative committee and were not voted on by the state legislature.207 Twenty bills successfully 
passed through a legislative committee before being quashed by the full House or Senate, while 
an additional six bills were explicitly voted down. Twenty bills survived one chamber of the state 
legislature only to die in a committee of the second chamber, and ten bills failed after being 
amended by the second chamber.208 Seven bills were quashed after passing through both the first 
chamber and a committee of the second chamber, and five bills passed through both chambers 
but were not enacted due to either a governor’s veto or a pocket veto.209  
Enacted state statutes were identified using the “Public Laws/ALS” filter on Lexis+, with 
the final search returning 560 state statutes from as early as 1995;210 the search also included the 
                                               
205 See California Privacy Rights Act of 2020, V. 9, 2020 Leg. (Ca. 2020). 
206 See Governor’s Public Safety Reform Initiative, E.O. 34 (Vt. 2020). 
207 See Evan Ringel, Facial Recognition Technology Regulation Database (Jan. 21, 2021) (unpublished Excel 
spreadsheet) (on file with author). 
208 See id. 
209 See Act of Dec. 22, 2020, H.B. 4042, 2020 Leg. (Mich. 2020); Parent’s Accountability and Child Protection Act, 
A.B. 1138, 2020 Leg. (Ca. 2020); Genetic Information Privacy Act, S.B. 980, 2020 Leg. (Ca. 2020). 
210 See 1995 Conn. Acts. 95-194 (Reg. Sess.). 
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forty-four state statutes enacted during the 2020 legislative session. Unlike with the 2020 bills, 
the author used a relevance filter to limit the scope of results. In an effort to target the statutes 
most directly related to the wide-scale regulation of facial recognition technology, only statutes 
of general regulatory applicability were coded. Statutes that were sector-specific or that targeted 
a particular profession (e.g., student data privacy statutes or physician licensing statutes) were 
not included in the final count. After filtering, sixty-one state statutes were added to the database, 
meaning that a total of 106 enacted state statutes were coded.  
As discussed in Chapter 1, several municipalities have also passed local ordinances either 
limiting the use of facial recognition technology or banning the technology’s use entirely. 
However, there is no searchable compiled database of local ordinances. Instead, individual cities 
or towns may opt to publicly post their municipal code on Municode211 or on the town’s website. 
Accordingly, relevant local ordinances were identified using other online sources. Some 
ordinances were found through the website “Ban Facial Recognition,”212 a page operated by 
nonprofit advocacy group Fight for the Future with a map indicating cities that have passed 
ordinances restricting or banning facial recognition technology.213 The remaining ordinances 
were identified through CCOPS (Community Control Over Police surveillance), a partnership 
between the American Civil Liberties Union, the Center for Democracy and Technology, and 16 
other civil society organizations.214 CCOPS laws are designed to given the public a say in how 
                                               
211 Municode is an online database that houses local ordinances from over 4,000 municipalities. See MUNICODE, 
https://www.municode.com/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2021). 
212 See Fight for the Future, BAN FACIAL RECOGNITION, https://www.banfacialrecognition.com/ (last visited Jan. 27, 
2021). 
213 See id. 
214 See ACLU, COMMUNITY CONTROL OVER POLICE SURVEILLANCE, https://www.aclu.org/issues/privacy-
technology/surveillance-technologies/community-control-over-police-surveillance (last visited Jan. 27, 2021). 
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technology is used by local law enforcement. According to the CCOPS website, “[t]he effort’s 
principal objective is to pass CCOPS laws that ensure local residents, through their city council 
representatives, are empowered to decide if and how surveillance technologies are used – a goal 
it achieves by maximizing the public’s influence over those decisions.”215 Though CCOPS 
ordinances focus more broadly on police use of surveillance technology, including items like 
Stingrays (devices that mimic cell phone towers and intercept local phone traffic), they also 
include limits on facial recognition and biometric surveillance technology.216 The organization 
identified 19 municipalities that had passed CCOPS ordinances, and each corresponding 
ordinance was coded and added to the database.217 A total of twenty-five local ordinances were 
added, meaning the database contains a total of 376 coded state and local regulations, including 
130 enacted state and local regulations.218 
Terms and Definitions 
 
 When drafting and enacting statutes, state and local legislators used a wide variety of 
terms and definitions that may trigger regulation for facial recognition technology. To identify 
relevant search terms, the author started by using terms from a handful of prominent statutes 
explicitly focused on facial recognition technology or biometric data.219 The search was 
subsequently expanded to include additional terms as they appeared in relevant statutes, and each 
                                               
215 See id. 
216 See id. 
217 See id. 
218 See Evan Ringel, Facial Recognition Technology Regulation Database (Jan. 21, 2021) (unpublished Excel 
spreadsheet) (on file with author). 
219 See, e.g., Biometric Information Privacy Act, 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 14/5 (2008); Facial Recognition Act, 2020 
Wash. Adv. Leg. Serv. 257 (2020); Capture or Use of Biometric Identifier Act, TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 
503.001(2009); California Consumer Privacy Act, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(b) (2018). 
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statute was coded based on what term appeared. In addition, definitions were collected when 
provided by a statute.220  
The collection of terms and definitions showed several trends in facial recognition-
adjacent legislation. As discussed in Chapter 1, few states have passed legislation explicitly 
focused on facial recognition technology. Nearly one-quarter of the bills collected and coded 
mentioned the search term in a definition section but not in the actual body of the bill itself, 
suggesting that facial recognition or biometric data were relevant to the purpose of the bill but 
not the main focus.221 However, some states have regulated the collection or use of biometric 
data in a more indirect fashion. Scholars have reported an increase in the addition of biometric 
data to the definition of personal information in data privacy or data breach legislation,222 and 
this analysis shows similar results, with more than one-quarter of bills either containing 
“biometric information” or “biometric data” within a definition of “personal information” or 
directly editing the definition of personal information to include biometric data.223 This trend 
suggests that expanding existing laws to include protections for biometric data or limits on facial 
                                               
220 See Evan Ringel, Facial Recognition Technology Regulation Database (Jan. 21, 2021) (unpublished Excel 
spreadsheet) (on file with author). 
221 See id. 
222 See, e.g., California Consumer Privacy Act, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(b) (2018) (including an expansive 
definition of “biometric information” within the covered category of personal information, including any 
“physiological, biological, or behavioral characteristics . . . that can be used . . . to establish individual identity”); 
N.Y. GEN. BUS. §899-aa(1)(b)(5) (2020); Kristine Argentine & Paul Yovanic Jr., The Growing Number of Biometric 
Privacy Laws and the Post-COVID Consumer Class Action Risks for Businesses, JD SUPRA (June 9, 2020), 
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/the-growing-number-of-biometric-privacy-62648/ (noting statutory changes in 
Louisiana, Arkansas, and Oregon); David Oberly, Vermont Amends Data Breach Notification Law with Focus on 
Biometric Data Protection, JD SUPRA (July 29, 2020), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/vermont-amends-data-
breach-notification-91369/. 
223 See Evan Ringel, Facial Recognition Technology Regulation Database (Jan. 21, 2021) (unpublished Excel 
spreadsheet) (on file with author); see also 2019 Ark. Acts 1030 (revising the definition of “personal information” in 
the Personal Information Protection Act); Act of May 29, 2018, 2018 Colo. Sess. Laws. Ch. 266 (strengthening 
protections for consumer data privacy by including “biometric data” in definition of “personal information”). 
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recognition technology may be more politically palatable than a bill solely focused on facial 
recognition or biometric data privacy. 
Same Terms, Different Meanings 
 
Though the most commonly used term to refer to facial recognition technology was 
“facial recognition,” bills also contained “facial template,” “facial recognition service,” “facial 
recognition system,” “facial recognition technology,” and “face surveillance system.”224 Fewer 
than half of the bills using “facial recognition” included a definition for the term, suggesting that 
many legislative drafters felt the term was unambiguous. However, an examination of three 
enacted statutes from the past eighteen months shows that the definition of “facial recognition” 
can vary widely in focus and scope. This difference in scope may lead to a difference in First 
Amendment scrutiny, as Chapter 4 will discuss in more depth. New York Assembly Bill 6787 
was signed into law by Governor Andrew Cuomo on December 22, 2020.225 The bill, which 
places a temporary prohibition on the use of biometric technology in both public and private 
schools, defines facial recognition simply as “any tool using an automated or semi-automated 
process that assists in uniquely identifying or verifying a person by comparing and analyzing 
patterns based on the person’s face.”226 This definition maps closely onto the two functions of 
facial recognition technology for verification (one-to-one match) and identification (one-to-many 
match). 
                                               
224 See Evan Ringel, Facial Recognition Technology Regulation Database (Jan. 21, 2021) (unpublished Excel 
spreadsheet) (on file with author). 
225 See 2020 N.Y. Laws 349 (placing a moratorium on the use of biometric identifying technology in both public and 
private schools). 
226 See id. § 2-e(1)(c). 
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Vermont Senate Bill 124, a bill enacted on October 7, 2020 which prohibits the use of 
facial recognition technology by law enforcement unless authorized in a separate bill regulating 
the use of drones, adds an additional element to the definition of facial recognition.227 While the 
first section of the definition includes traditional use for identification, the second section 
includes “the automated or semiautomated process by which the characteristics of a person’s 
face are analyzed to determine the person’s sentiment, state of mind, or other propensities, 
including the person’s level of dangerousness.”228 This definition expands regulation of facial 
recognition technology to include uses for both predictive police purposes and the type of mood 
detecting seen in commercial use.229  
California A.B. 1215, signed into law on October 8, 2019, institutes a moratorium on law 
enforcement use of facial recognition technology in connection with an officer’s body-worn 
camera.230 The bill defines “facial recognition” similarly to the other two bills, with reference to 
a process that assists in identifying an individual.231 However, a second definitional provision 
refers to “[a]n automated or semiautomated process that generates, or assists in generating, 
                                               
227 See Act of Oct. 7, 2020, 2020 Vt. Laws 166 (placing a moratorium on most uses of facial recognition technology 
by law enforcement officers). 
228 See id. § 14(b)(1)(B). 
229 See id.; see also Jake Adelstein, In Japan, Your Smile is Being Recorded: Take This Job and Love It—Or Else, 
DAILY BEAST (June 23, 2018), https://www.thedailybeast.com/in-japan-your-smile-is-being-recorded-take-this-job-
and-love-itor-else (noting McDonalds’ use of facial recognition in Japan to ensure that employees were smiling 
enough through their shifts); Hayley Peterson, Walmart is Developing a Robot That Identifies Unhappy Shoppers, 
BUSINESS INSIDER (July 19, 2017), https://www.businessinsider.com/walmart-is-developing-a-robot-that-identifies-
unhappy-shoppers-2017-7 (describing a patent filing Walmart made for a facial recognition system that would 
identify unhappy customers at the checkout line). 
230 See 2019 Cal. Stat. Ch. 579 (imposing a moratorium on police use of facial recognition technology in conjunction 
with a police-worn body camera). 
231 See id. § 832.19(a)(3)(A). 
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surveillance information about an individual based on biometric data.”232 Though the function of 
these two definitions seems to be similar, the second provision demonstrates an intersection 
between the specific technology used in facial recognition and more generalized concerns about 
the use of biometric data. An additional thirty-six bills use the terms “biometric surveillance,” 
“biometric identifying,” or “biometric matching” in conjunction with either “system” or 
“technology.” These terms include facial recognition technology but would also restrict the use 
of voice recognition, iris recognition, and gait recognition software.233 
The Secondary Meanings of Common Terms 
 
Common use of terms and definitions across state and local statutes can also indicate a 
single source of legislative material. Two regulatory sources are worth noting here. Before 2020, 
the terms “facial recognition service” or “facial template” had not been used in any proposed or 
enacted legislation. However, twelve bills proposed during the 2020 legislative session included 
the terms, with each bill identically defining a facial recognition service as “[t]echnology that 
analyzes facial features and is used by a state or local government agency for the identification, 
verification, or persistent tracking of individuals in still or video images” and a facial template as 
“[t]he machine-interpretable pattern of facial features that is extracted from one or more images 
of an individual by a facial recognition service.”234  
The new appearance of these terms in state legislatures suggest that a common force may 
be behind each of the bills, which is particularly relevant when considering that one of the bills is 
                                               
232 See id. § 832.19(a)(3)(B). 
233 See, e.g., Act of Jan. 28, 2020, S.B. 1383, 2020 Leg. (Ariz. 2020) (“controlling law enforcement use of military 
and surveillance equipment”). 
234 See, e.g., Facial Recognition Act, 2020 Wash. Adv. Leg. Serv. 257 (2020); Facial Recognition Privacy Protection 
Act, H.B. 1578, 2020 Leg. (Md. 2020); Facial Recognition Act, H.B. 492, 2020 Leg. (Idaho 2020). 
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Washington’s S.B. 6280, the first state bill focused on regulating the government use of facial 
recognition technology.235 Privacy scholars have questioned the close ties between Microsoft and 
the passage of S.B. 6280.236 While Microsoft has repeatedly called for the government regulation 
of facial recognition technology, they have simultaneously pitched their own facial recognition 
system to the DEA and other federal agencies since at least 2017.237 S.B. 6280 was co-sponsored 
by Washington State Senator Joe Nguyen, who also works as an employee for Microsoft.238 The 
company “strongly supported” the bill, praising its passage as a “significant breakthrough . . . 
putting guardrails in place for the use of facial recognition technology.”239 Others have criticized 
specific language within the bill. One of the key provisions of the Washington bill is that the use 
of a facial recognition system to make legally binding decisions must be subject to “meaningful 
human review.”240 This phrase has received criticism, with privacy scholars arguing that the 
standard lacks definition and that human reviewers are often susceptible to “automation bias,” 
                                               
235 See Facial Recognition Act, 2020 Wash. Adv. Leg. Serv. 257 (2020). 
236 See Jennifer Lee, We Need a Face Surveillance Moratorium, Not Weak Regulations: Concerns about SB 6280, 
ACLU (Mar. 31, 2020), https://www.aclu-wa.org/story/we-need-face-surveillance-moratorium-not-weak-
regulations-concerns-about-sb-6280; Brad Smith, Finally, Progress on Regulating Facial Recognition, MICROSOFT 
(Mar. 31, 2020), https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2020/03/31/washington-facial-recognition-legislation/. 
237 See Zach Whittaker, Microsoft Pitched Its Facial Recognition Tech to the DEA, New Emails Show, TECHCRUNCH 
(June 17, 2020), https://techcrunch.com/2020/06/17/microsoft-dea-facial-recognition/. 
238 See Dave Gershgorn, A Microsoft Employee Literally Wrote Washington’s Facial Recognition Law, ONEZERO 
(Apr. 3, 2020), https://onezero.medium.com/a-microsoft-employee-literally-wrote-washingtons-facial-recognition-
legislation-aab950396927. 
239 See Jennifer Lee, We Need a Face Surveillance Moratorium, Not Weak Regulations: Concerns about SB 6280, 
ACLU (Mar. 31, 2020), https://www.aclu-wa.org/story/we-need-face-surveillance-moratorium-not-weak-
regulations-concerns-about-sb-6280; Brad Smith, Finally, Progress on Regulating Facial Recognition, MICROSOFT 
(Mar. 31, 2020), https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2020/03/31/washington-facial-recognition-legislation/; 
see also James Vincent, Google Favors Temporary Facial Recognition Ban as Microsoft Pushes Back, THE VERGE 
(Jan. 21, 2020), https://www.theverge.com/2020/1/21/21075001/facial-recognition-ban-google-microsoft-eu-sundar-
pichai-brad-smith (describing the proposal of a moratorium on facial recognition technology as a “meat cleaver”  
and arguing that continued development of the technology relied on enabling more people to use it). 
240 See Facial Recognition Act, 2020 Wash. Adv. Leg. Serv. 257, § 4 (2020). 
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deferring to the algorithmically-created result rather than reviewing independently.241 At least 
one journalist has suggested that Microsoft is spearheading lobbying attempts to get similar bills 
passed in other state legislatures, each with the same “meaningful human review” language that 
provides a limited barrier to use of the technology.242 The use of identical terms and definitions 
in these statutes implies at least that the drafters have at least drawn influence from the 
Washington bill and perhaps that the same person or entity is writing them. Twelve of the 
thirteen 2020 bills containing “facial recognition service” and “facial template” also contain 
permission to use facial recognition technology when subject to “meaningful human review,” 
suggesting that Microsoft may have expanded efforts to pass similar facial recognition legislation 
with restrictions that the company finds favorable. 
The second source of regulatory material comes from the ACLU’s CCOPS efforts. Of the 
twenty-five local ordinances coded by the author, nine use the term “biometric surveillance 
technology,” with six of the ordinances including “facial, voice, iris, and gait-recognition 
software and databases.”243 Each of the municipalities using the term are identified as having 
adopted CCOPS laws on the campaign’s website, and the definitional language exactly matches 
the language from the ACLU’s model bill.244 ACLU model language also makes a repeat 
                                               
241 See Jennifer Lee, We Need a Face Surveillance Moratorium, Not Weak Regulations: Concerns about SB 6280, 
ACLU (Mar. 31, 2020), https://www.aclu-wa.org/story/we-need-face-surveillance-moratorium-not-weak-
regulations-concerns-about-sb-6280. 
242 See Nicolás Rivero, In a Facial Recognition Bill Backed by Microsoft, Three Words Stand Between Citizens and 
Their Civil Rights, QUARTZ (Sept. 18, 2020), https://qz.com/1905159/microsoft-is-shaping-facial-recognition-bills-
across-the-us/. 
243 See, e.g., YELLOW SPRINGS, OHIO, CODE ch. 607 (2018); CAMBRIDGE, MASS., CODE, ch. 2.128 (2018); 
NASHVILLE, TENN., CODE, ch. 13-08 (2017), SOMERVILLE, MASS., CODE, art. III, div. 1, § 9-25 (2019). 
244 See Community Control Over Police Surveillance (CCOPS) Model Bill, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/legal-
document/community-control-over-police-surveillance-ccops-model-bill?redirect=other/community-control-over-
police-surveillance-ccops-model-bill (last visited Jan. 27, 2021). 
 59 
appearance in the ordinances of municipalities that have banned the use of facial recognition 
technology by government officials. Of the twelve ordinances banning some use of facial 
recognition technology, seven are identified as CCOPS ordinances; the majority of those 
ordinances use definitional language directly from the ACLU’s “Instructions for Turning 
CCOPS Model Bill into CCOPS + Facial Recognition Ban Model Bill.”245 This similar language 
may not reflect the same ulterior motives attributed to Microsoft’s facial recognition legislation, 
but it does suggest that legislative bodies at the state and local level are looking for guidance on 
how to regulation surveillance technologies like facial recognition. 
The rest of this chapter will be broken up into five categories of facial recognition 
technology/biometric data regulation, with each category showing a different facet of potential 
regulatory constraint. The first, “Agents of Use,” will revolve around the entities using facial 
recognition technology or biometric data who are specifically targeted by a piece of legislation. 
The second, “Limitations on Use,” will include any explicitly stated restraint on the use of facial 
recognition technology or biometric data. The third, “Evaluation of Use,” will include regulatory 
measures designed to ensure accurate and proper use of facial recognition technology or 
biometric data. The fourth, “Accountability of Use,” will include regulatory measures designed 
to increase transparency of use of facial recognition technology or biometric data. The fifth and 
final category, “Enforcement of Permitted Use,” will include explicitly available remedies for 
statutorily improper use of biometric data. 
                                               
245 See Instructions for Turning CCOPS Model Bill into CCOPS + Facial Recognition Ban Model Bill 
(CCOPS+FR), ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/other/instructions-turning-ccops-model-bill-ccops-facial-recognition-
ban-model-bill-ccopsfr-ccops (last visited Jan. 27, 2021); see also CAMBRIDGE, MASS., CODE, ch. 2.128 (2018); 
OAKLAND, CAL., CODE, ch. 9.64 (2019); S.F., CAL., CODE, § 19B.2 (2019). 
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Category One: Agents of Use 
 
 Each of the pieces of legislation analyzed using the author’s coding protocol articulate 
the scope of regulatory authority. Any statutory limitations on the use of facial recognition 
technology or biometric data regulation apply only to the entities defined or stated in the statute, 
and many of the coded statutes and ordinances also explicitly state that the provisions do not 
apply to certain groups. For example, the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act applies only 
to “private entities,” defined as “any individual, partnership, corporation, limited liability 
company, association, or other group, however organized.”246 However, the statute explicitly 
does not apply to any state or local government agency.247  
This category can essentially be split into a dichotomy between public actors like state or 
local government agencies and private actors like businesses or individuals. This dichotomy may 
make regulations more or less likely to survive First Amendment review, as discussed in Chapter 
4. Out of a total of 376 coded statutes and ordinances, less than 10% apply to both public and 
                                               
246 Biometric Information Privacy Act, 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 14/10 (2008). 
247 Id. 
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private actors.248 Looking specifically at enacted pieces of legislation, only ten restrict both state 
or local government agencies and businesses or other private actors; each of those statutes are 
data breach statutes requiring both public and private entities to adopt a data breach notification 
policy after personal information (including biometric data) is illegally accessed.249 Of the 
statutes and ordinances analyzed, slightly more would apply to state government officials and 
agencies than local governments. One hundred and ninety-eight coded statutes would apply to a 
state government agency, including sixty-seven enacted statutes.250 One hundred and forty-four 
coded pieces of legislation would apply to a local government agency, including thirty-nine 
enacted statutes and each of the twenty-five analyzed local ordinances.251 A smaller number of 
statutes either explicitly or implicitly apply to law enforcement agencies, with seventy-two 
statutes (twenty-seven enacted) that directly mention applicability to law enforcement and forty-
one other statutes (seventeen enacted) that do not explicitly mention law enforcement but would 
still apply.252 Twenty-four of the twenty-five coded ordinances also either explicitly or implicitly 
apply to law enforcement agencies, with the only exception being a Portland, Oregon ordinance 
                                               
248 See Evan Ringel, Facial Recognition Technology Regulation Database (Jan. 21, 2021) (unpublished Excel 
spreadsheet) (on file with author). 
249 See Evan Ringel, Facial Recognition Technology Regulation Database (Jan. 21, 2021) (unpublished Excel 
spreadsheet) (on file with author); see also Database Security Breach Notification Law, 2018 La. Acts 382; Act of 
May 29, 2018, 2018 Colo. Sess. Laws. Ch. 266 (strengthening protections for consumer data privacy); Act of April 
11, 2018, 2018 Ariz. Sess. Laws 177 (relating to data security breaches). 
250 See Evan Ringel, Facial Recognition Technology Regulation Database (Jan. 21, 2021) (unpublished Excel 
spreadsheet) (on file with author). 
251 See id. 
252 See id. 
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that prohibits the use of facial recognition technology by private entities in places of public 
accommodation within the city.253  
 Many of the coded statutes also explicitly mention a non-law enforcement state or local 
agency. However, the author used no filter for relevance when coding statutes from the 2020 
legislative session, meaning that many sector-specific statutes were included. A total of eighty 
statutes from 2020 mentioned a specific state or local agency.254 The most commonly referenced 
agency was the agency “responsible for retaining the state’s criminal records,” included in 
seventeen statutes related to the licensure of nurses and a required biometric data-based 
background check.255 Twelve other bills referenced the agency responsible for notarization of 
                                               
253 See id.; see also PORTLAND, OR., CODE, Ch. 34.10 (Aug. 3, 2020). 
254 See id. 
255 See id.; see also Act of Sept. 23, 2020, S.B. 341, 2020 Leg. (Ohio 2020) (relating to the Interstate Nurse 
Licensure Compact). 
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documents, generally in the context of allowing remote online notarization during the COVID-19 
pandemic,256 while other bills referenced the Department of Education,257 Department of 
Treasury,258 and the State Board of Pharmacy.259 Enacted statutes from before 2020 were filtered 
for relevance to facial recognition technology or biometric data collection. These statutes were less 
likely to explicitly mention a non-law enforcement government agency, with only nineteen 
mentioning another agency.260 Of these statutes, eighteen mentioned the state Department of Motor 
Vehicles or Secretary of State, the two entities in charge of driver’s licenses (the main source of 
the photographs that populate the FBI’s facial recognition database).261 
                                               
256 See Evan Ringel, Facial Recognition Technology Regulation Database (Jan. 21, 2021) (unpublished Excel 
spreadsheet) (on file with author); see also Act of June 9, 2020, H.B. 122, 2020 Leg. (La. 2020) (relating to remote 
online notarization). 
257 See, e.g., Act of Feb. 20, 2020, H.B. 2869, 2020 Leg. (Okla. 2020) (relating to targeted advertising towards 
students in Oklahoma). 
258 See, e.g., Act of Apr. 28, 2020, H.B. 550, 2020 Leg. (Vt. 2020) (relating to the post-death inheritance of 
unclaimed property). 
259 See Act of Mar. 23, 2020, S.B. 1084, 2020 Leg. (Ca. 2020) (relating to the licensure of pharmacists). 
260 See Evan Ringel, Facial Recognition Technology Regulation Database (Jan. 21, 2021) (unpublished Excel 
spreadsheet) (on file with author). 
261 See id. 
 64 
 
The remaining statutes that do not apply to state or local governments instead place 
restrictions on private actors. Out of the 376 statutes and ordinances coded, 187 would apply to 
private individuals, including forty-three enacted pieces of legislation.262 One hundred and nine 
of those (thirty-seven enacted) would also apply to corporations and businesses.263 More than a 
third of coded legislation from 2020 would apply to a specific non-law enforcement profession, 
with the majority of those regulating the licensure of psychologists (twenty-five),264 nurses 
(seventeen),265 and Emergency Medical Services personnel (eleven).266 When a relevance filter 
                                               
262 See id. 
263 See id. 
264 See, e.g., Act of June 4, 2020, S.B. 2506, 2020 Leg. (N.J. 2020) (relating to the certification of psychologists); 
Act of Apr. 11, 2020, S.B. 760, 2020 Leg. (Va. 2020) (relating to the certification of psychologists). 
265 See, e.g., Act of June 29, 2020, S.B. 655, 2020 Leg. (Pa. 2020) (relating to the certification of nurses); Act of 
Dec. 14, 2020, H.B. 36H, 2020 Leg. (Minn. 2020) (relating to the certification of nurses). 
266 See, e.g., Act of Jan. 9, 2020, S.B. 197, 2020 Leg. (W. Va. 2020) (relating to the Emergency Medical Services 
Personnel Licensure Interstate Compact); Act of Mar. 5, 2020, S.B. 61, 2020 Leg. (Ind. 2020) (relating to the 
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was applied to pre-2020 statutes, this type of statute was almost completely excluded. Only two 
of the coded statutes from before 2020 referred to a specific profession.267 One, Illinois H.B. 
1438, mandated the presence of facial recognition-compatible surveillance cameras at 
dispensaries selling legalized marijuana.268 The other, Vermont H.B. 764, placed registration 
requirements and mandatory data security provisions on data brokers.269 This trend suggests that 
the pieces of legislation most directly focused on the private regulation of facial recognition 
technology or biometric data collection and use are more likely to apply broadly to all private 
actors than to a specific industry or population.270 
Category Two: Limitations on Use 
 
 Many of the statutes analyzed using the coding protocol place some sort of limitation on 
the use of facial recognition technology or biometric data collection. While some bills 
                                               
267 See Evan Ringel, Facial Recognition Technology Regulation Database (Jan. 21, 2021) (unpublished Excel 
spreadsheet) (on file with author). 
268 See Cannabis Regulation and Tax Act, 2019 Ill. Laws 27. 
269 See Act of May 22, 2018, 2017 Vt. Adv. Leg. Serv. 171 (relating to data brokers and consumer protection). 
270 See Evan Ringel, Facial Recognition Technology Regulation Database (Jan. 21, 2021) (unpublished Excel 
spreadsheet) (on file with author). 
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completely prohibit a specific use, others place procedural requirements or limitations on use. 
Limitations on use are the regulatory permutation most likely to trigger a First Amendment 
challenge, as they place a significant potential burden on speech; this possibility will be analyzed 
in greater depth in Chapter 4. These restraints are best understood in the context of the uses 
explicitly enabled by statutes and ordinances. Eighty-four coded statutes and ordinances (thirty-
one enacted) contain an explicit grant of authority to use facial recognition technology or 
collect/use biometric data, meaning that the statute specifically states that the technology or 
information can be used for a particular purpose.271 An additional 146 pieces of legislation (fifty-
two enacted) have an implicit grant of authority to use facial recognition technology or 
collect/use biometric data, meaning either that the statute places limitations on certain uses but 
not others or that the statute leaves a regulatory gap.272 More than half of the coded statutes 
mention a specific permitted use of facial recognition technology or biometric data.273 These 
permitted uses can be divided into subcategories.  
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272 See id. 
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The first subcategory involves identification of alleged criminals by law enforcement. 
Legislative drafters have proposed several different standards for the permissible use of facial 
recognition technology by law enforcement officers. Multiple proposed bills suggested allowing 
the use of facial recognition technology to identify an individual reasonably suspected of a 
criminal offense,274 while others allow police to use facial recognition technology to identify an 
individual when there is probable cause that a crime was committed.275  
The most common permitted government use for local ordinances is under “exigent 
circumstances.” A Davis, California ordinance defines exigent circumstances as “a city 
department’s good faith belief that an emergency involving imminent danger of death or serious 
physical injury to any person, or imminent danger of significant property damage, requires the 
                                               
274 See, e.g., Act of Mar. 12, 2020, S.B. 218, 2020 Leg. (Utah 2020) (relating to facial recognition technology); Act 
of Feb. 13, 2020, H.B. 1578, 2020 Leg. (Md. 2020) (relating to facial recognition technology). 
275 See, e.g., Facial Recognition Act, H.B. 492, 2020 Leg. (Idaho 2020); Act of Feb. 6, 2020, S.B. 185, 2020 Leg. 
(S.D. 2020) (relating to facial recognition technology). 
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use of the surveillance technology or the information it provides.”276 Oakland, California 
expands their definition of exigent circumstances to include “large-scale event[s],” meaning that 
city officials can use facial recognition technology if an event of more than 10,000 people 
provides a “reasonable basis” to conclude that exigent circumstances may occur.277 Other 
enacted statutes require law enforcement to get a warrant278 or court order279 before using facial 
recognition technology, and there are also statutory grants of use for the identification of 
deceased280 or missing persons.281  
The second subcategory includes different statutorily created exemptions allowing 
governments or private companies to use facial recognition technology or biometric data in 
certain circumstances. The first provision giving public or private entities leeway to use 
biometric data for a “security purpose.” An enacted New Jersey statute from 2020 allows public 
schools to collect, use, and disseminate personal information (including biometric information) 
for security reasons,282 while three pre-2020 enacted statutes allow businesses to use biometric 
                                               
276 See DAVIS, CAL., CODE, Art. 26.07.020 (2018); see also Evan Ringel, Facial Recognition Technology Regulation 
Database (Jan. 21, 2021) (unpublished Excel spreadsheet) (on file with author). 
277 See OAKLAND, CAL., CODE, Ch. 9.64.045 (2019). 
278 See, e.g., Act of May 16, 2020, 2020 Minn. Chap. Law 82 (preventing police from using a drone with facial 
recognition unless “expressly authorized by a warrant”); Capture or Use of Biometric Identifier Act, TEX. BUS. & 
COM. CODE § 503.001(2009). 
279 See Facial Recognition Act, 2020 Wash. Adv. Leg. Serv. 257 (2020). 
280 See, e.g., Facial Recognition Act, 2020 Wash. Adv. Leg. Serv. 257 (2020); Capture or Use of Biometric Identifier 
Act, TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 503.001(2009). 
281 See, e.g., Facial Recognition Act, 2020 Wash. Adv. Leg. Serv. 257 (2020); Capture or Use of Biometric Identifier 
Act, TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 503.001(2009). 
282 While other pre-2020 enacted statutes related to student data also have an exception for security purposes, they 
were not coded after filtering for statutes of general applicability. See Act of Jan. 21, 2020, 2019 N.J. Laws 494 
(2020) (concerning online education services and student educational records). 
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information for a security purpose.283 Other enacted statutes and ordinances allow private 
companies to collect and use biometric information for a “business purpose,” to complete a 
financial transaction, or for purposes integral to the functioning of a business.284 As discussed 
above, Washington’s S.B. 6280 and other facial recognition bills proposed during the 2020 
calendar year allow use of facial recognition technology after “meaningful human review.”285 
This enables government agencies to make facial recognition-based decisions for services like 
insurance, health care, and criminal justice as long as they are reviewed or overseen by “one or 
more individuals” who are trained on the capabilities of the facial recognition service.286  
Statutory Exemption Exemplar  
security purpose New Jersey A.B. 4978: No disclosure unless “the disclosure is to 
protect the safety of students or security of the service.” 
business purpose Portland, Maine Code § 17.129: Restriction on government use of 
facial recognition does not “prohibit the use of facial recognition 




Washington S.B. 6280: A government agency using facial 
recognition to make decisions “that produce legal effects” must 
make sure that those decisions are subject to “meaningful human 
review.” 
 
Many of the remaining affirmative grants of use are bureaucratic in nature. Sixty-four of 
the coded 2020 statutes allow the collection of biometric information, including the potential use 
                                               
283 See, e.g., Capture or Use of Biometric Identifier Act, TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 503.001(2009); Act of Apr. 13, 
2009, 2009 Wash. Ch. 66 (regulating the use of identification devices). 
284 See Act of Apr. 13, 2009, 2009 Wash. Ch. 66 (regulating the use of identification devices); PORTLAND, ME., 
CODE, Ch. 17, Art. XI, § 17.129 (2020) (allowing non-government use of facial recognition technology for a 
business purpose). 
285 See, e.g., Facial Recognition Act, 2020 Wash. Adv. Leg. Serv. 257; Facial Recognition Privacy Protection Act, 
H.B. 1578, 2020 Leg. (Md. 2020); Facial Recognition Act, H.B. 492, 2020 Leg. (Idaho 2020). 
286 Facial Recognition Act, 2020 Wash. Adv. Leg. Serv. 257, § 4. 
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of facial recognition technology, as part of a background check for board licensure.287 Eleven 
enacted statutes specifically allow use of facial recognition for state-issued driver’s licenses or 
identification cards, including statutes ordering compliance with Federal REAL ID guidelines.288 
Other statutes allow the use of facial recognition technology or biometric information for identity 
verification purposes either by any government agency289 or specifically by law enforcement.290 
Lastly, three statutes and ordinances allow use at airports within their jurisdiction, with each 
stating that the restrictions within the bill do not apply to any Transportation Safety 
Administration use of facial recognition technology at airports.291 
 Two hundred and one coded statutes contain a specific limit on either the use of facial 
recognition technology or the use, collection, or dissemination of biometric information; this 
figure includes fifty-one enacted statutes and twenty-one local ordinances.292 These restrictions 
can be grouped into two main categories: (1) bans and moratoriums on use of facial recognition 
technology or biometrics and (2) restrictions on use of biometric data.  
                                               
287 See, e.g., Act of Apr. 11, 2020, S.B. 760, 2020 Leg. (Va. 2020) (relating to the certification of psychologists); Act 
of June 29, 2020, S.B. 655, 2020 Leg. (Pa. 2020) (relating to the certification of nurses); Act of Mar. 5, 2020, S.B. 
61, 2020 Leg. (Ind. 2020) (relating to the certification of EMS personnel). 
288 See, e.g., Act of July 7, 2017, 2017 Ore. Laws 568 (relating to the federal Real ID Act of 2005); Act of Apr. 28, 
2017, 2017 Me. Laws 27 (requiring state compliance with federal Real ID guidelines). 
289 See, e.g., Act of July 7, 2017, 2017 Ore. Laws 568 (relating to the federal Real ID Act of 2005); Act of Apr. 2, 
2020, 2020 Wash. Ch. 312 (relating to guardianships and conservatorships). 
290 See Act of Mar. 10, 2017, 2017 S.D. Laws 3 (providing for the use of mobile breath alcohol testing in the 24/7 
sobriety program). 
291 See Facial Recognition Act, 2020 Wash. Adv. Leg. Serv. 257; 2014 N.H. Ch. 162 (restricting the collection of 
biometric data by state and local government agencies); S.F.., CAL., CODE, § 19B.2 (2019). 
292 See Evan Ringel, Facial Recognition Technology Regulation Database (Jan. 21, 2021) (unpublished Excel 
spreadsheet) (on file with author). 
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 During the 2020 legislative session, there were two statutes proposed (but not enacted) 
that would have placed a complete ban on state and local government use of facial recognition 
technology. The first, New Hampshire H.B. 1642, prohibited state and local officials from 
“obtain[ing], retain[ing], access[ing], or us[ing] any face recognition system or any information 
obtained from a face recognition system.”293 The bill died in the state House after passing an 
initial committee vote.294 A second bill, Massachusetts S.B. 2963, contained a moratorium on 
government use of facial recognition technology that was later edited out after the governor 
threatened to veto the bill.295 Twelve municipalities have passed local ordinances banning the use 
                                               
293  See Act of Feb. 19, 2020, H.B. 1642, 2020 Leg. (N.H. 2020) (proposing a near-total ban on government use of 
facial recognition technology). 
294 See Michael Boldin, New Hampshire House Passes Bill to Ban Facial Recognition, TENTH AMENDMENT CTR. 
(Feb. 19, 2020), https://blog.tenthamendmentcenter.com/2020/02/new-hampshire-house-passes-bill-to-ban-facial-
recognition/. 
295 See An Act Relative to Justice, Equity and Accountability in Law Enforcement in the Commonwealth, 2020 
Mass. Acts 253, § 26 (2020). 
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of facial recognition technology by any city agency or officer.296 More than half of these cities 
added a ban on facial recognition to CCOPS legislation restricting government use of 
surveillance technology, but local governments like Portland, Oregon,297 and cities in 
Massachusetts, like Boston,298 and Brookline299 passed standalone bans on government use of 
facial recognition. Another Massachusetts town (Springfield) passed a temporary moratorium on 
local government use of facial recognition technology; though initial drafts of the ordinance 
placed a moratorium on facial recognition use through 2025, the town council agreed to review 
the matter in a year contingent on technological advances in accuracy and reliability.300 
Other state legislatures focused specifically on law enforcement use of facial recognition 
technology. South Carolina, Vermont, and New York introduced bills in 2020 that would ban 
law enforcement use of facial recognition technology, while New Jersey, California, and 
Vermont introduced 2020 bills that would have put a temporary moratorium on law enforcement 
use.301 Vermont S.B. 124, enacted in October 2020, represents the first successful attempt by a 
state legislature to prohibit law enforcement use of facial recognition technology.302 While most 
                                               
296 See Evan Ringel, Facial Recognition Technology Regulation Database (Jan. 21, 2021) (unpublished Excel 
spreadsheet) (on file with author). 
297 See Linn Freedman, Portland City Council Bans Use of Facial Recognition Technology, JDSUPRA (Sept. 14, 
2020), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/portland-city-council-bans-use-of-74887/. 
298 See BOSTON, MASS., CODE, Ch. 16-62 (2020). 
299 See BROOKLINE, MASS., CODE, Art. 8.39 (2019). 
300 See Jackson Cote, Springfield City Council Passes Facial Recognition Moratorium, MASSLIVE (Feb. 25, 2020), 
https://www.masslive.com/springfield/2020/02/springfield-city-council-passes-facial-recognition-moratorium.html. 
301 See Evan Ringel, Facial Recognition Technology Regulation Database (Jan. 21, 2021) (unpublished Excel 
spreadsheet) (on file with author). 
302 See Act of Oct. 7, 2020, 2020 Vt. Laws 166, § 14 (placing a moratorium on most uses of facial recognition 
technology by law enforcement officers). 
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moratoriums are time-based and structured with an explicit expiration date, Vermont’s 
moratorium prohibits law enforcement officers from using facial recognition technology until 
“use . . . is authorized by an enactment of the General Assembly.”303 As of the drafting of this 
chapter, the only permitted use of facial recognition technology by Vermont law enforcement is 
if a warrant is obtained to use drone surveillance on a specific investigative target.304 Local 
governments have also targeted law enforcement use of facial recognition technology. In 
December 2020, New Orleans passed an ordinance banning police use of facial recognition 
technology days after a local newspaper revealed that the New Orleans Police Department had 
been using facial recognition despite “years of denials.”305  
 Legislatures have been more successful passing restrictions on individual law 
enforcement uses of facial recognition technology. Washington H.B. 1793, passed in March of 
2020, prevents the use of real-time facial recognition in connection with a pilot program for 
“automated traffic safety cameras.”306 The statute also prevents law enforcement access to any 
facial data collected by the cameras, even if a face image was collected accidentally.307 
Washington S.B. 6280 also places limits on real-time facial recognition by state and local 
government agencies, prohibiting real-time use without (1) a warrant, (2) exigent circumstances, 
                                               
303 See id. 
304 See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 4622 (2016). 
305 See Michael Isaac Stein, New Orleans City Council Bans Facial Recognition, Predictive Policing and Other 
Surveillance Tech, THE LENS (Dec. 18, 2020), https://thelensnola.org/2020/12/18/new-orleans-city-council-
approves-ban-on-facial-recognition-predictive-policing-and-other-surveillance-tech/. 
306 See 2020 Wash. Ch. 224, § 5(b) (relating to establishing additional uses for automated traffic safety cameras).  
307 See id. 
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or (3) a court order specifically for the purposes of “locating or identifying” a missing or 
deceased person.308 
 Other statutes have addressed specific uses of cameras by law enforcement. Oregon and 
New Hampshire have placed bans on the use of facial recognition technology in connection with 
officer-worn body cameras,309 while California’s moratorium on facial recognition in officer 
body cameras prevents use until January 1, 2023.310 Minnesota S.B. 3072 imposes a warrant 
requirement on the use of facial recognition technology in connection with police-operated 
drones,311 and Maine H.B. 24 requires that law enforcement agencies place “restrictions” on the 
use of facial recognition technology in drones (though an earlier prohibition on facial recognition 
technology in drones was amended out).312 A local CCOPS ordinance passed by Lawrence, 
Massachusetts in 2018 excluded facial recognition technology in police body cameras or drones 
from other allowable temporary government uses of surveillance technology while the ordinance 
came into full effect.313 
 The remaining bans and moratoriums are centered around a prohibition of a specific non-
law enforcement use of facial recognition technology. Nine other coded, enacted statutes have 
explicit bans on use of facial recognition technology or biometric information; most of these 
statutes are from states refusing to comply with facial recognition compatibility in driver’s 
                                               
308 See Facial Recognition Act, 2020 Wash. Adv. Leg. Serv. 257, § 11. 
309 See OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 133.741(1)(D) (2020); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 105-D:2(XII) (2020). 
310 See 2019 Cal. Stat. Ch. 579 (imposing a moratorium on police use of facial recognition technology in conjunction 
with a police-worn body camera). 
311 See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.19(4)(b) (2020). 
312 See 2015 Me. Laws 307 (regulating domestic unmanned aerial vehicle use). 
313 See LAWRENCE, MASS., CODE, Ch. 9.25 (2018). 
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licenses.314 This type of statute impacts use of facial recognition technology by both federal and 
state agencies, as the FBI’s facial recognition database relies largely on driver’s license 
photographs shared by state agencies.315 Other proposed (but not enacted) bills from 2020 
suggested banning the use of facial recognition technology for COVID-19 contact tracing in 
New York316 and preventing the collection of any non-fingerprint biometric data from applicants 
for concealed carry permits.317  
 The second major category of limitations on use relates to the use of biometric 
information. Sixty-nine coded statutes and ordinances (seventeen enacted) place some sort of 
restriction on the acquisition of biometric data, while 125 coded statutes and ordinances (thirty-
two enacted) restrict the sharing of biometric data.318  
                                               
314 See, e.g., 2014 N.H. Ch. 274 (prohibiting the use of facial recognition technology in connection with driver’s 
license photographs); 2009 Va. Acts 769 (preventing government agencies from complying with any provision 
REAL ID act that “they determine would compromise the economic privacy, biometric data, or biometric samples of 
any resident of the Commonwealth”). 
315 See Daniel Bromberg, Facial Recognition and Drivers’ Licenses, UNIV. OF N.H. CARSEY SCHOOL OF PUBLIC 
POLICY (Oct. 29, 2019), https://carsey.unh.edu/publication/facial-recognition-nh. 
316 See Act of May 11, 2020, S.B. 8311, 2020 Leg. (N.Y. 2020) (banning the use of facial recognition technology in 
the tracking of the coronavirus). 
317 See Act of Jan. 8, 2020, H.B. 1630, 2020 Leg. (Mo. 2020) (prohibiting the collection of any non-fingerprint 
biometric data from applicants for concealed carry permits). 
318 See Evan Ringel, Facial Recognition Technology Regulation Database (Jan. 21, 2021) (unpublished Excel 
spreadsheet) (on file with author). 
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Notable among these statutes are the three main biometric privacy bills in Illinois (BIPA),319 
Texas (CUBI),320 and Washington,321 each of which place restrictions on the acquisition and 
sharing of biometric information by private entities. BIPA forbids private entities from collecting 
an individual’s biometric information unless the entity both gives notice to the individual and 
receives a written release from the individual consenting to the collection.322 BIPA also restricts 
the sharing of biometric information, banning any “profitable” sharing (like a sale or trade) of an 
individual’s biometric information.323 The statute prevents any disclosure at all unless the private 
                                               
319 Biometric Information Privacy Act, 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 14/10 (2008). 
320 Capture or Use of Biometric Identifier Act, TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 503.001(2009). 
321 See WASH. REV. CODE § 19.375.020 (2017) (prohibiting anyone from “enroll[ing] a biometric identifier in a 
database for a commercial purpose” without notice or consent). 
322 See Biometric Information Privacy Act, 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 14/15(b) (2008). 
323 See id. § 14/15(c). 
Regulations Restricting Biometric Information (n=128, 35 
enacted)
Restrictions on both acquisition and sharing of biometric data (n=66)
Restriction only on sharing of biometric data (n=59)
Restriction only on acquisition of biometric data (n=3)
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entity receives consent, is served with a warrant, or is otherwise legally bound to disclose the 
information.324 
State Date Enacted Restrictions on acquisition and sharing 
Illinois 2008 • No acquisition of biometric information 
without (1) notice and (2) written consent 
• No “profitable” sharing of an individual’s 
biometric information 
• No disclosure without (1) consent; (2) 
warrant; or (3) other legal obligation 
Texas 2009 • No acquisition of biometric information for a 
“commercial purpose” without (1) notice and 
(2) consent (no written requirement) 
• Limits on sale and disclosure, but no absolute 
prohibition 
Washington 2017 • No acquisition of biometric information 
without (1) notice and (2) consent unless 
mechanism in place to prevent “subsequent 
use . . . for a commercial purpose” 
• Can collect without notice and consent for a 
“security purpose” 
 
 While CUBI also has restrictions on both acquisition and selling of biometric data, they 
are less stringent than those in BIPA. While CUBI requires both notice and consent before an 
individual collects biometric information for a “commercial purpose,” the consent is not required 
to be in the form of a written release.325 CUBI also lacks a blanket prohibition on the sale of 
biometric information, instead allowing both sale and disclosure when the disclosure completes a 
financial transaction, is required by another statute, is in response to warrant, or if the individual 
consents “for identification purposes in the event of [their] disappearance or death.”326  
                                               
324 See id. § 14/15(d).  
325 See Capture or Use of Biometric Identifier Act, TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 503.001(b) (2009). 
326 See id. §up503.001(c). 
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Washington’s biometric privacy law provides fewer restrictions for private entities 
looking to collect biometric information. A private entity can collect biometric information if 
they provide notice and obtain consent.327 Additionally, a private entity can still collect biometric 
information without notice or consent if they “provid[e] a mechanism to prevent the subsequent 
use of [biometric information] for a commercial purpose.”328 As discussed earlier in this section, 
a private entity can also collect biometric information without notice or consent under this statute 
if the collection is “in furtherance of a security purpose.”329 The private entity can sell, lease, or 
disclose an individual’s biometric information with consent or without consent if necessary to (1) 
provide a product or service requested by the individual; (2) to complete a financial transaction; 
or (3) if required by another law. 
 Other statutes place restrictions on acquisition or sharing of biometric data belonging to 
specific groups of people. Student data privacy statutes place restrictions on both the acquisition 
and sharing of biometric data, generally through the inclusion of “biometric information” or an 
equivalent term within the definition of personal information.330 Some drivers’ license laws also 
restrict the collection and sharing of biometric data by preventing state DMV agencies from 
either collecting facial recognition images or sharing them with other state and federal 
agencies.331 
                                               
327 See WASH. REV. CODE § 19.375.020(1) (2017). 
328 See id. 
329 See id. § 19.375.020(7). 
330 See, e.g., Act of Mar. 5, 2020, 2019 Vt. Laws 89 (relating to data privacy and consumer protection).  
331 See, e.g., 2014 N.H. Ch. 274 (prohibiting the use of facial recognition technology in connection with driver’s 
license photographs); 2009 Va. Acts 769 (preventing government agencies from complying with any provision 
REAL ID act that “they determine would compromise the economic privacy, biometric data, or biometric samples of 
any resident of the Commonwealth”); 2019 Me. Laws 634 (allowing only the Maine Secretary of State to use 
biometric technology to search driver’s license records). 
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Category Three: Evaluation of Use 
 
 The next two categories, evaluation of use and accountability of use, include measures 
designed to increase accuracy and transparency when using facial recognition technology or 
collecting biometric data. One hundred and fifty-five coded statutes (thirty-two enacted) 
contained some sort of transparency or accountability requirement, and each coded local 
ordinance that was not a complete ban or moratorium on the use of facial recognition technology 
contained a transparency or accountability requirement.332  
 The statutory provisions classified under evaluation of use are mostly pre-emptive 
policies an agency or private party would adhere to ensure accurate and responsible use of either 
facial recognition technology or biometric data. Two enacted statutes and nine ordinances 
contain a “use policy” requirement, mandating that a government agency using facial recognition 
technology establish a policy governing when and how the technology is used.333 This 
requirement can mean several different things. Some statutes are vague, merely requiring an 
                                               
332 See Evan Ringel, Facial Recognition Technology Regulation Database (Jan. 21, 2021) (unpublished Excel 
spreadsheet) (on file with author). 
333See id.; see also Facial Recognition Act, 2020 Wash. Adv. Leg. Serv. 257; Act of July 7, 2017, 2017 Pa. Laws 22 
(requiring a use policy for municipal law enforcement use of facial recognition technology); SEATTLE, WASH., 
CODE, Ch. 14.18 (2018); YELLOW SPRINGS, OHIO, CODE ch. 607 (2018). 
Category 3: Evaluation of Use
How does the statute 
ensure accurate and 
responsible use of 
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Examples: 
Use policies, training 
requirements, testing and 
accuracy standards
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agency to have a use policy without articulating what that policy should include.334 Washington’s 
S.B. 6280 shows a more robust approach to the requirement of a use policy (and an approach 
mimicked by most coded local ordinances).335 Rather than simply requiring an agency to have a 
use policy, the statute identifies several elements a sufficient use policy must contain. S.B. 6280 
requires an agency to submit both an intent-to-use application and an “accountability report” 
before beginning use of facial recognition technology.336 The accountability report must contain 
a description of the technology’s capabilities and limitations, along with a description of the 
likely data inputs and outputs used by the technology.337 In addition, the report must describe the 
agency’s intended purpose and uses for the technology.338 While S.B. 6280 requires the 
accountability report to be updated every two years, 5 local ordinances require a yearly update of 
agency use reports.339 
 Only three enacted statutes and ordinances340 explicitly require training for use of facial 
recognition technology, meaning that most people not living in Yellow Springs, Ohio,341 
                                               
334 See Act of July 7, 2017, 2017 Pa. Laws 22 (requiring a use policy for municipal law enforcement use of facial 
recognition technology). 
335 See Facial Recognition Act, 2020 Wash. Adv. Leg. Serv. 257, § 3. 
336 See id. § 3(2). 
337 See id. § 3(2)(a)-(b). 
338 See id. § 3(2)(c). 
339 See, e.g., SEATTLE, WASH., CODE, Ch. 14.18 (2018); DAVIS, CAL., CODE, Art. 26.07.020 (2018). 
340 See Facial Recognition Act, 2020 Wash. Adv. Leg. Serv. 257. 
341 See YELLOW SPRINGS, OHIO, CODE ch. 607 (2018). 
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Lawrence, Massachusetts,342 or the state of Washington343 are living in a jurisdiction where the 
government can use facial recognition technology without any required training. S.B. 6280 is the 
only enacted piece of legislation to require a training policy for both use of facial recognition 
technology and accuracy-based testing of the technology.344 Proper training for the use of facial 
recognition technology is especially important when the accuracy of results can vary widely 
based on proper user execution. When the ACLU tested Amazon’s facial recognition system on 
every member of Congress in 2018, the system generated twenty-eight false matches.345 An 
Amazon representative claimed the faulty results were due to poor user calibration, alleging that 
the facial recognition operator should have used the system at a higher confidence threshold to 
avoid the “significant consequences” of misidentification.346 
 Washington’s S.B. 6280 is the only enacted statute or ordinance to include detailed 
testing and accuracy provisions, though several proposed statutes from the 2020 legislative 
session would have mandated accuracy standards or bias testing for government use of facial 
recognition technology.347 S.B. 6280 includes specific testing and accuracy standards, requiring 
facial recognition vendors to both disclose any “complaints or reports of bias” and make 
available an application programming interface to enable “legitimate, independent, and 
                                               
342 See LAWRENCE, MASS., CODE, Ch. 9.25 (2018). 
343 See Facial Recognition Act, 2020 Wash. Adv. Leg. Serv. 257. 
344 See id. 
345 See Russell Brandom, Amazon’s Facial Recognition Matched 28 Members of Congress to Criminal Mugshots, 
THE VERGE (July 26, 2018), https://www.theverge.com/2018/7/26/17615634/amazon-rekognition-aclu-mug-shot-
congress-facial-recognition. 
346 See id. 
347 See, e.g., Act of July 27, 2020, H.B. 4886, 2020 Leg. (Mass. 2020) (reforming police standards and policies); Act 
of June 1, 2020, A.B. 4211, 2020 Leg. (N.J. 2020) (regulating law enforcement use of biometric information and 
technologies). 
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reasonable” tests of accuracy and bias.348 The statute also requires the agency to disclose 
information about the technology’s rate of false matches.349 
                                               
348 See Facial Recognition Act, 2020 Wash. Adv. Leg. Serv. 257, § 6. 
349 See id. 
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 Local and state law enforcement agencies have been criticized for a lack of public 
transparency in their use of facial recognition technology, and multiple police departments have 
denied using facial recognition until the moment documents are released showing that they have 
surreptitiously used the technology for years.350 The legislative provisions categorized under 
accountability of use are designed to increase public awareness about use of facial recognition 
technology. Some provisions give members of the public a direct role in limiting the use of facial 
recognition, while others require public or private entities to notify the public about use. 
 Twenty-two enacted statutes and ordinances contained an explicit disclosure or notice 
provision.351 Washington’s facial recognition act, S.B. 6280, and three local ordinances 
                                               
350 See, e.g., Erin Einhorn, A Fight Over Facial Recognition is Dividing Detroit – With High Stakes For Police and 
Privacy, NBC NEWS (Aug. 22, 2019), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/fight-over-facial-recognition-
dividing-detroit-high-stakes-police-privacy-n1045046l; Michael Isaac Stein, New Orleans City Council Bans Facial 
Recognition, Predictive Policing and Other Surveillance Tech, THE LENS (Dec. 18, 2020), 
https://thelensnola.org/2020/12/18/new-orleans-city-council-approves-ban-on-facial-recognition-predictive-policing-
and-other-surveillance-tech/; Ethan Geringer-Sameth, The NYPD’s Facial Recognition Policy Leaves a Lot of 
Leeway the Department Says It’s Not Using, GOTHAM GAZETTE (July 22, 2020), 
https://www.gothamgazette.com/city/9608-nypd-facial-recognition-policy-leeway-department-not-using-black-
lives-matter-protests. 
351 See Evan Ringel, Facial Recognition Technology Regulation Database (Jan. 21, 2021) (unpublished Excel 
spreadsheet) (on file with author). 
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contained a requirement that government agencies log facial recognition searches and produce a 
yearly, publicly available report with non-identifiable information about the searches.352 S.B. 
6280 also requires judges to issue a yearly report with information about any warrants granted 
for use of facial recognition technology.353 Government agencies are also required to maintain 
records for government auditing,354 and law enforcement officers are required to disclose the use 
of facial recognition technology to criminal defendants.355 
 Multiple statutes and ordinances have provisions related to community involvement and 
civil rights. CCOPS ordinances are designed specifically to encourage increased community 
involvement in police use of surveillance technologies,356 while four coded and enacted statutes 
also encourage community involvement.357 Multiple pieces of legislation require an agency to 
evaluate any potential effects the use of facial recognition technology or biometric information 
may have on civil rights and civil liberties.358 Washington’s S.B. 6280 and other local ordinances 
also require a mandatory public review period (complete with public hearings) after an agency 
                                               
352 See Facial Recognition Act, 2020 Wash. Adv. Leg. Serv. 257, § 8(2)-(4); see also SEATTLE, WASH., CODE, Ch. 
14.18 (2018); YELLOW SPRINGS, OHIO, CODE ch. 607 (2018); LAWRENCE, MASS., CODE, Ch. 9.25 (2018). 
353 See Facial Recognition Act, 2020 Wash. Adv. Leg. Serv. 257, § 8(2)-(4). 
354 See Facial Recognition Act, 2020 Wash. Adv. Leg. Serv. 257, § 8(2); see also DAVIS, CAL., CODE, Art. 26.07.020 
(2018). 
355 See Facial Recognition Act, 2020 Wash. Adv. Leg. Serv. 257, § 8(1). 
356 See ACLU, COMMUNITY CONTROL OVER POLICE SURVEILLANCE, https://www.aclu.org/issues/privacy-
technology/surveillance-technologies/community-control-over-police-surveillance (last visited Jan. 27, 2021). 
357 See Facial Recognition Act, 2020 Wash. Adv. Leg. Serv. 257; 2020 N.Y. Laws 349 (placing a moratorium on the 
use of biometric identifying technology in both public and private schools); Act of Oct. 7, 2020, 2020 Vt. Laws 166 
(placing a moratorium on most uses of facial recognition technology by law enforcement officers); Act of May 15, 
2018, 2018 N.H. Ch. 21 (establishing a committee to study the use and regulation of biometric information). 
358 See Facial Recognition Act, 2020 Wash. Adv. Leg. Serv. 257; 2020 N.Y. Laws 349 (placing a moratorium on the 
use of biometric identifying technology in both public and private schools); see also DAVIS, CAL., CODE, Art. 
26.07.020 (2018); Bay Area Rapid Transit Ordinance 2018-1 (2018). 
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submits an intent-to-use application but before they actually start using facial recognition 
technology.359 Both Seattle’s local ordinance and Vermont’s S.B. 124 establish a task force or 
advisory committee that helps oversee use of facial recognition technology or biometric 
information.360 Washington Governor Jay Inslee vetoed a similar provision in S.B. 6280.361 
 Consent and notice requirements also fall under accountability of use.  Each of the three 
main biometric privacy laws (Illinois, Texas, and Washington) include both notice and consent 
requirements.362 These provisions require private entities to both notify an individual that their 
biometric data is being collected and obtain consent from that individual to collect and use 
biometric data.363 Other state statutes include only a notice provision.364 For example, the 
California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 uses an “opt-out” privacy protection scheme, placing 
the burden on consumers to affirmatively indicate that they do not want private companies to sell 
their private information.365 This type of notice-and-choice information privacy law has been 
                                               
359 See Facial Recognition Act, 2020 Wash. Adv. Leg. Serv. 257, § 3(3); SEATTLE, WASH., CODE, Ch. 14.18 (2018); 
Bay Area Rapid Transit Ordinance 2018-1 (2018). 
360 See SEATTLE, WASH., CODE, Ch. 14.18 (2018); Act of Oct. 7, 2020, 2020 Vt. Laws 166, § 14 (placing a 
moratorium on most uses of facial recognition technology by law enforcement officers). 
361 See Facial Recognition Act, 2020 Wash. Adv. Leg. Serv. 257. 
362 See Biometric Information Privacy Act, 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 14/10 (2008); Capture or Use of Biometric 
Identifier Act, TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 503.001(b) (2009); See WASH. REV. CODE § 19.375.020(1) (2017). 
363 See Biometric Information Privacy Act, 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 14/10 (2008); Capture or Use of Biometric 
Identifier Act, TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 503.001(b) (2009); See WASH. REV. CODE § 19.375.020(1) (2017). 
364 See, e.g., California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, 2018 Cal. Stat. ch. 55. 
365 See id. 
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criticized by privacy scholars, who claim that placing excessive agency in the hands of 
consumers is dangerous and ineffective.366 
Category Five: Enforcement of Permitted Use 
  
 
The final category of regulation facial recognition technology and biometric information 
involves any statutorily-created remedies for improper use. These provisions include 
administrative remedies, civil litigation, and criminal penalties.367 A total of 117 coded pieces of 
legislation (51 enacted) have some mention of available remedies for violations, including 
ninety-eight coded state statutes (twenty-nine enacted) and nineteen coded local ordinances.368  
                                               
366 See Daniel J. Solove, Introduction: Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma, 126 HARV. L. REV. 
1879, 1880-81 (2013); Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, The Pathologies of Digital Consent, 96 WASH. U.L. 
REV. 1461, 1464 (2019). 
367 See Evan Ringel, Facial Recognition Technology Regulation Database (Jan. 21, 2021) (unpublished Excel 
spreadsheet) (on file with author). 
368 See id. 
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Administrative remedies include statutory provisions imposing some sort of procedural 
punishment on the governmental entity that used facial recognition technology or biometric data 
improperly. Four enacted statutes have provisions that mandate the suppression of unlawfully 
collected evidence, meaning that a prosecutor cannot use any evidence unlawfully collected 
using facial recognition technology by a law enforcement agency.369 Each of these provisions are 
in bills relating to police use of facial recognition technology within some form of surveillance 
camera, either officer-worn body cameras or cameras attached to an unmanned drone.370 Seven 
coded local ordinances also provide for the suppression of unlawfully collected evidence.371 New 
                                               
369 See Act of May 16, 2020, 2020 Minn. Ch. Law 82 (preventing police from using a drone with facial recognition 
unless “expressly authorized by a warrant”); Act of June 24, 2016, 2016 N.H. Ch. 322 (relating to the use of facial 
recognition technology in officer-worn body cameras); Act of Nov. 24, 2020, 2020 N.J. Pub. L. No. 129 (regulating 
the use of officer-worn body cameras); Act of June 25, 2015, 2015 Ore. Laws 550 (relating to the use of officer-
worn body cameras). 
370 See id. 
371 See, e.g., BOSTON, MASS., CODE, Ch. 16-62 (2020); BROOKLINE, MASS., CODE, Art. 8.39 (2019); SOMERVILLE, 
MASS., CODE, art. III, div. 1, § 9-25 (2019). 
Mention of Available Remedies for Statutory Violation
Regulation mentions remedy within bill (n=117, including 51 enacted)
Regulation does not mention remedy within bill  (n=262, including 80 enacted)
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Jersey A.B. 4312 and seven local ordinances have a provision stating that police officers or 
government employees violating restrictions on facial recognition technology will be subject to 
administrative discipline.372 One proposed statute from 2020, A.B. 10411, suggested the 
withholding of state funding from any police department that failed to comply with a ban on 
using facial recognition technology as the sole determinant of probable cause.373 
 
The mechanisms for enforcing civil and criminal remedies can be divided into three 
categories. Some statutes and ordinances establish a private right of action allowing an individual 
harmed by an improper use of facial recognition or biometrics to bring a claim in state or federal 
court to enforce the statute.374 As discussed in Chapter 1, BIPA is one such statute, allowing a 
                                               
372 See Act of June 24, 2016, 2016 N.H. Ch. 322 (relating to the use of facial recognition technology in officer-worn 
body cameras); see also BOSTON, MASS., CODE, Ch. 16-62 (2020); BROOKLINE, MASS., CODE, Art. 8.39 (2019); 
SOMERVILLE, MASS., CODE, art. III, div. 1, § 9-25 (2019). 
373 See Act of May 4, 2020, A.B. 10411, 2020 Leg. (N.Y. 2020) (banning the use of evidence acquired from facial 
recognition technology as the sole determinant of probable cause in a criminal trial). 
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party to recover the greater of statutory damages of $1,000 or actual damages for a negligent 
violation by a private entity and the greater of statutory damages of $5,000 or actual damages for 
an intentional or reckless violation by a private entity.375 A total of six coded and enacted statutes 
and ordinances establish a private right or action against a private entity.376  
Other statutes allow private individuals to bring a civil action against a government 
officer or agency.377 An additional eighteen coded and enacted statutes and ordinances create this 
sort of right, including fifteen local ordinances.378 The CCOPS model bill contains a provision 
establishing a private right of action against local government officials but limiting potential 
recovery to injunctive relief and attorney’s fees.379 Accordingly, many of the local ordinances 
using the CCOPS framework have a similar limitation on recovery from a suit against a 
government entity.380  
A third group of statutes and ordinances assign enforcement for statutory violations to a 
state or local attorney general who brings a civil action on behalf of citizens of the state.381 This 
                                               
375 Biometric Information Privacy Act, 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 14/20 (2008). 
376 See Evan Ringel, Facial Recognition Technology Regulation Database (Jan. 21, 2021) (unpublished Excel 
spreadsheet) (on file with author). 
377 See, e.g., Act of Nov. 24, 2020, 2020 N.J. Pub. L. No. 129 (regulating the use of officer-worn body cameras); Act 
of May 16, 2020, 2020 Minn. Ch. Law 82 (preventing police from using a drone with facial recognition unless 
“expressly authorized by a warrant”). 
378 See Evan Ringel, Facial Recognition Technology Regulation Database (Jan. 21, 2021) (unpublished Excel 
spreadsheet) (on file with author). 
379 See Community Control Over Police Surveillance (CCOPS) Model Bill, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/legal-
document/community-control-over-police-surveillance-ccops-model-bill?redirect=other/community-control-over-
police-surveillance-ccops-model-bill (last visited Jan. 27, 2021). 
380 See, e.g., SEATTLE, WASH., CODE, Ch. 14.18 (2018); CAMBRIDGE, MASS., CODE, ch. 2.128 (2018); DAVIS, CAL., 
CODE, Art. 26.07.020 (2018). 
381 See Evan Ringel, Facial Recognition Technology Regulation Database (Jan. 21, 2021) (unpublished Excel 
spreadsheet) (on file with author). 
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authority is often exclusive. For example, a 2015 data security bill from Connecticut authorizes 
the Connecticut Attorney General to bring a civil action “in the name of the state” if he 
determines that a private contractor has improperly used biometric data or other personal 
information.382 The bill is also explicit that individuals have no other form of legal recourse, 
stating that “[nothing] in [the bill] shall be construed to create a private right of action.”383 
The most commonly available remedy for violations of a statute or ordinance is 
injunctive relief, with twenty-seven enacted and coded statutes and ordinances allowing 
aggrieved parties to obtain an injunction halting the improper use of facial recognition 
technology or biometric data.384 Thirteen enacted and coded statutes and ordinances, including 
BIPA385 and the California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018,386 allow an aggrieved party to 
recover the actual damages suffered as a result of the improper use of facial recognition 
technology or biometric information. Fifteen enacted and coded statutes and ordinances allow for 
the recovery of a statutorily created monetary damage award for a violation.387 While these 
                                               
382 See Act of June 30, 2015, 2015 Conn. Pub. Acts 142(g) (relating to data security for private state contractors). 
383 See id. 
384 See Evan Ringel, Facial Recognition Technology Regulation Database (Jan. 21, 2021) (unpublished Excel 
spreadsheet) (on file with author); see also California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, 2018 Cal. Stat. ch. 55; Act of 
May 29, 2018, 2018 Colo. Sess. Laws. Ch. 266 (strengthening protections for consumer data privacy by including 
“biometric data” in definition of “personal information”); Biometric Information Privacy Act, 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
§ 14/20 (2008); OAKLAND, CAL., CODE, Ch. 9.64.045 (2019); BOSTON, MASS., CODE, Ch. 16-62 (2020); 
CAMBRIDGE, MASS., CODE, ch. 2.128 (2018). 
385 See Biometric Information Privacy Act, 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 14/20 (2008). 
386 See California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, 2018 Cal. Stat. ch. 55. 
387 See Evan Ringel, Facial Recognition Technology Regulation Database (Jan. 21, 2021) (unpublished Excel 
spreadsheet) (on file with author). 
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damage awards can range from $1 to $50,000, most of the statutes allow for a statutory damage 
award of approximately $1,000.388 
State legislatures and city councils have used a host of legislative approaches to regulate 
facial recognition technology. Some statutes and ordinances are explicitly focused on 
government or private use of facial recognition technology, while others regulate facial 
recognition indirectly through provisions limiting the use or processing of biometric data. 2020 
saw the first enacted state statute focused on the regulation of facial recognition technology 
(Washington’s S.B. 6280), while an examination of proposed statutes from the 2020 legislative 
session showed that more states are trying to address the problems posed by unregulated use of 
facial recognition technology.389 However, at least one facial recognition provider has argued in 
a lawsuit that their services are subject to constitutional protection.390 The First Amendment 
could represent a significant barrier to the regulation of facial recognition technology and would 
likely change the regulatory options available to states and municipalities. Chapter 3 of this 






                                               
388 See id.; see also OAKLAND, CAL., CODE, Ch. 9.64.045 (2019); PORTLAND, ME., CODE, Ch. 17, Art. XI, § 17.129 
(2020); California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, 2018 Cal. Stat. ch. 55. 
389 See Evan Ringel, Facial Recognition Technology Regulation Database (Jan. 21, 2021) (unpublished Excel 
spreadsheet) (on file with author). 
390 See Kashmir Hill, Facial Recognition Start-Up Mounts a First Amendment Defense, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 11, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/11/technology/clearview-floyd-abrams.html. 
 92 
CHAPTER 3: EXAMINING THE APPLICABILITY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT TO 




 Chapter 2 of this thesis examined the state and local regulations regulating the use of 
facial recognition technology by both government agencies and private actors. In the absence of 
federal legislation controlling use of facial recognition technology, states and municipalities have 
been forced to fill the regulatory gap. These governmental entities have approached regulating 
facial recognition technology in a variety of ways. A handful of local ordinances have banned the 
use of facial recognition technology by government agencies, and Portland, Oregon is the first 
city to ban the use of facial recognition technology by private entities in places of public 
accommodation.391 Washington has passed a law (S.B. 6280) regulating the use of facial 
recognition technology by state and local government actors, and other states have provisions 
prohibiting specific uses of facial recognition technology by law enforcement agencies.392 
                                               
391 See PORTLAND, OR., CODE, Ch. 34.10 (Aug. 3, 2020). 
392 See Facial Recognition Act, 2020 Wash. Adv. Leg. Serv. 257 (2020); see also An Act Relative to Justice, Equity 
and Accountability in Law Enforcement in the Commonwealth, 2020 Mass. Acts 253, § 26 (2020).; OR. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 133.741(1)(D) (2020); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 105-D:2(XII) (2020). 
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 Three states have biometric privacy laws that place restrictions on the collection and 
dissemination of biometric data by private entities; these laws require companies to obtain notice 
and consent from individuals before collecting their biometric data.393 Illinois’ Biometric 
Information Privacy Act (BIPA), the first state-level biometric privacy law (enacted in 2008), 
provides the cause of action for a recent lawsuit that will likely shape future attempts to regulate 
facial recognition technology.  
On May 28, 2020, the ACLU filed a lawsuit in Cook County (Illinois) Circuit Court to 
enjoin the collection and use of facial images by Clearview AI, Inc. As discussed in Chapter 1 of 
this thesis, Clearview AI uses more than three billion images “scraped” from public websites to 
populate their facial recognition database.394 The ACLU and other civil society organizations 
filed suit on behalf of the Illinois residents whose faces were collected from websites like 
Facebook and LinkedIn to appear in Clearview’s database.395 According to the complaint, the 
collection and retention of these images violated BIPA because Clearview failed to obtain 
written consent from the individuals depicted in the photos; inform the individuals of “when their 
biometric data [would be deleted]”; or tell the individuals “to whom Clearview [was] disclosing 
or selling their faceprints.”396 
                                               
393 See Biometric Information Privacy Act, 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 14/10 (2008); Capture or Use of Biometric 
Identifier Act, TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 503.001(2009); WASH. REV. CODE § 19.375.020 (2017) (prohibiting 
anyone from “enroll[ing] a biometric identifier in a database for a commercial purpose” without notice or consent). 
 
394 See Kashmir Hill, The Secretive Company That Might End Privacy as We Know It, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/18/technology/clearview-privacy-facial-recognition.html 
395 See Compl. of Pl., ACLU v. Clearview AI, 2020-CH-04353 (Ill. Cir. Ct. May 28, 2020). 
396 See id. at 3. 
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It should be noted that ACLU v. Clearview AI is not the only lawsuit filed against the 
facial recognition provider in the aftermath of Kashmir Hill’s New York Times exposé. In 
December 2020, Clearview AI successfully consolidated nine separate lawsuits against it in the 
Northern District of Illinois and Southern District of New York; a federal judicial panel joined 
these lawsuits through a procedure called multidistrict litigation, determining that the suits “share 
factual questions” based on Clearview AI’s allegedly improper conduct.397 The Canadian Privacy 
Commission determined that Clearview AI’s facial recognition application was illegal after a 
yearlong investigation, leading the company to leave the country entirely.398 Clearview AI has 
also faced lawsuits under consumer fraud laws,399 and at least one company accused of using 
Clearview AI’s facial recognition application has also been the subject of litigation.400 
 Clearview AI has advanced many different procedural arguments in support of their 
motion to dismiss in ACLU v. Clearview AI. The company claims that they are not subject to 
personal jurisdiction in Illinois due to the absence of a “nexus between Clearview, Illinois, and 
                                               
397 See In re Clearview AI Inc., 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 236053 (J.P.M.L. Dec. 15, 2020) (consolidating the lawsuits 
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399 See Ruling on Def. Mot. to Dismiss, State of Vermont v. Clearview AI, Docket No. 226-3-20 (Vt. Sup. Ct. Sept. 
10, 2020). 




Plaintiffs’ alleged injuries.”401 Clearview AI alleges that the suit violates the extraterritoriality 
doctrine, arguing that the allegations stated in the complaint did not occur “primarily and 
substantially in Illinois.”402 The company also claims that the application of BIPA to Clearview’s 
conduct would violate the constitutional Commerce Clause by rendering the company liable 
under one state statute for their actions in a separate state.403 
 However, the substantive core of Clearview AI’s argument to dismiss ACLU v. Clearview 
AI is that Clearview’s “creation and use of its app” are protected speech for purposes of the First 
Amendment.404 To further explore Clearview AI’s argument, this chapter will examine the 
relationship between facial recognition technology and the First Amendment. First, this chapter 
will examine whether facial recognition technology is protected under the First Amendment. 
Assuming arguendo that facial recognition technology is subject to First Amendment protection, 
this chapter will then examine the potential scope of that protection. 
Does the First Amendment Apply to Facial Recognition Technology? 
 
 Clearview AI’s arguments that their facial recognition technology is protected by the 
First Amendment are built on Sorrell v. IMS Health, a 2011 Supreme Court case. Sorrell 
emerged from a challenge to the Prescription Confidentiality Law, a 2007 Vermont law 
prohibiting particular uses of doctor prescribing information.405 Specifically, the statute 
prohibited prescriber information from being sold by pharmacies, disclosed “for marketing 
                                               
401 See Mem. In Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss at 2, ACLU v. Clearview AI, 2020-CH-04353 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Oct. 7, 2020). 
402 See id. 
403 See id. at 14. 
404 See id. at 16. 
405 See Sorrell v. IMS Health, 564 U.S. 552 (2011). 
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purposes,” or “used for marketing” by drug manufacturers.406 The statute was designed in part to 
target “data miners,” companies that produce reports based on data acquired from pharmacies (or 
other entities), and “detailers,” firms employed by drug manufacturers who use the reports from 
data miners to “refine . . . marketing tactics and increase sales.”407 
 Sorrell’s focus on the collection and compilation of data mirrors a societal and economic 
evolution over the past quarter-century. Technological advances have altered every aspect of 
American life; commerce and personal interaction are funneled through a “platform economy” 
that presents unique regulatory challenges for regulators and creates instant challenges around 
consumer privacy.408 Law and technology scholar Julie Cohen argues that the American 
regulatory structure is struggling due to an “ongoing shift” from a socioeconomic environment 
where the industrial mode of development has long been dominant to a new socioeconomic 
environment where an information- and data-based economy has taken precedent.409 Vermont’s 
Prescription Confidentiality Law represented an attempt to target this monetization of individual 
data. 
 In striking down the law, the Sorrell Court applied what it called “heightened” scrutiny, 
ruling that Vermont had imposed both a speaker-based and content-based “burden on protected 
expression.”410 Associate Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote that Vermont’s law had the effect of 
“preventing detailers–and only detailers–from communicating with physicians in an effective 
                                               
406 See id. at 557. 
407 See id. 
408 See Julie E. Cohen, Law for the Platform Economy, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 133 (2017). 
409 See Julie E. Cohen, The Regulatory State in the Information Age, 17 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 369, 370 (2016). 
410 Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 572 (2011). 
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and informative manner.”411 In addition, the Court found that the “express purpose and practical 
effect” of the law were to reduce the marketing effectiveness of drug manufacturers.412  
In his decision, Justice Kennedy acknowledged the “strong argument” that prescriber-
identifying information is speech under the First Amendment. This argument leads to two 
statements by Kennedy that, though they are in dicta, have shaped the subsequent debate over the 
First Amendment and data. First, Justice Kennedy states that the Supreme Court has “held that 
the creation and dissemination of information are speech within the meaning of the First 
Amendment.”413 Second, Justice Kennedy refuses to consider Vermont’s request for an 
“exception to the rule that information is speech.”414 
The majority draws the “rule” that information is speech from several Supreme Court 
precedents, including Bartnicki v. Vopper,415 Rubin v. Coors Brewing Company,416 and Dun & 
Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders.417 Bartnicki involved a radio personality who, on his radio 
show, played an illegally intercepted recording featuring two representatives of a Pennsylvania 
teacher’s union that was involved in a contentious labor dispute.418 Though the conversation was 
                                               
411 See id. at 564. 
412 See id. 
413 See id. at 570. 
414 See id. 
415 See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 527 (2001) (cited by Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 570 
(2011)).  
416 See Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 481 (1995) (cited by Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 
570 (2011)). 
417 See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 759 (1985) (cited by Sorrell v. IMS Health 
Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 570 (2011)). 
418 See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 514 (2001). 
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obtained through an illegal wiretap, the radio personality was not involved in obtaining the 
conversation and had been sent a recording anonymously; regardless, the union representatives 
filed for damages under state and federal wiretap laws.419 The Supreme Court concluded that 
public disclosure of the wiretapped conversation by an uninvolved third party was protected by 
the First Amendment.420 Justice Kennedy relied on Bartnicki for the proposition that “disclosing” 
and “publishing” of information are speech for First Amendment purposes.421 
Rubin involved a challenge to the Federal Alcohol Administration Act (FAAA), which 
prohibited “disclosure of the alcohol content of beer” on either a label or in an advertisement.422 
The FAAA was intended to mitigate the potential threat of “strength wars,” where multiple 
brewers permitted to state the alcohol content of their beer would market their product 
specifically based on its capacity for intoxication.423 The Supreme Court threw out the 
regulation, finding that the FAAA was “[in]sufficiently tailored to its goal” of avoiding 
competitive marketing based on alcohol content.424 Justice Kennedy used Rubin to show that 
alcohol content information on beer labels was considered speech for First Amendment 
purposes; both parties in Rubin agreed that information on beer labels “constitutes commercial 
                                               
419 See id. 
420 See id. at 515. 
421 See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 570 (2011); see also Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 527 
(2001). 
422 See Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 478 (1995). 
423 See id. at 479. 
424 See id. at 490. 
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speech,” and the Court evaluated the statute using the Central Hudson commercial speech 
analysis.425 
Dun & Bradstreet, a prominent case in the defamation canon, involved a credit reporting 
agency that sent a report to a small group of subscribers falsely asserting that a construction 
contractor had filed for bankruptcy.426 The contractor subsequently brought a defamation action 
against the credit reporting agency that was appealed to the Supreme Court.427 A plurality of the 
Court ultimately ruled that, unlike Sullivan and other defamation cases involving a matter of 
public concern, a showing of “actual malice” was not required to award presumed and punitive 
damages.428 Justice Kennedy used Dun & Bradstreet to show that the information contained in a 
credit report is considered speech capable of defamation for First Amendment purposes.429 
Sorrell left it unclear whether data would be considered “speech” under the First 
Amendment, but other forms of “information” have been adjudicated at the lower court level. 
Courts have addressed the potential First Amendment coverage of Internet search engine results, 
with multiple federal district courts ruling that search results are protected as speech by the First 
Amendment.430 In Jian Zhang, a group of New York residents unsuccessfully challenged a 
Chinese search engine’s intentional blocking of content related to the Chinese pro-democracy 
                                               
425 See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 570 (2011); see also Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 
481 (1995). 
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428 See id. at 758-61. 
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430 See, e.g., Jian Zhang v. Baidu.com Inc., 10 F. Supp. 3d 433, 435 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); Langdon v. Google, Inc., 474 
F. Supp. 2d 622 (D. Del. 2007). 
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movement.431 In granting a motion to dismiss, the court described the function of a search engine 
as “retriev[ing] relevant information from the vast universe of data on the Internet and . .  . 
organiz[ing] it in a way that would be most helpful to the searcher.”432 Through this process, the 
search engine is determining (1) what information to include in the results and (2) the method of 
display for that information; the court considered those determinations sufficient to trigger First 
Amendment protection.433  
 Courts have also addressed the potential First Amendment protection of computer code. 
In 1996, the Northern District of California ruled that an encryption algorithm created by a Ph.D. 
candidate at the University of California was speech, determining that computer code was 
written expressively in a “language” much the same as other forms of speech and thus deserved 
First Amendment protection.434 The court also rejected the State Department’s argument that the 
computer code was not speech because it was “purely functional.”435 The Ninth Circuit upheld 
the ruling, but emphasized the “narrowness” of First Amendment protection for software, stating 
that most software “surely is not” expressive.436 A subsequent Sixth Circuit opinion also upheld 
First Amendment protection for computer source code, classifying the code as “an expressive 
means for the exchange of information and ideas about computer programming.”437 
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433 See id. at 438. 
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 A 2015 decision suggests that private companies performing surveillance-like functions 
via their collection and use of data may have First Amendment protection.438 In Digital 
Recognition Network, the Eighth Circuit ruled that a company that collected and sold license 
plate data to auto insurers and repossession agencies lacked standing to challenge an Arkansas 
statute criminalizing the use of an “automatic license plate reader system.”439 However, the 
court’s ruling was based on an Eleventh Amendment argument that the company couldn’t sue 
state officials seeking injunctive relief.440 The court was more sympathetic to a potential First 
Amendment argument. Citing Sorrell, the court suggested that the companies’ collection and 
dissemination of license plate data was “arguably affected with a constitutional interest” because 
it would be considered speech for First Amendment purposes.441 
 Despite significant judicial support for a seemingly broad interpretation of information as 
speech, at least one federal court has rejected an argument that the organization of information 
belonging to a third party is sufficient to create First Amendment protection.442 In CDK Global 
LLC v. Brnovich, the Federal District Court of Arizona ruled that a company operating a 
proprietary “dealer management” computer system housing confidential customer data could not 
exclude third parties from accessing the system.443 The court determined that, unlike search 
engine cases or other information-based First Amendment claims, the company organizing the 
                                               
438 See Digital Recognition Network, Inc. v. Hutchinson, 803 F.3d 952 (8th Cir. 2015). 
439 See id. at 955. 
440 See id. at 957-58. 
441 See id. at 957. 
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data failed to exercise any “editorial discretion” through determination of what speech to 
disseminate.444 
 As discussed further in Chapter 1, scholars have acknowledged the significant doctrinal 
inconvenience of treating information and data as First Amendment speech.445 Some have 
responded by arguing that data should not fall under the First Amendment’s reach; for example, 
Neil Richards has questioned the applicability of the First Amendment both before446 and after447 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Sorrell. Richards argues for a pre-Sorrell understanding that 
commercial regulation of the “huge data trade” did not trigger First Amendment protections,448 
noting that a world where commercial flows of data cannot be regulated is essentially a world in 
where commerce itself cannot be regulated.449 If Sorrell’s rule truly means that data flows are 
speech, Richards depicts a dystopian world where every regulation on the disclosure of 
information would be “presumptively unconstitutional,” eliminating medical privacy laws, 
financial privacy laws, and even the attorney-client privilege.450 Despite this potentially bleak 
regulatory future, other scholars have accepted that the Court’s language must be taken 
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seriously.451 Even if Justice Kennedy’s rule leads to a “yawning over-inclusiveness,” lower 
courts have adopted the rule to the extent that reversing course would be difficult.452 
 A decision in a Vermont state court case involving Clearview AI highlights the ambiguity 
around whether the company’s offerings should receive First Amendment protection.453 Vermont 
v. Clearview AI involves a consumer fraud action, with the Vermont Attorney General claiming 
that Clearview AI engaged in “unfair acts and practices” by collecting photographs and using 
them in a searchable facial recognition database without consent.454 The State also alleged that 
Clearview AI “fraudulently acquired” personal information (in the form of biometric data) and 
engaged in “deceptive” acts by misrepresenting its product.455 Clearview AI filed a motion to 
dismiss the action on multiple grounds, including an argument that the company’s facial 
recognition application “and the computer code used to write it” are protected by the First 
Amendment.456 In September 2020, a superior court judge allowed the allegations of 
misrepresenting the product and engaging in unfair acts and practices to continue, while 
dismissing the fraudulent acquisition of data claims on non-First Amendment grounds.457 
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 The court quickly dismissed the argument that Clearview’s allegedly deceptive 
misrepresentations of its product would be protected by the First Amendment, noting that the 
statements would qualify as commercial speech due to their advertising nature and that the First 
Amendment does not offer protection for “false or deceptive commercial speech.”458 However, 
determining whether Clearview AI’s facial recognition application is First Amendment speech 
was a “harder question” for the court.459 The opinion suggested that Clearview AI’s application 
may not be speech under the First Amendment, with the functions of the application resembling 
other computer code cases where the First Amendment did not apply.460 The court explained as 
follows: 
[T]he app arguably has no expressive speech component and is more similar to the 
“entirely mechanical” automatic trading system in Vartuli that “induce[d] action 
without the intercession of the mind or the will of the recipient.” The user simply 
inputs a photograph of a person, and the app automatically displays other 
photographs of that person with no further interaction required from the human 
user. In that sense, the app might not be entitled to any First Amendment 
protection.461  
 
However, the court did admit the similarities between Clearview’s facial recognition application 
and search engines, which, as discussed earlier in this chapter, do typically receive some level of 
First Amendment protection.462 Ultimately, the court dodged the question in much the same way 
the Sorrell court does. Since the court preliminarily determined that Vermont’s regulation would 
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be a content-neutral regulation on speech sufficient to survive intermediate scrutiny (making the 
issue of whether Clearview AI’s application is speech irrelevant), the court “assum[ed] without 
deciding” that the application was speech.463 
 Despite several nebulous judicial rulings and arguments from privacy scholars that data 
should not be considered speech under the First Amendment, a general consensus seems to be 
developing post-Sorrell that data and the accompanying processing technology are subject to 
some First Amendment protection.464 In ACLU v. Clearview AI, the most prominent of the 
lawsuits against Clearview AI’s facial recognition application, both sides concede that Clearview 
AI should receive some First Amendment protection. While the plaintiffs “recogniz[e] that BIPA 
may impose an incidental burden on Clearview’s search tool,”465 one of Clearview AI’s core 
arguments is that BIPA is an unconstitutional infringement on their First Amendment right to 
collect, process, and disseminate facial biometric information.466 
 For the purposes of this paper, the author will assume that data and facial recognition 
technology are subject to some level of First Amendment scrutiny. Though the issue has not been 
directly decided by the Supreme Court, the specific language of Justice Kennedy’s rule in Sorrell 
suggests that information and data are speech for First Amendment purposes. Subsequent 
decisions also indicate that lower courts are taking Justice Kennedy at his word, acknowledging 
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the First Amendment protection available to technologies that process data. It is telling that both 
parties in ACLU v. Clearview AI are willing to concede that Clearview AI’s facial recognition 
technology receives some First Amendment protection. The plaintiffs’ easiest argument would 
be to assert that Clearview AI’s technology is not subject to the First Amendment, which would 
lead a court to uphold the statute, but they instead argue their case under a framework of 
intermediate scrutiny.467 
 The remainder of this chapter will examine the scope of First Amendment protection for 
facial recognition technology. This section will assume that the First Amendment does apply in 
some way to facial recognition technology and examine the arguments for different levels of 
judicial scrutiny. 
What is the Scope of First Amendment Protection for Facial Recognition Technology?  
 
If the First Amendment does apply to facial recognition technology, the judicial question 
then becomes the level of constitutional scrutiny applied to regulations limiting the use of facial 
recognition. Justice Kennedy’s decision in Sorrell provides little guidance. Despite a general 
statement of heightened scrutiny, the Court decided not to clarify whether it was applying the 
intermediate scrutiny typical in a commercial speech case or the stricter scrutiny applied to “pure 
speech.”468 For the purposes of Sorrell, the Court accepted Vermont’s argument that prescriber-
identifying information is a “mere commodity” subject to intermediate scrutiny, noting that the 
result would be the same regardless of the level of scrutiny applied.469 Since Vermont’s statute 
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imposed a “speaker- and content-based burden on protected expression,” any application of 
heightened scrutiny was sufficient to declare the statute unconstitutional.470 
While the result in Sorrell may be the same, the required showing for the government is 
different based on which First Amendment standard is applied. If a regulation targets either non-
speech or non-expressive conduct, the government only has to survive a “rational basis” 
inquiry.471 Under intermediate scrutiny, restrictions on speech are constitutional as long as they 
“also directly advance a substantial government interest that could not be served as well by a 
more limited restriction.”472 Commercial speech does receive some First Amendment protection, 
with courts interested in protecting society’s “strong interest in the free flow of commercial 
information,”473 but that protection can be overcome by a sufficient government showing. Strict 
scrutiny, on the other hand, is triggered by a content-based or speaker-based restriction on speech 
and requires the state to show that its regulatory action is a “narrowly tailored means of serving a 
compelling state interest.”474 The remaining ambiguity post-Sorrell has left it unclear what 
standard of scrutiny actually applies when a court hears a First Amendment challenge to the 
regulation of information or data.475 
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 The district court, in Vermont v. Clearview AI, applied intermediate scrutiny to Clearview 
AI’s facial recognition technology, with the court finding that Vermont’s attempted regulation 
was content-neutral and based “purely on [the Clearview app’s] alleged function . . . allowing 
users to easily identify Vermonters through photographs obtained unfairly and without 
consent.”476 The court also rejects Clearview AI’s reliance on Sorrell to claim that the regulation 
is “speaker-based,” differentiating Vermont’s generally applicable consumer protection statute 
from the statute in Sorrell, which specifically prohibited “pharmaceutical manufacturers” from 
using prescriber information “for marketing purposes” while allowing other uses of prescriber 
information.477 Vermont’s request for an injunction and civil penalties is framed as not based on 
the content of the images collected by Clearview AI’s application, but rather based on the 
application’s invasion of individual privacy.478 
 The Vermont court’s interpretation that intermediate scrutiny should apply to Vermont’s 
attempted regulation of Clearview AI is echoed by the plaintiffs in ACLU v. Clearview AI, who 
argue that regulation of Clearview AI’s facial recognition application should be subject to 
intermediate scrutiny.479 This sets up one of the core arguments around the regulation of 
Clearview AI’s allegedly protected speech/conduct. Clearview AI presents their activities as the 
                                               
Dismiss, ACLU v. Clearview AI, 2020-CH-04353 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Nov. 2, 2020) (arguing that intermediate scrutiny for 
commercial speech should apply to Clearview AI’s challenge of BIPA). 
476 See Ruling on Def. Mot. to Dismiss at 14, State of Vermont v. Clearview AI, Docket No. 226-3-20 (Vt. Sup. Ct. 
Sept. 10, 2020). 
477 See Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 557 (2011); see also Ruling on Def. Mot. to Dismiss at 14-15, State of Vermont v. 
Clearview AI, Docket No. 226-3-20 (Vt. Sup. Ct. Sept. 10, 2020). 
478 See Ruling on Def. Mot. to Dismiss at 16, State of Vermont v. Clearview AI, Docket No. 226-3-20 (Vt. Sup. Ct. 
Sept. 10, 2020) (“The State seeks those penalties because of the app’s function in invading Vermonters’ privacy, not 
because of disagreement with the app’s content.”). 
479 See Pl. Resp. to Def. Mot. to Dismiss at 18, ACLU v. Clearview AI, 2020-CH-04353 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Nov. 2, 2020) 
(citing United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)). 
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“collection and use of publicly-available photographs.”480 This would almost certainly receive 
the full protection of the First Amendment; the language closely mirrors the “creation and 
dissemination of information” that Justice Kennedy refers to as speech in Sorrell.481 Under this 
interpretation of Clearview AI’s application, BIPA’s restriction on the collection of biometric 
information without notice and consent would infringe on Clearview AI’s “ability to use this 
public information in Clearview’s search engine.”482 
 Intermediate scrutiny under United States v. O’Brien, a Supreme Court case upholding a 
ban on the destruction of a military draft card, applies when challenged conduct contains 
elements of both “speech” and “nonspeech.”483 The ACLU argues that BIPA applies not to 
Clearview AI’s republication of publicly-available photographs, but to the company’s collection 
of a biometric identifier without consent.484 Analogizing this nonconsensual collection to a 
trespass or traditional privacy torts, the ACLU suggests this type of activity “is, and always has 
been, the subject of rules about consent.”485 A distinction is drawn between a potential regulation 
on dissemination of lawfully captured data (which may trigger strict scrutiny as a direct 
restriction on speech) and BIPA’s restriction on the capture of a “wholly new category” of data 
                                               
480 See Mem. In Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss at 16, ACLU v. Clearview AI, 2020-CH-04353 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Oct. 7, 2020). 
481 See Mem. In Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss at 16, ACLU v. Clearview AI, 2020-CH-04353 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Oct. 7, 2020); 
see also Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 571 (2011). 
482 See Mem. In Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss at 16, ACLU v. Clearview AI, 2020-CH-04353 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Oct. 7, 2020). 
483 See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (“When ‘speech’ and ‘nonspeech’ elements are combined 
in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element 
can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms.”). 
484 See Pl. Resp. to Def. Mot. to Dismiss at 15, ACLU v. Clearview AI, 2020-CH-04353 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Nov. 2, 2020). 
485 See id. at 15. 
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(which is more likely to trigger intermediate scrutiny).486 In the ACLU’s view, ignoring the 
difference between the two is analogous to arguing that “publishing a photograph of people’s 
hands should be treated no differently than collecting their fingerprints.”487 
 Other parties weighing in on the litigation against Clearview AI have advanced other 
arguments for why regulation of Clearview AI’s facial recognition program should be subject to 
intermediate scrutiny. The Electronic Frontier Foundation filed an amicus brief in November in 
support of the ACLU’s lawsuit against Clearview AI.488 In the brief, the EFF argued that 
“Clearview’s faceprinting” should not be subject to strict constitutional scrutiny because it is not 
a matter of public concern.489 This argument is centered within precedent from privacy tort 
litigation. Courts weighing the competing interests of First Amendment publication and 
individual privacy have often given greater deference when a regulation targets private speech 
while scrutinizing the regulation more carefully if the First Amendment right involves a matter 
of public concern.490 For example, the newsworthiness exception to the public disclosure of 
private facts tort allows for a constitutional defense to liability for publication of truthful 
information, but only when that publication is of sufficient social value.491 
                                               
486 See id. at 16. 
487 See id.  
488 See Br. for Elec. Frontier Found. as Amici Curiae Opposing Def. Mot. to Dismiss, ACLU v. Clearview AI, 2020-
CH-04353 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Nov. 2, 2020). 
489 See id. at 7. 
490 See id.; see also New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (requiring a showing of actual malice for 
allegedly defamatory speech about a public figure on a matter of public concern); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. 
Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985) (allowing a lower defamation standard where allegedly defamatory 
speech targets a private figure on a matter of private concern). 
491 See Shulman v. Grp. W Prods., Inc., 18 Cal. 4th 200, 222, 955 P.2d 469, 483 (1998), as modified on denial of 
reh’g (July 29, 1998) (“First, the analysis of newsworthiness does involve courts to some degree in a normative 
assessment of the ‘social value’ of a publication.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
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 According to the EFF, Clearview AI’s faceprinting is like the defamatory credit report at 
issue in Dun & Bradstreet, protected by the First Amendment but simultaneously “serving no 
public issue.”492 However, the EFF’s use of Dun & Bradstreet’s factors is somewhat misleading, 
raising the question of whether Clearview AI’s collection and processing of facial truly falls 
within the same category. Here is the brief’s framing of the factors in Dun & Bradstreet: 
In Dun & Bradstreet, a plurality of the Court found that a defamatory credit report 
concerned “no public issue” based on several factors: (1) it was “damaging to the 
victim’s reputation”; (2) it was “solely in the individual interest of the speaker and 
its specific business audience”; and (3) it was only distributed to a limited number 
of recipients, paying subscribers who were contractually prohibited from further 
distribution of the report.493  
 
A closer examination of the actual language from Dun & Bradstreet tells a slightly different 
story. The Court does consider that the credit report was “solely in the individual interest of the 
speaker and its specific business audience.”494 However, the Court then goes on to state that the 
particular interest “warrants no special protection when . . . the speech is wholly false and clearly 
damaging to the victim’s business reputation.”495 This says something different than the EFF’s 
framing of the factors. Rather than considering damage to the victim’s reputation and the 
individual interest of the speaker as two factors to be considered separately, the Court’s language 
presents the “individual interest” as a relevant factor only when the speech is “wholly false and 
clearly damaging to the victim’s business reputation.” Accordingly, even if Clearview AI’s First 
                                               
492 See Br. for Elec. Frontier Found. as Amici Curiae Opposing Def. Mot. to Dismiss at 9, ACLU v. Clearview AI, 
2020-CH-04353 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Nov. 2, 2020); see also Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 
749, 759 (1985). 
493 See Br. for Elec. Frontier Found. as Amici Curiae Opposing Def. Mot. to Dismiss at 9, ACLU v. Clearview AI, 
2020-CH-04353 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Nov. 2, 2020). 
494 See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 762 (1985). 
495 See id. 
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Amendment interest can be reduced to the company itself and users of the company’s facial 
recognition technology, an element of “whole” falsity and reputation damage is still necessary to 
ensure intermediate scrutiny. 
 The third Dun & Bradstreet factor cited by the EFF is also worthy of further scrutiny. 
According to the EFF, the credit report did not concern a public issue because it was only 
distributed to a “limited number” of subscribers who could not distribute it further. The EFF 
suggested that Clearview AI’s facial recognition technology is similarly limited in the number of 
people who have access to it, but there is a significant difference in numbers. In Dun & 
Bradstreet, the defamatory credit report was only made available to five subscribers; the Court 
argued that the scope of distribution was so limited that there was no way the report “involve[d] 
any strong interest in the free flow of commercial information.”496  
The use of Clearview AI’s facial recognition application is more widespread. When 
Kashmir Hill first published her New York Times article in January 2020, she wrote that “more 
than 600” police departments were using the technology.497 An August 2020 interview with 
Clearview AI’s founder revealed that more than 2,400 police departments had contracts to use 
the company’s facial recognition application.498 While no court has drawn a line deciding exactly 
how many people must have access to speech, the scope of information flow is much larger for 
thousands of law enforcement agencies than five subscribers to a credit report, suggesting that a 
potential regulation may be more burdensome. The EFF argued that Clearview AI’s facial 
                                               
496 See id. (internal citations omitted). 
497 See Kashmir Hill, The Secretive Company That Might End Privacy as We Know It, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/18/technology/clearview-privacy-facial-recognition.html. 
498 See Elizabeth Lopatto, Clearview AI CEO Says ‘Over 2,400 Police Agencies’ Are Using its Facial Recognition 
Software, THE VERGE (Aug. 26, 2020), https://www.theverge.com/2020/8/26/21402978/clearview-ai-ceo-interview-
2400-police-agencies-facial-recognition. 
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recognition technology is not a matter of public concern “just because the company sells the 
service to law enforcement agencies,” making a slippery slope argument that any personal data 
could be used to solve crimes without necessarily becoming a matter of public concern.499 
Eugene Volokh and Jane Bambauer categorically rejected this argument in an opposing amicus 
brief on behalf of Clearview AI, claiming that the general public has an “obvious interest in . . . 
prompt and accurate identification of criminal suspects”500 similar to the public interest in the 
identity of a rape victim.501 
The next paragraph in Dun & Bradstreet emphasized the concern about the potential 
burden of regulation. The Court wrote that the credit report, motivated only by hope of financial 
profit, is “hardy [speech] . . . unlikely to be deterred by incidental state regulation.”502 If the 
regulated speech is, as Clearview AI would argue, the entire process of collecting publicly 
available photographs and obtaining a faceprint to use in facial recognition searches, regulations 
of biometric data and facial recognition technology surely represent far more than an 
“incidental” burden on Clearview AI’s speech.503 If the regulated speech is, as plaintiffs would 
argue, solely Clearview AI’s “dissemination or discussion of information [the company] has 
lawfully acquired,” BIPA would represent less of a burden on speech and would be more likely 
to trigger only intermediate scrutiny. 
                                               
499 See Br. for Elec. Frontier Found. as Amici Curiae Opposing Def. Mot. to Dismiss at 9-10, ACLU v. Clearview 
AI, 2020-CH-04353 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Nov. 2, 2020). 
500 See id. 
501 See id. (citing Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 536). 
502 See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 762 (1985). 
503 See Br. for First Amendment Clinic at Duke Law et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Def. Mot. to Dismiss, ACLU 
v. Clearview AI, 2020-CH-04353 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 2020) (arguing that any Supreme Court distinction between 
use and conduct for First Amendment purposes is untenable when a law targets “information gathering, analysis, 
and creation”). 
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Can the different facets of Clearview AI’s facial recognition technology be separated out 
in this way, with some portions of the process representing speech and others representing non-
expressive conduct? There is no clear answer, and the issue has not been formally adjudicated in 
a facial recognition context. However, the Seventh Circuit suggests in ACLU v. Alvarez (2012) 
that a First Amendment differentiation between parts of a technological speech process (in this 
case, the videotaping of law enforcement officers without their consent) may not be possible.504 
In Alvarez, the Seventh Circuit upheld the ACLU’s challenge to an Illinois eavesdropping statute 
on First Amendment grounds, ruling that there is no “fixed First Amendment line between the 
act of creating speech” and the subsequent dissemination of that speech.505 To the court, a 
regulation restricting the collection of a recording “suppresses speech . . . as effectively” as a 
regulation that restricts the later distribution of that recording.506 The court also definitively 
rejects the State’s argument that the restriction does not implicate any first Amendment interest, 
stating that such a restriction would allow the State to limit speech by “restricting an early step in 
the speech process rather than the end result.”507 
Relying on Alvarez, Volokh and Bambauer argue that a First Amendment distinction 
between speech and non-speech for Clearview AI’s facial recognition technology is 
unworkable.508 In their eyes, the collection and use of non-private information is “inextricably 
                                               
504 See ACLU v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 596 (7th Cir. 2012) (“[T]here is no fixed First Amendment line between the 
act of creating speech and the speech itself.”). 
505 See id. 
506 Id. 
507 See id. at 597. 
508 See Br. for First Amendment Clinic at Duke Law et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Def. Mot. to Dismiss at 4, 
ACLU v. Clearview AI, 2020-CH-04353 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 2020). 
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intertwined with the right to produce the speech upon which that information is based,” even if 
that information is collected via a mechanical device like a camera.509 Sorrell stands for the idea 
that the First Amendment protects not only the communication of speech, but also the 
“upstream” activities that enable communication.510 Accordingly, a court should not differentiate 
between Clearview AI’s (non-consensual) collection of publicly posted images and production of 
a faceprint, which the ACLU alleges is non-speech, and the subsequent dissemination of facial 
recognition search results, which both sides concede is likely First Amendment speech.511 
A preliminary decision in Vermont’s litigation against Clearview AI may indicate that 
some courts are willing to disregard Alvarez’s (non-binding) potential applicability to facial 
recognition technology and make a speech-nonspeech distinction.512 In the decision denying 
Clearview AI’s motion to dismiss, the Vermont state court suggested that Clearview AI’s 
application may contain a speech “component,” with some portions considered First Amendment 
speech and others considered functional “nonspeech.”513 The ACLU’s argument for the 
application of intermediate O’Brien scrutiny draws a similar distinction, arguing that BIPA’s 
requirement of consent before the capture of a faceprint is a regulation of non-speech conduct 
                                               
509 See id. at 4-5. 
510 See id. at 4-5 (citing Sorrell v. v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 571 (2011)). 
511 See Br. for First Amendment Clinic at Duke Law et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Def. Mot. to Dismiss at 7, 
ACLU v. Clearview AI, 2020-CH-04353 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 2020) (“Like regulation of a painting process or a 
writing method, restriction of Clearview’s use of faceprints restricts speech by preventing Clearview from creating 
new information. Illinois cannot circumvent the First Amendment by having its restrictions act earlier in the speech 
process. Restricting speech is just as nefarious at the information gathering and creation stages as at the publication 
stage”); see also Pl. Resp. to Def. Mot. to Dismiss at 17, ACLU v. Clearview AI, 2020-CH-04353 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Nov. 
2, 2020) (“Even recognizing that BIPA may impose an incidental burden on Clearview’s search tool, the law need 
only survive [intermediate] O’Brien scrutiny.”). 
512 See Ruling on Def. Mot. to Dismiss at 13, State of Vermont v. Clearview AI, Docket No. 226-3-20 (Vt. Sup. Ct. 
Sept. 10, 2020). 
513 See id. 
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separate from the potentially First Amendment-protected use of a legally obtained faceprint.514 
This separation is also used to reject Clearview AI’s analogies to the First Amendment protection 
given to search engines.515 BIPA is focused only on the collection of biometric identifiers 
without consent, not the operation of a search engine or an operator’s “ability to make editorial 
judgments in determining what publicly-available content to present.”516 
Both Clearview AI and the company’s supporters argue that regulation of the company’s 
facial recognition application should be subject to strict scrutiny, requiring both a compelling 
government interest and a regulation narrowly tailored to that interest.517 Clearview AI’s 
argument that BIPA should be subject to strict scrutiny is based on BIPA’s alleged “targeting 
[of] specific content,” namely the regulation’s specific applicability to “biometric information” 
and “biometric identifiers” but not to photographs, written signatures, or other types of 
content.518 According to Clearview AI, BIPA’s focus on specific content means that the statute 
“target[s] speech based on its communicative content.”519 
                                               
514 See id. at 16-17. 
515 See Pl. Resp. to Def. Mot. to Dismiss at 17, ACLU v. Clearview AI, 2020-CH-04353 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Nov. 2, 2020); 
see also Mem. In Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss at 14, ACLU v. Clearview AI, 2020-CH-04353 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Oct. 7, 
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see also Biometric Information Privacy Act, 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 14/10 (2008). 
519 See id. (citing Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 163). 
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In Sorrell, Justice Kennedy deemed the Vermont statute unconstitutional as a “content- 
and speaker-based restriction[]” on the sale and use of information,520 analogizing to a 
hypothetical law “prohibiting trade magazines from purchasing or using ink.”521 As discussed 
earlier in this chapter, Sorrell is unclear about the specific level of scrutiny applied to this type of 
restriction; however, the decision made it clear that some form of heightened scrutiny must apply 
when a state imposes a content-based restriction.522  
Clearview AI claims that BIPA is a content-based restriction on speech because the 
statute has a similar impact on the company’s facial recognition technology as the Vermont 
statute’s unconstitutional effect on detailers in Sorrell.523 While the Vermont statute prohibited 
pharmacies from selling or disseminating prescriber-identifying information for marketing 
purposes, sale of the information was allowed for “educational communications,” while 
disclosure of the information was allowed for non-marketing purposes.524 Just as the statute’s 
“purpose and practical effect” was to limit the effectiveness of drug marketing, Clearview AI 
claims the purpose and practical effect of BIPA is to “unconstitutionally limit Clearview’s 
effectiveness in communicating with the users of its app information about the public 
photographs they upload.”525 Clearview AI also cites the ACLU’s complaint to suggest that the 
unique effectiveness of the company’s facial recognition application allegedly implicates the 
                                               
520 See Sorrell v. IMS Health, 564 U.S. 552, 563-64 (2011). 
521 See id. at 571. 
522 See id. at 572. 
523 See Mem. In Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss at 20, ACLU v. Clearview AI, 2020-CH-04353 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Oct. 7, 2020). 
524 See Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 563-64 (2011). 
525 See Mem. In Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss at 20, ACLU v. Clearview AI, 2020-CH-04353 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Oct. 7, 2020). 
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privacy concerns behind BIPA and is a driving force in the regulation’s unconstitutional practical 
effect.526 
In a brief supporting Clearview AI’s motion to dismiss the ACLU lawsuit, Volokh and 
Bambauer advance a distinct argument for why BIPA’s regulation of Clearview AI should be 
subject to strict scrutiny. Like Clearview AI, the legal scholars argue that BIPA represents a 
content-based restriction on the creation and dissemination of speech.527 However, they assert 
that BIPA is a content-based restriction because it “explicitly prohibits faceprints of human 
faces, but not of any other type of face.”528 Since BIPA does not prohibit faceprints from non-
human sources, Volokh and Bambauer argue that the regulation’s restrictions revolve around 
“whether [the faceprint] refers to a human subject,” a content-based restriction leading to strict 
scrutiny.529 
Despite these arguments for strict scrutiny, the state court in Vermont v. Clearview AI 
categorically rejected the application of strict scrutiny to Clearview AI’s facial recognition 
technology.530 The court refused to accept Clearview AI’s “misplaced” reliance on Sorrell as an 
analogue for speaker-based restrictions on speech, noting that the statute in Sorrell was a facial 
restriction on use of information for pharmaceutical manufacturers engaging in marketing while 
                                               
526 See id. at 19-20 (referencing Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc. and R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul for the proposition that the 
First Amendment “prohibits the application of laws that have the purpose and/or practical effect of burdening speech 
by reducing the effectiveness of its content.”). 
527 See Br. for First Amendment Clinic at Duke Law et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Def. Mot. to Dismiss at 8, 
ACLU v. Clearview AI, 2020-CH-04353 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 2020) (“BIPA is a facially content-based restriction on 
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528 See id. 
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530 See Ruling on Def. Mot. to Dismiss at 14, State of Vermont v. Clearview AI, Docket No. 226-3-20 (Vt. Sup. Ct. 
Sept. 10, 2020). 
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allowing other speakers to collect and use the same information.531 Conversely, the Vermont 
Consumer Protection Act at issue in Vermont v. Clearview AI is “obviously not facially speaker-
based.”532 The court also rejected Clearview AI’s argument that Vermont’s enforcement of the 
law is discriminatory.533  
Unsurprisingly, the ACLU and other parties supporting legal action against Clearview AI 
also reject the company’s arguments that their facial recognition application should be subject to 
strict scrutiny. The plaintiffs in ACLU v. Clearview AI argue that Sorrell is easily differentiated 
from their case, noting that the Supreme Court’s rejection of the Vermont statute was not, as 
Clearview AI claimed, “because it diminished the effectiveness of speech,” but because the 
diminished speech was “by a particular category of speakers who convey[ed] messages that are 
often in conflict with the goals of the state.”534 The ACLU frames the regulatory provisions of 
BIPA as only applying narrowly to a category of conduct (“the capture of biometric identifiers”), 
rather than the facial targeting of speech based on a specific viewpoint or message.535 Since 
BIPA “broadly proscribes nonconsensual faceprinting” regardless of how the faceprints are used, 
it is not a content-based restriction like the one in Sorrell.536 
                                               
531 See id. at 14-15. 
532 See id. at 15. 
533 See id. 
534 See Pl. Resp. to Def. Mot. to Dismiss at 21, ACLU v. Clearview AI, 2020-CH-04353 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Nov. 2, 2020). 
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The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Dahlstrom v. Sun-Times Media (2015) also suggests 
that a regulation based on privacy interests may be classified as a content-neutral regulation 
subject to intermediate scrutiny even if the regulation’s limitation on disclosure of information 
has an “incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not others.”537 In Dahlstrom, the 
court of appeals rested the determination of content neutrality on whether the government 
regulation of speech was adopted because of “agreement or disagreement” with a specific 
message.538 Since goals of public safety and informational privacy were “unrelated” to the 
content of expression, the regulation in question was content-neutral and survived a First 
Amendment challenge despite permitting disclosure of information in some circumstances and 
not others.539 
While the arguments for intermediate scrutiny and strict scrutiny both have weaknesses, 
Clearview AI’s arguments for strict scrutiny frame BIPA as a content-based restriction on speech 
and rely heavily on cases like Sorrell v. IMS Health540 and Reed v. Town of Gilbert.541 These 
cases can be distinguished as true content-based restrictions on speech. The statute at issue in 
Sorrell forbids the dissemination and use of prescriber-identifying information by 
pharmaceutical manufacturers for marketing purposes, a specific group of entities and a specific 
purpose, while explicitly permitting other uses.542 BIPA’s statutory provisions are much broader, 
                                               
537 See Dahlstrom v. Sun-Times Media, LLC, 777 F.3d 937, 950 (7th Cir. 2015). 
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539 See id. 
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541 See id. at 20. 
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applying generally to any “private entity” that seeks to collect biometric identifiers or biometric 
information.543 Rather than, as in Sorrell, targeting a single prohibited use and allowing 
essentially all other uses of a particular type of information, BIPA imposes an absolute 
prohibition on sale of biometric information and strictly limits the collection and disclosure of 
biometric information.544  
The ordinance at issue in Reed is a facial restriction on the content of signs; according to 
the Court, the ordinance ensures that the plaintiff’s signs inviting people to attend worship are 
“treated differently from signs conveying other types of ideas.”545 From the decision:  
If a sign informs its reader of the time and place a book club will discuss John 
Locke's Two Treatises of Government, that sign will be treated differently from a 
sign expressing the view that one should vote for one of Locke's followers in an 
upcoming election, and both signs will be treated differently from a sign expressing 
an ideological view rooted in Locke's theory of government.546 
 
Despite Clearview AI’s claims that their facial recognition application is being subjected to a 
similar restriction based on communicative content, BIPA is not regulating the content of a 
specific message. As the ACLU notes, BIPA “does not prevent Clearview from opining about . . 
. a photograph, or republishing photos.”547 Rather, BIPA regulates the collection of biometric 
information by requiring consent.548 
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 Though the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Alvarez suggests that a First Amendment 
delineation between capture of a biometric identifier and the subsequent use and dissemination 
of biometric information may not be possible,549 the issue is far from settled. The Vermont state 
court’s willingness to make a delineation between the two emphasizes the ambiguity around the 
issue.550 Since Alvarez is a non-binding Seventh Circuit decision not directly relating to facial 
recognition technology, it offers limited guidance as to whether a regulation on the collection of 
a probe image can be separated from the likely First Amendment interest present in the 
processing and dissemination of facial recognition results.  
 This chapter examined the arguments for and against the applicability of the First 
Amendment to facial recognition technology. Those arguments were examined through the 
proxy of ongoing litigation involving Clearview AI, a prominent facial recognition provider. 
While some scholars have argued that the collection and use of data (and, by extension, facial 
recognition technology) is not subject to First Amendment protection, Justice Kennedy’s rule 
that information is speech from Sorrell suggests that facial recognition technology is speech 
likely to receive at least some level of First Amendment protection. This chapter then laid out the 
respective arguments for intermediate First Amendment scrutiny and strict First Amendment 
scrutiny, a critical distinction that will dictate how courts resolve issues related to the regulation 
of facial recognition technology. While there is no definitive answer, this thesis finds that facial 
recognition technology will most likely be subject to intermediate scrutiny, requiring the state to 
show that any regulation (1) is within the constitutional power of the Government; (2) advances 
                                               
549 See ACLU v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 596 (7th Cir. 2012) (“[T]here is no fixed First Amendment line between the 
act of creating speech and the speech itself.”). 
550 See Ruling on Def. Mot. to Dismiss at 13, State of Vermont v. Clearview AI, Docket No. 226-3-20 (Vt. Sup. Ct. 
Sept. 10, 2020). 
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an “important or substantial” government interest (3) unrelated to the “suppression of free 
expression”; and (4) places minimal “incidental restriction on . . . First Amendment freedoms” to 
further the important government interest.551 
 The final chapter of this thesis will analyze any potential First Amendment barriers to the 
regulation of facial recognition technology. This chapter will examine the different coded 
categories of facial recognition technology discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2, analyzing 
those regulations to see whether they would survive a First Amendment argument. Since it is 
unclear whether intermediate scrutiny or strict scrutiny would apply to the regulation of facial 
recognition technology, the chapter will discuss how both levels of scrutiny may affect a 





                                               
551 See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). 
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CHAPTER 4: THE FIRST AMENDMENT AS A LIMIT ON THE REGULATION OF 




 Chapter 3 of this thesis examined the arguments for and against the applicability of the 
First Amendment to facial recognition technology. Despite arguments from some legal scholars 
that applying the First Amendment to the capture, use, and dissemination of data is impractical, a 
general scholarly and legal consensus has developed that data collection and processing receives 
some level of First Amendment protection as speech. Justice Anthony Kennedy’s majority 
opinion in Sorrell v. IMS Health, a case involving information about the prescribing practices of 
doctors, is a touchstone for these arguments.552 Kennedy’s decision includes a statement of the 
“rule that information is speech” for First Amendment purposes,553 also declaring that the 
                                               
552 See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2011). 
553 See id. at 570. 
 125 
“creation and dissemination of information” are speech within the First Amendment.554 In the 
aftermath of Sorrell, lower courts have adopted Justice Kennedy’s rule to other challenged uses 
of information and data.555  
 The facial recognition technology provider Clearview AI used images “scraped” from 
publicly available online accounts to populate a facial recognition database accessible via a 
cellphone application.556 After a New York Times article from January 2020 exposed the 
company’s existence to a wider audience, multiple parties brought lawsuits against the company, 
claiming violations of privacy and other causes of action.557 In response, Clearview AI claimed 
their facial recognition application was protected by the First Amendment.558 This thesis 
concluded that Clearview AI’s facial recognition application is likely speech subject to some sort 
of First Amendment protection, noting that plaintiffs on either side of one of the main suits 
against the company, ACLU v. Clearview AI, conceded that some aspects of the application 
would receive some sort of protection as speech.559  
                                               
554 See id. 
555 See, e.g., Jian Zhang v. Baidu.com Inc., 10 F. Supp. 3d 433, 435 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (applying the rule to search 
engines); Digital Recognition Network, Inc. v. Hutchinson, 803 F.3d 952, 955, 957 (8th Cir. 2015) (suggesting that 
the rule would likely apply to an “automatic license plate reader system”); see also Kyle Langvardt, The Doctrinal 
Toll of “Information as Speech,” 47 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 761, 775-76 (2016) (decrying the judicial consequences of the 
rule but acknowledging that lower courts have adopted it to the point that reversing course would be difficult). 
556 See Kashmir Hill, The Secretive Company That Might End Privacy as We Know It, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/18/technology/clearview-privacy-facial-recognition.html. 
557 See ACLU v. Clearview AI, 2020-CH-04353 (Ill. Cir. Ct. May 28, 2020); In re Clearview AI Inc., 2020 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 236053 (J.P.M.L. Dec. 15, 2020) (consolidating several lawsuits against Clearview AI into a single suit 
to be heard in the Northern District of Illinois). 
558 See Mem. In Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss at 16, ACLU v. Clearview AI, 2020-CH-04353 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Oct. 7, 2020) 
(arguing that Clearview AI’s application is protected by the First Amendment); Ruling on Def. Mot. to Dismiss, 
State of Vermont v. Clearview AI, Docket No. 226-3-20 (Vt. Sup. Ct. Sept. 10, 2020) (analyzing Clearview AI’s 
argument that their application is protected by the First Amendment). 
559 Compare Br. for First Amendment Clinic at Duke Law et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Def. Mot. to Dismiss, 
ACLU v. Clearview AI, 2020-CH-04353 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 2020) (arguing that strict First Amendment scrutiny 
should apply to Clearview AI’s challenge of BIPA) with Pl. Resp. to Def. Mot. to Dismiss at 17, ACLU v. 
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 The main arguments around Clearview AI’s facial recognition application involve 
whether the application should be subject to intermediate scrutiny (as the plaintiffs in lawsuits 
against the company have argued) or strict scrutiny (as Clearview AI and the company’s 
supporters have argued.560 Chapter 3 of this thesis examined the arguments for differing levels of 
scrutiny, ultimately concluding that Clearview AI’s application would likely be subject to 
intermediate scrutiny under the First Amendment.  
In many ways, the litigation against Clearview AI under Illinois’ Biometric Information 
Privacy Act (BIPA) and other privacy laws is an effective proxy for a larger discussion about 
how the First Amendment may apply to facial recognition technology. However, one unique 
aspect of Clearview AI’s facial recognition technology should be discussed. While most 
available facial recognition programs have used databases of government images like driver’s 
license photos and criminal mugshots, Clearview AI used publicly posted images from websites 
to populate its database.561 In filings related to ACLU v. Clearview AI, Clearview AI has 
emphasized the fact that the images collected and processed by the company’s facial recognition 
application were publicly available.562 The company repeatedly mentions the public availability 
of the images used, distinguishing the images from photographs depicting private sexual 
conduct, which the company acknowledges may not receive First Amendment protection.563  
                                               
Clearview AI, 2020-CH-04353 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Nov. 2, 2020) (acknowledging that regulation may impose an 
“incidental burden” on Clearview AI’s program and stating that any regulation must survive intermediate scrutiny). 
560 Id. 
561 See Kashmir Hill, The Secretive Company That Might End Privacy as We Know It, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/18/technology/clearview-privacy-facial-recognition.html. 
562 See Mem. In Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss at 17, ACLU v. Clearview AI, 2020-CH-04353 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Oct. 7, 2020). 
563 See id. (citing People v. Austin, 2019 IL 123910). 
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Whether the photographs were truly “publicly available” is a matter of debate. At least 
one court has observed that many social media sites have terms of service prohibiting 
“scraping,”564 while the original New York Times article discussing Clearview AI’s facial 
recognition application notes that representatives from several online websites that images were 
collected from claimed Clearview AI’s scraping was a violation of their policies.565 However, the 
potential public availability of the photographs used by Clearview AI may mean that the 
company’s facial recognition technology is treated differently under the First Amendment than 
facial recognition providers collecting biometric data from government databases.  
Clearview AI and supporters have argued that the company’s collection and processing of 
public images posted online is deserving of specific First Amendment protection. The company 
suggests that the government may not prevent the dissemination of information once it has been 
“publicly revealed or [has entered] the public domain.”566 Similarly, Eugene Volokh and Jane 
Bambauer argue that Clearview AI’s capture of publicly available images is analogous to 
“filming, photographing, or recording behavior in a public forum” where individuals have ceded 
any claim to a reasonable expectation of privacy.567 Since the images were posted by users to 
                                               
564 See Footnote 4, Ruling on Def. Mot. to Dismiss at 23, State of Vermont v. Clearview AI, Docket No. 226-3-20 
(Vt. Sup. Ct. Sept. 10, 2020) (“[M]any social media sites to which consumers post photos have terms of service 
policies that expressly prohibit screen scraping . . . Those terms of service provide a reasonable basis for consumers 
to assume that their photos would not be scraped and used in a facial recognition search engine without their 
consent.”). 
565 See Kashmir Hill, The Secretive Company That Might End Privacy as We Know It, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/18/technology/clearview-privacy-facial-recognition.html (“Representatives of 
[Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, Instagram, and Venmo] said their policies prohibit such scraping, and Twitter said it 
explicitly banned use of its data for facial recognition.”). 
566 See Mem. In Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss at 18, ACLU v. Clearview AI, 2020-CH-04353 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Oct. 7, 2020) 
(citing In re Minor, 205 Ill. App. 3d 480, 491 (4th Dist. 1990), aff’d, 149 Ill. 2d 247 (1992)). 
567 See Br. for First Amendment Clinic at Duke Law et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Def. Mot. to Dismiss at 10-
11, ACLU v. Clearview AI, 2020-CH-04353 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 2020). 
 128 
public-facing websites, Volokh and Bambauer assert that those users lack a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in their faceprint.568 These arguments suggest that an individual’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy may be different if an image of their face from a government-
issued photograph is used in a facial recognition database than if the image comes from a public 
post to a website. If the individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy is lessened, the 
corresponding state interest in protecting individual privacy is also lessened, meaning that 
Clearview AI’s facial recognition technology would be more likely to successfully assert a First 
Amendment defense. 
However, an examination of privacy tort law may suggest that Clearview AI’s facial 
recognition technology has less First Amendment protection than facial recognition reliant on 
government images. The EFF’s amicus brief in ACLU v. Clearview AI noted that privacy torts 
like the public disclosure of private facts tort are more likely to favor the First Amendment rights 
of publishers over the privacy rights of individuals when information has been obtained from the 
government. 569 This argument relies on Florida Star v. B.J.F., a Supreme Court case striking 
down a statute punishing reporters for revealing the identity of a rape victim but suggesting that 
the government has a greater right to “forbid [the] nonconsensual acquisition” of information 
when it “rests in private hands.”570 It is unclear whether the public nature of the photographs 
used by Clearview AI makes the company’s facial recognition technology receive more or less 
First Amendment protection that other facial recognition programs, but there may be a difference 
in treatment. Clearview AI’s scraping of social media sites has already been mimicked by other 
                                               
568 See id. at 11. 
569 See id. at 8. 
570 See Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 534 (1989); see also Br. for Elec. Frontier Found. as Amici Curiae 
Opposing Def. Mot. to Dismiss at 8, ACLU v. Clearview AI, 2020-CH-04353 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Nov. 2, 2020). 
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facial recognition providers, meaning that facial recognition technology may shift further 
towards the utilization of publicly posted images.571 This technological transition emphasizes the 
importance of the pending litigation against Clearview AI. As other facial recognition 
technology providers start to use publicly posted images, ACLU v. Clearview AI et al. will 
become a guide for potential First Amendment limitations on the regulation of facial recognition 
technology. 
The remainder of this chapter will discuss how the First Amendment may limit the 
regulation of facial recognition technology. The chapter will examine the regulation of facial 
recognition technology through the lens of the 376 state- and local-level statutes and ordinances 
identified and coded by the author and discussed in Chapter 2 of this thesis.572 In Chapter 2, the 
author developed five “categories of regulation” identified based on common themes from the 
collected and coded statutes and ordinances. Those categories are (1) “Agents of Use”; (2) 
“Limitations on Use”; (3) “Evaluation of Use”; (4) “Accountability of Use”; and (5) 
“Enforcement of Permitted Use.” This chapter will explore how the First Amendment may limit 
regulatory provisions under each of those categories, along with a discussion of how different 
statutory terms and definitions may affect First Amendment scrutiny. 
Terms and Definitions 
 
 In Chapter 2, this thesis examined the different terms and definitions used within the 
proposed and enacted regulations collected by the author. Legislatures use a variety of terms to 
frame regulations on the use of facial recognition technology and the collection and processing 
                                               
571 See Jane Wakefield, PimEyes Facial Recognition Website ‘Could Be Used By Stalkers’, BBC (June 11, 2020), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-53007510.  
572 See Evan Ringel, Facial Recognition Technology Regulation Database (Jan. 21, 2021) (unpublished Excel 
spreadsheet) (on file with author). 
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of biometric data. The coding process revealed eighteen unique terms used by state and local 
legislative bodies, each of which appeared in at least one proposed piece of state regulation from 
the 2020 legislative session.573 Of those coded terms, seventeen appeared in at least one enacted 
state or local regulation targeting facial recognition technology or biometric data collection; 
“biometric security” was the only term present in a proposed bill but not in any enacted statute or 
ordinance.574 
 Most terms were explicitly defined within the statute. Of the seventeen terms used within 
enacted regulations, only “facial recognition system,” “automated analysis,” “automated 
analytics,” “face geometry” and “faceprint” were not defined in any regulation.575 The most 
commonly used terms were defined less than half of the time. Sixty-three proposed or enacted 
regulations used the term “facial recognition,” but only thirty-one of the regulations provided a 
definition for the term.576 The most commonly used term, “biometric data,” appeared in 189 
proposed or enacted state statutes, but only seventy of those statutes defined the term.577 While 
more than half of the sixty-five enacted regulations using the term “biometric information” 
                                               
573 See id. 
574 See Act of Mar. 3, 2020, H.B. 466, 2020 Leg. (Utah 2020) (defining “biometric security” as “facial recognition, 
iris recognition, fingerprint scanning . . . or any other method of using physical characteristics to authenticate an 
individual’s identity to secure the individual’s electronic device); see also Evan Ringel, Facial Recognition 
Technology Regulation Database (Jan. 21, 2021) (unpublished Excel spreadsheet) (on file with author). 
575 See Evan Ringel, Facial Recognition Technology Regulation Database (Jan. 21, 2021) (unpublished Excel 
spreadsheet) (on file with author). 
576 See id.; see also OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 133.741(1)(D) (2020) (regulating the use of facial recognition in police 
body cameras). 
577 See Evan Ringel, Facial Recognition Technology Regulation Database (Jan. 21, 2021) (unpublished Excel 
spreadsheet) (on file with author); see also 2018 Mich. Pub. Acts 65 (requiring the destruction of biometric data 
collected from criminal suspects if the suspect’s case is dismissed). 
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provided a definition, twenty-four regulations designed to regulate the use of biometric 
information did not define the term.578 
 Even for terms that seem to have an intuitive meaning, the absence of an explicit 
definition can lead to uncertainty in application. Chapter 2 explores three different statutory 
definitions of the term “facial recognition,” a term which seems generally to apply to the use of 
an image of a person’s face to identify that person. While some regulations apply only to 
traditional uses of facial recognition technology for identification and verification,579  other 
regulations define facial recognition more broadly to include uses for mood-detecting580 or 
surveillance purposes.581 By including a term like “facial recognition” without providing a 
definition, regulatory drafters are opening themselves up to the possibility that a facial 
recognition technology user or provider may slip through the cracks of regulatory enforcement.  
This ambiguity could also have legal consequences if a regulation of facial recognition 
technology is challenged on First Amendment grounds. Regardless of whether a regulation of 
facial recognition technology or biometric data collection is subjected to intermediate or strict 
judicial scrutiny, the government must make some showing that a regulation is targeted to a 
government interest. When courts apply intermediate scrutiny for regulation of commercial 
speech, the government must show that the challenged regulation “could not be served as well by 
                                               
578 See Evan Ringel, Facial Recognition Technology Regulation Database (Jan. 21, 2021) (unpublished Excel 
spreadsheet) (on file with author); see also Act of May 15, 2018, 2018 N.H. Ch. 21 (establishing a committee to 
study the use and regulation of biometric information) 
579 See Act of Dec. 22, 2020, 2020 N.Y. Laws 349 (placing a moratorium on the use of biometric identifying 
technology in both public and private schools). 
580 See Act of Oct. 7, 2020, 2020 Vt. Laws 166 (placing a moratorium on most uses of facial recognition technology 
by law enforcement officers). 
581 See 2019 Cal. Stat. Ch. 579 (imposing a moratorium on police use of facial recognition technology in conjunction 
with a police-worn body camera). 
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a more limited restriction.”582 If strict scrutiny applies, the government must show that the 
challenged regulation is “narrowly tailored” to a “compelling” state interest.583 The lack of a 
statutory definition could inhibit government attempts to argue that regulations of facial 
recognition technology meet these burdens.  
A plaintiff may struggle to argue that a statute is narrowly tailored specifically to meet a 
compelling state interest when the statute fails to articulate the specific scope of what is being 
regulated. For example, say facial recognition technology is being used by Big Box Corp. to 
detect the mood of a customer. At least two of the largest corporations in the United States have 
explored using facial recognition technology in conjunction with their businesses, so this 
scenario is far from unrealistic.584 The state of East Dakota has a statute outlawing the use of 
facial recognition technology in retail settings by private actors; however, East Dakota does not 
provide a specific definition for “facial recognition technology.” As discussed earlier, while 
some state statutes have defined facial recognition as specifically applying to mood detection, 
other states use a more general definition of facial recognition based on use for identification and 
verification.  
                                               
582 See Cent. Hudson Gas and Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 560 (1980); see also United States 
v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (applying intermediate scrutiny to a mix of speech and non-speech conduct 
and requiring the state to show that any regulation advances an “important or substantial” government interest). 
583 See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utilities Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 19 (1986) (articulating the strict scrutiny 
inquiry for “burdens [on] protected speech”); see also Roy G. Spece, Jr. & David Yokum, Scrutinizing Strict 
Scrutiny, 40 VT. L. REV. 285, 295 (2015). 
584 See Jake Adelstein, In Japan, Your Smile is Being Recorded: Take This Job and Love It—Or Else, DAILY BEAST 
(June 23, 2018), https://www.thedailybeast.com/in-japan-your-smile-is-being-recorded-take-this-job-and-love-itor-
else (noting McDonalds’ use of facial recognition in Japan to ensure that employees were smiling enough through 
their shifts); Hayley Peterson, Walmart is Developing a Robot That Identifies Unhappy Shoppers, BUSINESS INSIDER 
(July 19, 2017), https://www.businessinsider.com/walmart-is-developing-a-robot-that-identifies-unhappy-shoppers-
2017-7 (describing a patent filing Walmart made for a facial recognition system that would identify unhappy 
customers at the checkout line). 
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Chapter 3 of this thesis establishes that the First Amendment likely provides some level 
of First Amendment protection to facial recognition technology. If East Dakota brings suit to 
enjoin Big Box Corp.’s use of facial recognition technology, the state’s regulation of facial 
recognition technology will likely have to survive at least intermediate scrutiny. Regardless of 
the substantial government interest East Dakota uses to justify their restriction on retail use of 
facial recognition technology, it is difficult for East Dakota to argue that a more limited 
regulation would not advance the substantial government interest in a similarly effective fashion. 
Since East Dakota has not defined the specific technology that they intend to regulate, it is 
unclear whether the state’s definition of facial recognition technology includes uses outside of 
identification and verification. If East Dakota’s substantial government interest is to preserve the 
anonymity of shoppers, the state’s regulation could be limited specifically to use of facial 
recognition technology for identification purposes. Depending on how the facial recognition 
technology used by Big Box Corp. actually works, they may not fall within this restriction. 
The absence of a statutory definition is even more problematic if a court decides that 
regulations targeting facial recognition technology are subject to strict scrutiny. If East Dakota 
fails to include a definition of the technology they are seeking to regulate, it is nearly impossible 
for the state to convincingly argue that their statute is narrowly tailored to a compelling state 
interest. A court has no way of effectively evaluating the overlap between the state’s allegedly 
compelling government interest and the direct target of the state’s regulation. As discussed in 
Chapter 1, facial recognition technology can be used in many different ways by both government 
actors and private entities. Is East Dakota only trying to target the use of facial recognition for 
identification purposes? Is East Dakota also trying to target the use of facial recognition for 
mood detection or other non-identification purposes? If East Dakota wants to limit or eliminate 
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Big Box Corp.’s use of facial recognition for mood detection, the state should theoretically tailor 
the regulation as narrowly as possible to cover that use. The more specific East Dakota is with a 
regulatory target and definition, the more likely that regulation seemingly is to survive a higher 
level of constitutional scrutiny.  
Intuitively, it makes sense that a regulation explicitly designed to target a specific use of 
facial recognition technology may be more likely to survive constitutional scrutiny as a narrowly 
tailored regulation based on a compelling government interest. However, the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Sorrell shows the potential problems with such an approach, setting up one of the 
core tensions in state attempts to regulate facial recognition technology. In Sorrell, Vermont’s 
attempted ban on the use of prescriber-identifying information for marketing purposes was seen 
by the Court as a “content- and speaker-based restriction[].”585 Vermont had a specific use that 
the Prescription Confidentiality Law was intended to target. According to the Sorrell decision, 
the Vermont state legislature determined that the use of detailing by prescription drug 
manufacturers was affecting the prescribing practices of doctors, making the doctors more likely 
to prescribe newer and more expensive brand-name drugs.586 This problem was exacerbated by 
detailers’ collection and use of prescriber-identifying information, which the legislature found 
allowed detailers to “target their visits” to doctors based on “individual prescriber styles, 
preferences, and attitudes.”587 
In response to the problem of detailers using prescriber-identifying information, the 
Prescription Confidentiality Act explicitly prevented the use of prescriber-identifying 
                                               
585 See Sorrell v. IMS Health, 564 U.S. 552, 571 (2011). 
586 See id. at 561. 
587 See id. 
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information for marketing purposes while leaving the door open for other uses of the 
information.588 Another statutory provision allowed sale of prescriber-identifying information for 
educational purposes while restricting sale for other reasons.589 The Court interpreted this narrow 
tailoring of Vermont’s regulation as a unconstitutional content-based burden on speech, finding 
that the law effectively “prevent[ed] detailers–and only detailers–from communicating with 
physicians in an effective and informative manner.”590  However, Justice Kennedy suggested that 
a broader restriction may have been more likely to survive constitutional scrutiny. 
Perhaps the State could have addressed physician confidentiality through “a more 
coherent policy.” For instance, the State might have advanced its asserted privacy 
interest by allowing the information's sale or disclosure in only a few narrow and 
well-justified circumstances. A statute of that type would present quite a different 
case from the one presented here. But the State did not enact a statute with that 
purpose or design. Instead, Vermont made prescriber-identifying information 
available to an almost limitless audience.591 
 
Essentially, by targeting a specific use of prescriber-identifying information that Vermont felt 
was negatively affecting its citizens rather than passing a broader restriction on use of the 
information, the state imposed a content-based restriction on speech. The Court acknowledged 
that determining a particular regulation is content-based is “all but dispositive” in deciding a 
case; if a regulation is content-based, it will almost certainly be struck down as 
unconstitutional.592 
                                               
588 See id. at 564. 
589 See id. 
590 See id. 
591 See id. at 573 (internal citations omitted). 
592 See id. at 571 (citing R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992)). 
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 In the context of facial recognition technology, Sorrell establishes a regulatory tension 
that makes it difficult for states to target the uses of facial recognition technology they find most 
problematic. The more granular a regulation is, the more likely that the court will apply a higher 
level of constitutional scrutiny and/or determine that the regulation represents a content-based 
burden on speech. Sorrell shows that narrow regulations prohibiting a specific use of information 
will struggle to survive even intermediate scrutiny. However, general regulations prohibiting 
most uses of information may be more likely to survive under Sorrell; the less targeted a 
restriction is, the less likely a court may be to apply heightened scrutiny to the restriction as a 
content-based restriction on speech.   
 What does this mean for states and municipalities trying to regulate facial recognition 
technology either directly or more broadly through a biometric data privacy law? Practically 
speaking, any regulation of facial recognition technology must be broad enough to survive the 
standard laid out in Sorrell. The Court suggests HIPAA as a potentially constitutional regulation, 
noting that a statute allowing the collection or dissemination of information in limited 
circumstances is less likely to be classified as a speaker-based prohibition on speech.593 At the 
same time, the regulation of facial recognition technology likely needs to survive at least 
intermediate scrutiny as a regulation on speech.594 Accordingly, the state must tailor the 
regulation narrowly enough to correlate with a substantial government interest, lest the 
regulation be ruled unconstitutional for being too broad and untargeted.  
                                               
593 See id. at 573 (internal citations omitted). 
594 See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (requiring intermediate scrutiny when challenged 
conduct contains elements of both speech and nonspeech); Cent. Hudson Gas and Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. 
Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 560 (1980) (establishing that the court applies intermediate scrutiny to regulations on 
commercial speech). 
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One aspect of Vermont’s argument for constitutionality in Sorrell may provide some 
hope to states hoping to regulate the collection and use of facial recognition technology. Though 
Vermont’s challenged statutory provisions were focused specifically on the use of prescriber-
identifying information for marketing purposes, the state argued that the law was necessary to (1) 
protect “medical privacy” and (2) achieve “improved public health and reduced health care 
costs.”595 In rejecting the justifications, the Court focused on the attenuation between a generally 
focused interest in privacy and a provision preventing one specific use of prescriber-identifying 
information while allowing essentially any other use.596 A regulation of facial recognition 
technology, whether direct or via a biometric privacy law, almost certainly has a more direct 
connection between the government interest of protecting an individual’s privacy in their 
biometric identifier and whatever restriction the regulation is imposing. 
Volokh and Bambauer have argued that BIPA is a content-based restriction because it 
regulates based on whether a collected faceprint is human or non-human.597 The argument seems 
facially questionable. Under this supposed human/non-human dichotomy, since all of the 
regulations coded and analyzed in this thesis apply to the use of facial recognition technology on 
human faces, any of the regulatory terms discussed in the “terms and definitions” section in 
Chapter 2 would theoretically subject a regulation to strict constitutional scrutiny and 
presumptive unconstitutionality. However, a court has not conclusively ruled on the argument.  
                                               
595 See Sorrell v. IMS Health, 564 U.S. 552, 572 (2011). 
596 See id. at 574 (“Rules that burden protected expression may not be sustained when the options provided by the 
State are too narrow to advance legitimate interests or too broad to protect speech. [The Vermont law] permits 
extensive use of prescriber-identifying information and so does not advance the State’s asserted interest in physician 
confidentiality.”). 
597 See Br. for First Amendment Clinic at Duke Law et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Def. Mot. to Dismiss at 8, 
ACLU v. Clearview AI, 2020-CH-04353 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 2020) (arguing that BIPA “explicitly prohibits 
faceprints of human faces, but not of any other type of face”). 
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If use of the term “faceprint” to refer to a human facial image within a regulation of facial 
recognition is sufficient to make the regulation content-based and subject to strict scrutiny, the 
existing regulatory structure for facial recognition technology could be blown up entirely. Seven 
enacted regulations of facial recognition technology use the term “faceprint” in a definition for 
either “biometric identifier,” “biometric data,” or “facial recognition software.”598 This includes 
not only BIPA, the subject of litigation in ACLU v. Clearview AI, but also the California 
Consumer Privacy Act of 2018599 and Massachusetts’ new law requiring police to obtain a court 
order before using facial recognition technology.600 With content-based regulations subject to 
presumptive invalidity, state statutes using “faceprint” would face an uphill battle to survive a 
challenge on First Amendment grounds.601  
This tension between breadth and narrowness places states in a difficult position with 
three potentially less-than-ideal outcomes. First, the state may decide not to regulate facial 
recognition technology at all, determining that the possibility of having a regulation struck down 
is not worth the time and effort it would take to pass a regulation. This essentially describes the 
current regulatory climate around facial recognition technology. Only a handful of states have 
laws specifically regulating the use of facial recognition technology by state agencies,602 while 
                                               
598 See Evan Ringel, Facial Recognition Technology Regulation Database (Jan. 21, 2021) (unpublished Excel 
spreadsheet) (on file with author). 
599 California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, 2018 Cal. Stat. ch. 55, § 1798.140(b) (including “faceprint” in a 
statutory definition of “biometric information”). 
600 An Act Relative to Justice, Equity and Accountability in Law Enforcement in the Commonwealth, 2020 Mass. 
Acts 253 (requiring law enforcement to obtain a court order to perform a facial recognition search unless the agency 
is identifying a deceased person or acting under exigent circumstances). 
601 See Sorrell v. IMS Health, 564 U.S. 552, 571 (2011) (citing R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 382, 
(1992)). 
602 See, e.g., Facial Recognition Act, 2020 Wash. Adv. Leg. Serv. 257; An Act Relative to Justice, Equity and 
Accountability in Law Enforcement in the Commonwealth, 2020 Mass. Acts 253 (requiring law enforcement to 
obtain a court order to perform a facial recognition search unless the agency is identifying a deceased person or 
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only three states indirectly regulate the use of facial recognition technology by private entities 
through biometric data privacy laws.603 Despite legitimate concerns about privacy, a state may 
decide that the risk of unconstitutionality is not worth the energy involved in regulating facial 
recognition technology, especially in the face of judicial uncertainty around the applicability of 
First Amendment protection and the scope of that protection.  
 Alternatively, a state may decide to take an overly broad approach to the regulation of 
facial recognition technology, up to and including banning the technology’s use entirely. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, New Hampshire proposed an (ultimately unsuccessful) bill in 2020 
completely banning the government use of facial recognition technology,604 while city councils 
have passed ordinances banning both government use of facial recognition technology605 and 
private use of facial recognition technology in places of public accommodation.606 Many 
scholars607 and civil society organizations608 support this approach, arguing that the dangers of 
                                               
acting under exigent circumstances); Act of Oct. 7, 2020, 2020 Vt. Laws 166 (placing a moratorium on most uses of 
facial recognition technology by law enforcement officers). 
603 See Biometric Information Privacy Act, 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 14/10 (2008); Capture or Use of Biometric 
Identifier Act, TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 503.001(2009); WASH. REV. CODE § 19.375.020 (2017) (prohibiting 
anyone from “enroll[ing] a biometric identifier in a database for a commercial purpose” without notice or consent). 
604 See Act of Feb. 19, 2020, H.B. 1642, 2020 Leg. (N.H. 2020); see also Michael Boldin, New Hampshire House 
Passes Bill to Ban Facial Recognition, TENTH AMENDMENT CTR. (Feb. 19, 2020), 
https://blog.tenthamendmentcenter.com/2020/02/new-hampshire-house-passes-bill-to-ban-facial-recognition/. 
605 See, e.g., BOSTON, MASS., CODE, Ch. 16-62 (2020); BROOKLINE, MASS., CODE, Art. 8.39 (2019); Linn Freedman, 
Portland City Council Bans Use of Facial Recognition Technology, JDSUPRA (Sept. 14, 2020), 
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/portland-city-council-bans-use-of-74887/. 
606 See PORTLAND, OR., CODE, Ch. 34.10 (Aug. 3, 2020). 
607 See Evan Selinger & Woodrow Hartzog, The Inconsentability of Facial Surveillance, 66 LOY. L. REV. 33, 54 
(2020) (“[E]ven if advocates of consent and warrant requirements got everything on their wish list, society would 
still end up worse off. We would suffer unacceptable harm to our obscurity and collective autonomy . . . . There is 
only one way to stop the harms of face surveillance. Ban it.”). 
608 See, e.g., Evan Greer, Don’t Regulate Facial Recognition. Ban it., BUZZFEED NEWS (July 18, 2019), 
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/evangreer/dont-regulate-facial-recognition-ban-it (writing on behalf of Fight 
for the Future to argue for a ban on facial recognition technology); Kate Ruane, Biden Must Halt Face Recognition 
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facial recognition technology are such that a moratorium or ban is the only justifiable approach. 
However, facial recognition does have valuable uses for law enforcement609 and private 
individuals alike.610 An overly broad ban on use of facial recognition technology may prevent 
uses that are beneficial to society, whether governments are identifying criminals or abuse 
victims or private actors are holding law enforcement accountable or ensuring secure business 
transactions.  
 In an effort to regulate a complicated technology that many lawmakers may not have the 
time or capacity to fully understand, states could become reliant on industry insiders to help draft 
a regulation. Critics of Washington’s pioneering regulation of facial recognition technology have 
zeroed in on this issue. As referenced in Chapter 2, the bill’s sponsor in the state legislature was 
also a Microsoft employee611 and Microsoft has pushed for other state legislatures to pass 
identical regulations.612 Much like manufacturers in other industries, facial recognition 
                                               
Technology to Advance Racial Equity, ACLU (Feb. 17, 2021), https://www.aclu.org/news/privacy-
technology/biden-must-halt-face-recognition-technology-to-advance-racial-equity/. 
609 See Kashmir Hill & Gabriel Dance, Clearview’s Facial Recognition App Is Identifying Child Victims of Abuse, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 7, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/07/business/clearview-facial-recognition-child-
sexual-abuse.html (describing how law enforcement utilized Clearview Ai’s facial recognition technology to 
identify child victims of sexual abuse); Kashmir Hill, The Facial-Recognition App Clearview Sees a Spike in Use 
After Capitol Attack, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 9, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/09/technology/facial-
recognition-clearview-capitol.html (noting an increase in Clearview AI searches by law enforcement agencies after 
the riots at the Capitol building in Washington, D.C.). 
610 See Kashmir Hill, Activists Turn Facial Recognition Tools Against the Police, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/21/technology/facial-recognition-police.html (referencing efforts in the United 
States and abroad to use facial recognition technology to identify police officers who attempt to obscure their 
identities). 
611 See Dave Gershgorn, A Microsoft Employee Literally Wrote Washington’s Facial Recognition Law, ONEZERO 
(Apr. 3, 2020), https://onezero.medium.com/a-microsoft-employee-literally-wrote-washingtons-facial-recognition-
legislation-aab950396927. 
612 See Nicolás Rivero, In a Facial Recognition Bill Backed by Microsoft, Three Words Stand Between Citizens and 
Their Civil Rights, QUARTZ (Sept. 18, 2020), https://qz.com/1905159/microsoft-is-shaping-facial-recognition-bills-
across-the-us/. 
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technology providers are likely calling for government regulation to ensure the “least 
burdensome” set of regulations and to avoid being subject to stringent regulations by individual 
states.613 Other technology-related companies detecting public unrest about an apparent lack of 
regulatory accountability have issued public calls for regulation. In 2019, Facebook CEO Mark 
Zuckerberg wrote an editorial in the Washington Post calling for “new rules” for the Internet that 
would ostensibly provide substantial regulatory constraints for social media platforms;614 critics 
noted the proposed regulations would allow Facebook to solidify its near-monopoly over the 
social media marketplace and avoid public blame for unpopular policies.615 Facial recognition 
technology providers are likely in a similar place, calling for state and federal legislatures to pass 
regulations while trying to ensure those regulations provide the best possible terms for the 
company. When industries are directly involved in drafting the legislation, loopholes can occur 
that may provide insufficient protection against the potential harms of facial recognition 
technology.616 
 The use of specific terms and definitions in regulations targeting the use of facial 
recognition technology could affect the regulation’s constitutionality. Without any definition at 
                                               
613 See Eric Lipton & Gardiner Harris, In Turnaround, Industries Seek U.S. Regulations, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 16, 
2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/16/washington/16regulate.html (referencing push by industries, fearing 
the end of years of deregulation, for government regulation amidst concerns that Democrats may take control of 
Congress and impose stringent regulations). 
614 See Mark Zuckerberg, Mark Zuckerberg: The Internet Needs New Rules. Let’s Start in These Four Areas, WASH. 
POST (Mar. 30, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/mark-zuckerberg-the-internet-needs-new-rules-
lets-start-in-these-four-areas/2019/03/29/9e6f0504-521a-11e9-a3f7-78b7525a8d5f_story.html. 
615 See Mike Isaac, Mark Zuckerberg’s Call to Regulate Facebook, Explained, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/30/technology/mark-zuckerberg-facebook-regulation-explained.html. 
616 See Nicolás Rivero, In a Facial Recognition Bill Backed by Microsoft, Three Words Stand Between Citizens and 
Their Civil Rights, QUARTZ (Sept. 18, 2020), https://qz.com/1905159/microsoft-is-shaping-facial-recognition-bills-
across-the-us/ (discussing the potentially problematic use of “meaningful human review” as an inadequate limit on 
the government use of facial recognition technology). 
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all, a regulation may not be narrowly tailored to survive a First Amendment challenge, especially 
if strict scrutiny is applied. However, the Supreme Court’s decision in Sorrell is based in part on 
a regulation too narrowly focused on one specific use of information, making the regulation a 
content-based restriction on speech. States and municipalities are left in the unenviable position 
of threading the regulatory needle, meaning that they may opt to forego regulation entirely or 
look for guidance from the regulated entities. Clearview AI’s argument that the use of 
“faceprint” is sufficient to make BIPA a content-based restriction, though implausible, raises the 
question of whether any legislative body can regulate human-based facial recognition technology 
without being subject to strict constitutional scrutiny. Though Sorrell is nebulous in terms of 
providing guidance, the Court does suggest that a statute more closely connected to the 
advancement of a government interest is less likely to be struck down.617 If a state or 
municipality can draw a sufficient connection between a government interest in individual 
privacy and their regulation of facial recognition technology, the regulation could at least pass 
intermediate scrutiny. 
Category One: Agents of Use 
 
 Each statute and ordinance collected and analyzed by the author states whether the 
relevant regulation applies to public actors (government agencies) or private actors (businesses 
or individuals). Nearly all of the coded regulations apply to either public or private actors, with 
less than 10% applying to both state or local governments and private individuals.618 A smaller 
                                               
617 See Sorrell v. IMS Health, 564 U.S. 552, 574 (2011) (“Rules that burden protected expression may not be 
sustained when the options provided by the State are too narrow to advance legitimate interests or too broad to 
protect speech. [The Vermont law] permits extensive use of prescriber-identifying information and so does not 
advance the State’s asserted interest in physician confidentiality.”). 
618 See Evan Ringel, Facial Recognition Technology Regulation Database (Jan. 21, 2021) (unpublished Excel 
spreadsheet) (on file with author). 
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subset of the coded regulations applying to government agencies also apply to state and local law 
enforcement agencies.619 Many of the regulations applying to government agencies but not to 
law enforcement are sector-specific statutes from 2020 in areas like education,620 notarization,621 
or child care622 that were omitted when a relevance filter was utilized for pre-2020 state statutes 
(see Chapter 2 for further discussion on the use of a relevance filter). However, other statutes 
include explicit provisions stating that regulation of state agencies do not apply to law 
enforcement agencies.623  
 The remaining coded regulations apply to private parties like businesses or individuals 
acting outside of a government function. Approximately one-third of all coded statutes and 
ordinances apply to private individuals, with thirty-seven of the forty-three enacted statutes and 
ordinances applying both to private individuals and corporations.624 As discussed in Chapter 2, 
many of the 2020 statutes with private applicability referenced a specific profession, often 
focused on licensure of medicine-adjacent fields.625 However, the relevance filter use for pre-
2020 statutes and ordinances eliminated all but two enacted statutes regulating a specific private 
                                               
619 See id. 
620 See Act of May 8, 2020, H.B. 1122, 2020 Leg. (Md. 2020) (instituting specific data security provisions for public 
institutions of higher education in Maryland) 
621 See Act of June 9, 2020, H.B. 122, 2020 Leg. (La. 2020) (establishing procedures for remote notarization of 
official documents in light of the COVID-19 pandemic). 
622 See Act of Apr. 2, 2020, S.B. 6287, 2020 Leg. (Wash. 2020). 
623 See Act of June 27, 2017, 2017 Wash. Ch. 1 (limiting the capture of biometric identifiers by state agencies but 
explicitly exempting law enforcement agencies from statutory provisions requiring notice and consent). 
624 See Evan Ringel, Facial Recognition Technology Regulation Database (Jan. 21, 2021) (unpublished Excel 
spreadsheet) (on file with author). 
625 See id. 
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profession,626 meaning that nearly all regulations directed at private use of facial recognition 
technology or biometric information applied broadly to all non-government actors. 
 The pending lawsuits based on Clearview AI’s facial recognition technology revolve 
around violations of state laws directed at private actors. Many of the lawsuits use the private 
cause of action established in BIPA, which applies to private entities but not to state and local 
government agencies or any judicial entity.627 This distinction is important for several aspects of 
the litigation against Clearview AI and any future challenges to regulation of facial recognition 
technology. Clearview AI has argued that the licensing of their technology to law enforcement 
agencies and other government entities does not make the company subject to the regulations of 
BIPA; while Clearview AI originally licensed their facial recognition technology to both public 
and private actors, the company now alleges that they have cancelled all contracts with private 
actors and license “only to government entities.”628 Since BIPA exempts “contractors [or 
subcontractors . . . of a State agency or local unit of government when working for that State 
agency or local unit of government,”629 Clearview AI claims that the licensing of their product 
                                               
626 See Cannabis Regulation and Tax Act, 2019 Ill. Laws 27; Act of May 22, 2018, 2017 Vt. Adv. Leg. Serv. 171 
(relating to data brokers and consumer protection); see also Evan Ringel, Facial Recognition Technology Regulation 
Database (Jan. 21, 2021) (unpublished Excel spreadsheet) (on file with author). 
627 See Biometric Information Privacy Act, 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 14/10 (2008) (“‘Private entity’ means any 
individual, partnership, corporation, limited liability company, association, or other group, however organized. A 
private entity does not include a State or local government agency. A private entity does not include any court of 
Illinois, a clerk of the court, or a judge or justice thereof.”). 
628 See Mem. In Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss at 5, ACLU v. Clearview AI, 2020-CH-04353 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Oct. 7, 2020); 
see also Kashmir Hill, The Secretive Company That Might End Privacy as We Know It, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/18/technology/clearview-privacy-facial-recognition.html (reporting that Fortune 
500 companies and wealthy individuals had access to Clearview AI’s facial recognition application before the 
company revoked it). 
629 See Biometric Information Privacy Act, 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 14/25(e) (2008). 
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solely to government agencies makes them exempt from BIPA’s requirements of notice and 
consent.630  
This argument has a major sticking point. First, the BIPA regulation in question prevents 
the capture or collection of an individual’s biometric identifier or biometric information by a 
private entity without obtaining notice and consent.631 While Clearview AI claims that they no 
longer offer their services to private companies, early reporting on the company suggests that 
private entities still had access to Clearview AI’s facial recognition application well after the 
company had “scraped” photographs and collected biometric data to populate a facial recognition 
database.632 Even if Clearview AI now qualifies as a government contractor by only offering 
their service to government agencies, it seems clear that the company was marketing to both law 
enforcement agencies and private companies at the time they actually violated BIPA by 
collecting Illinois residents’ biometric information without notice and consent. If a court 
accepted Clearview AI’s argument, any other facial recognition technology provider offering 
their service only to the government would not be subject to regulations targeting the use of 
facial recognition technology by private entities even if the company is itself a private entity. 
Sorrell also weighs the distinction between government and private entities when ruling 
on a First Amendment challenge to a regulation limiting the collection and dissemination of 
information. In Sorrell, Vermont argued that the Prescription Confidentiality Law did not 
                                               
630 See Mem. In Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss at 5, ACLU v. Clearview AI, 2020-CH-04353 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Oct. 7, 2020). 
631 See Biometric Information Privacy Act, 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 14/15(b) (2008). 
632 See Kashmir Hill, The Secretive Company That Might End Privacy as We Know It, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/18/technology/clearview-privacy-facial-recognition.html (reporting that 
Clearview AI has, as of January 2020, licensed use of their facial recognition technology while also describing the 
collection of biometric data from social media images). 
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regulate speech but instead only “access to information.”633 The state attempted to rely on a 
previous Supreme Court precedent, LAPD v. United Reporting Publishing (1999), for the 
proposition that a State could use a content-based regulation to limit access to government 
information.634 The Court rejected the comparison to United Reporting, finding that, unlike the 
challenged statute in United Reporting, Vermont had restricted access to information that was 
already “in private hands.” Though the Court was careful to note that the United Reporting 
decision was about standing to bring a facial challenge and had no adjudication of a First 
Amendment claim, Justice Kennedy’s decision does suggest that there is a “significant” 
difference in the burden on speech when a regulation targets information in private possession 
rather than information possessed by the government.635  
This difference could mean two things for the regulation of facial recognition technology. 
First, a facial recognition technology provider using a model like Clearview AI’s, where 
biometric data in a database is obtained from photographs on a public website, may have a 
stronger argument for First Amendment protection than a facial recognition technology provider 
that relies on biometric data obtained from drivers’ license photographs, criminal mugshots, or 
other photographs within a government’s possession. This difference in constitutional protection 
incentivizes facial recognition technology providers to move towards a Clearview AI model, 
where images are scraped from public profiles to create a massive facial recognition database 
that dwarfs the size of databases reliant on government-sourced images.636 
                                               
633 See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 568 (2011). 
634 See id. 
635 See id. 
636 See Kashmir Hill, The Secretive Company That Might End Privacy as We Know It, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/18/technology/clearview-privacy-facial-recognition.html (depicting a chart 
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A second reading of the First Amendment distinction between government and private 
actors is that states may have more latitude to regulate the use of facial recognition technology 
by government actors than by private actors. This reading receives some tacit support in 
government employee cases like Garcetti v. Ceballos (2006), which holds that “speech” by 
government employees within the course of their official duties is not protected by the First 
Amendment.637 If facial recognition technology is considered speech for First Amendment 
purposes, regulation of use by government actors may not be subject to the same level of First 
Amendment scrutiny as a regulation on use by private actors. This means that regulations on 
government use of facial recognition technology would be more likely to survive a First 
Amendment challenge. 
On the surface, this may not seem like a problem. Though private entities may have 
broader latitude to use facial recognition technology, at least police departments are inhibited 
from using the technology with impunity. The regulatory landscape for facial recognition 
technology tells a different story. States are reluctant to prevent their own government agencies 
and law enforcement officers from using a valuable tool, and few states have passed statutes 
explicitly limiting law enforcement use of facial recognition technology.638 When state 
legislatures actually pass regulations limiting government use, they are subject to criticism and 
                                               
Clearview AI used as promotional material that showed Clearview’s ability to search more than 3 billion images for 
a potential match, while a search of FBI databases only used 411 million images). 
637 See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 422 (2006) (holding that the speech of public employees “pursuant to 
their official duties” is not subject to First Amendment protection because the employees are not “speaking as 
citizens for First Amendment purposes”). 
638 See Evan Ringel, Facial Recognition Technology Regulation Database (Jan. 21, 2021) (unpublished Excel 
spreadsheet) (on file with author); but see An Act Relative to Justice, Equity and Accountability in Law 
Enforcement in the Commonwealth, 2020 Mass. Acts 253 (requiring law enforcement to obtain a court order to 
perform a facial recognition search unless the agency is identifying a deceased person or acting under exigent 
circumstances); Facial Recognition Act, 2020 Wash. Adv. Leg. Serv. 257 (2020); Act of Oct. 7, 2020, 2020 Vt. 
Laws 166 (placing a moratorium on most uses of facial recognition technology by law enforcement officers). 
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pressure from police departments who frame the regulation as inhibiting law enforcement ability 
to do popular tasks like identify victims of child sex trafficking.639 What if state and local 
legislatures do strictly regulate use of facial recognition technology by government agencies and 
law enforcement while leaving private use of facial recognition technology essentially 
unregulated? While this may seem to reduce the risk of government surveillance while allowing 
private industry to thrive, this may not be the regulatory panacea many hope for. Privacy 
scholars have warned about a regulatory environment where minimal constraints are placed on 
private use of facial recognition technology, noting the tendency of governments to utilize 
private surveillance technology networks when a state-sponsored one is unavailable.640 
Regulations of facial recognition technology likely face First Amendment barriers 
regardless of whether the regulation is directed at use of facial recognition by a government 
agency or by a private individual. However, Supreme Court case law suggests that private 
entities providing and using facial recognition technology may have a stronger First Amendment 
claim than government entities using the technology. The distinction between public and private 
applicability can also shape the applicability of statutes to particular providers of facial 
recognition technology, with Clearview AI arguing that a change in their business practices 
should mean they avoid BIPA liability entirely. The potential success of this argument could 
shape the future model of facial recognition technology, with companies building ever-larger 
databases populated with images posted on social media pages. 
                                               
639 See Kashmir Hill, How One State Managed to Actually Write Rules on Facial Recognition, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 27, 
2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/27/technology/Massachusetts-facial-recognition-rules.html (quoting law 
enforcement officials in Vermont calling for the lifting of a moratorium on police use of facial recognition 
technology because there “could be hundreds of kids waiting to be saved”). 
640 See Evan Selinger & Woodrow Hartzog, The Inconsentability of Facial Surveillance, 66 LOY. L. REV. 33, 54 
(2020). 
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Category Two: Limitations on Use 
 
 Many statutes and ordinances governing the use of facial recognition technology or 
biometric information place a limitation on use, whether through an absolute prohibition on a 
specific use of the technology or through some sort of procedural limitation. Other regulations 
create an explicit or implicit grant of authority for an agency or entity to use facial recognition 
technology or collect biometric information. More than half of the coded statutes and ordinances 
collected for this thesis articulate a specific permitted use of facial recognition technology or 
biometric data collection.641  
 Chapter 2 broke the permitted uses of facial recognition technology into three different 
categories: (1) the identification of alleged criminals by law enforcement agencies; (2) statutorily 
created loopholes allowing governments or private companies to use facial recognition 
technology or biometric data in certain circumstances; and (3) bureaucratic grants of authority to 
government agencies, generally for non-criminal purposes. It is extremely unlikely that an 
affirmative grant of authority to use facial recognition technology would trigger a potential First 
Amendment challenge. These permitted uses are still relevant to First Amendment arguments 
against regulation of facial recognition technology for two main reasons.  
 First, the Sorrell framework for First Amendment challenges to regulation of information 
suggests that a law is more likely to trigger strict judicial scrutiny if it is a content-based 
restriction on speech.642 As discussed earlier in this chapter, an important factor in the Court’s 
decision that Vermont’s regulation of prescriber-identifying information was a content-based 
                                               
641 See Evan Ringel, Facial Recognition Technology Regulation Database (Jan. 21, 2021) (unpublished Excel 
spreadsheet) (on file with author). 
642 See Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 565 (2011) (“[The Prescription Confidentiality Law] is designed to impose a specific, 
content-based burden on protected expression. It follows that heightened judicial scrutiny is warranted.”). 
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restriction on speech is that Vermont made availability of the information “almost limitless,” 
prohibiting use for marketing purposes while allowing essentially every other use of the 
information.643 Justice Kennedy suggested in his decision that a statute allowing the disclosure of 
information in “only a few narrow and well-justified circumstances” would be more likely to 
overcome a First Amendment challenge.  
A regulation of facial recognition technology may be in trouble if it has both a broad 
explicit or implicit grant of authority to use facial recognition technology and a narrow 
restriction on use of facial recognition technology in a specific context or by a specific group. 
This would trigger a Sorrell fact pattern, where a regulation permitting broad use but 
constraining one specific use was subject to heightened scrutiny as a content-based law. While a 
state could still survive strict scrutiny by showing that the regulation was narrowly tailored to a 
compelling state interest,644 the presumption of constitutional invalidity would make it difficult 
for a regulation to survive.645 Many of the laws coded as having implicit grants of authority to 
use facial recognition technology or biometric data did not have a corresponding direct 
restriction on use.646 Regardless, future regulations that leave too many uses of facial recognition 
technology available in an effort to not be overbroad may trigger content-based heightened 
scrutiny. 
                                               
643 See id. at 573. 
644 See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utilities Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 19 (1986) (articulating the strict scrutiny 
inquiry for “burdens [on] protected speech”); see also Roy G. Spece, Jr. & David Yokum, Scrutinizing Strict 
Scrutiny, 40 VT. L. REV. 285, 295 (2015). 
645 See Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 571 (2011) (citing R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 382, (1992)). 
646 See, e.g., Database Security Breach Notification Law, 2018 La. Acts 382; Act of May 29, 2018, 2018 Colo. Sess. 
Laws. Ch. 266 (strengthening protections for consumer data privacy). 
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 The use of facial recognition technology as a tool to identify suspected criminals may 
also be relevant in a First Amendment challenge. Chapter 3 of this thesis analyzes the battle 
between intermediate scrutiny and strict scrutiny for Clearview AI’s challenge to BIPA. One of 
the arguments used by the plaintiffs in ACLU v. Clearview AI is that Clearview AI’s faceprinting 
of human images resembles the credit report in Dun & Bradstreet in that it “serv[es] no public 
issue.”647 As mentioned in Chapter 3, the EFF argues in an amicus brief that Clearview AI’s 
facial recognition technology is not a matter of public concern “just because the company sells 
the service to law enforcement agencies,”648 an argument Volokh and Bambauer rebut by citing 
the general public’s “obvious interest in . . . prompt and accurate identification of criminal 
suspects.”649  
These arguments raise the question of whether the level of public concern and 
corresponding First Amendment interest when some statutes explicitly permit use of facial 
recognition technology for criminal identification purposes and others permit use for non-
criminal government reasons. Clearview AI is not a direct corollary, as the company has 
restricted use to only law enforcement agencies. However, it stands to reason that a higher 
standard of judicial review may be applied when the use of facial recognition technology for 
criminal identification is at issue, regardless of whether the regulation is challenged by a facial 
recognition technology provider or an entity seeking to use the technology. 
                                               
647 See Br. for Elec. Frontier Found. as Amici Curiae Opposing Def. Mot. to Dismiss at 9, ACLU v. Clearview AI, 
2020-CH-04353 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Nov. 2, 2020); see also Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 
749, 759 (1985). 
648 See Br. for Elec. Frontier Found. as Amici Curiae Opposing Def. Mot. to Dismiss at 9-10, ACLU v. Clearview 
AI, 2020-CH-04353 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Nov. 2, 2020). 
649 See id. 
 152 
Guidance from Sorrell and Clearview AI’s ongoing litigation indicates that the best First 
Amendment defense for facial recognition technology revolves around regulations placing an 
unconstitutional burden on First Amendment “speech,” which Sorrell indicates includes the 
creation and dissemination of information.650 That burden on speech is strongest when a 
complete limitation has been placed on use; accordingly, regulations within the Limitations on 
Use category are the most likely to trigger a potential First Amendment challenge. In Chapter 2 
of this thesis, restrictions on use of facial recognition technology or biometric information were 
grouped into two main categories: (1) bans and moratoriums on use of facial recognition 
technology or biometrics and (2) restrictions on use of biometric data. Regulatory provisions in 
each of these categories may trigger First Amendment concerns, though litigation around 
Clearview AI suggests that restrictions on use of biometric data may be most at risk to a First 
Amendment defense. 
At least one state proposed a complete ban on state and local government use of facial 
recognition technology during the 2020 legislative session,651 but no state has enacted a ban or 
moratorium on government use of facial recognition technology as of March 2021.652 Though 
this type of comprehensive limitation is not popular at the state level, twelve municipalities have 
passed bans on use of facial recognition technology by any city agency or law enforcement 
officer. Boston’s ban on facial recognition technology, passed in May 2020, is an example of 
how these local bans typically look. The city bans any official from “obtaining, retaining, 
                                               
650 See Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 570 (2011) (“[T]he creation and dissemination of information are speech within the 
meaning of the First Amendment.”). 
651 See Act of Feb. 19, 2020, H.B. 1642, 2020 Leg. (N.H. 2020) (proposing a near-total ban on government use of 
facial recognition technology). 
652 See Evan Ringel, Facial Recognition Technology Regulation Database (Jan. 21, 2021) (unpublished Excel 
spreadsheet) (on file with author). 
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possessing, accessing, or using . . . any face surveillance system, or . . . information derived from 
a face surveillance system.”653 The ban also prohibits city officials from entering agreements 
with third parties to use facial recognition technology.654 
Despite what seems like a wide-reaching restriction on speech, two factors make this type 
of ban likely to survive a First Amendment challenge. First, as discussed earlier in this chapter, 
state and local governments may have more latitude under the First Amendment to regulate their 
own conduct than to regulate the conduct of private individuals or entities. A state regulation that 
prohibits law enforcement officers from using facial recognition technology in almost every 
circumstance655 is likely to trigger a lower level of First Amendment scrutiny. 
Second, and more importantly, Sorrell suggests that a near-total restriction on the 
acquisition and use of information is “quite” different from the Vermont regulation that was 
deemed unconstitutional.656 This means that broader bans and moratoriums on use of facial 
recognition technology are less likely to trigger strict scrutiny. It also means that the coded 
statutes and ordinances prohibiting most uses of facial recognition technology within a particular 
sector, while allowing use under exigent circumstances,657 for a security purpose,658 or for some 
other reason are likely to avoid the Sorrell trap, especially if a state can provide a “well-justified” 
                                               
653 See BOSTON, MASS., CODE, Ch. 16-62(b)(1)(a) (2020). 
654 See id. 
655 See, e.g., Act of Oct. 7, 2020, 2020 Vt. Laws 166 (placing a moratorium on most uses of facial recognition 
technology by law enforcement officers). 
656 See Sorrell v. IMS Health, 564 U.S. 552, 572 (2011) (“For instance, the State might have advanced its asserted 
privacy interest by allowing the information’s sale or disclosure in only a few narrow and well-justified 
circumstance. A statute of that type would present quite a different case from the one presented here.”). 
657 See Facial Recognition Act, 2020 Wash. Adv. Leg. Serv. 257 (2020) (allowing the use of real-time facial 
recognition technology by government agencies under exigent circumstances). 
658 See WASH. REV. CODE § 19.375.020 (2017). 
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explanation for why those specific uses are permitted. Under Washington’s biometric data 
privacy law, persons are prevented from capturing biometric identifiers “for a commercial 
purpose” without providing notice and obtaining consent;659 the notice and consent requirement 
does not apply if the biometric identifier has been collected for a security purpose, defined as 
“the purpose of preventing shoplifting, fraud, or any other misappropriation or theft of a thing of 
value . . . and other purposes in furtherance of protecting the security or integrity of software . . . 
or any person.”660 Washington would likely justify the exception as connected to a substantial 
government purpose, perhaps enabling Washington-based businesses to protect themselves from 
crime or helping ensure the security of Washington residents while they shop. Sorrell suggests 
that a lower level of scrutiny may apply for a party challenging this law with a First Amendment 
argument. 
A ban or moratorium on facial recognition technology in a specific sector may more 
closely mirror the unconstitutional content-based restriction in Sorrell. A 2020 statute passed by 
New York imposes a moratorium on the use of facial recognition technology in both public and 
private schools until July 2022.661 The statute, which also creates a task force to evaluate future 
use of facial recognition technology in schools, does not mention any other industry or field. If a 
private school was taken to court for a violation of the moratorium, it could theoretically 
construct a Sorrell-adjacent First Amendment argument that New York was imposing a content-
based restriction by limiting the school’s use of “information as speech” while other users can 
                                               
659 See id. § 19.375.020(1) (prohibiting anyone from “enroll[ing] a biometric identifier in a database for a 
commercial purpose” without notice or consent). 
660 See id. § 19.375.010. 
661 See 2020 N.Y. Laws 349 (placing a moratorium on the use of biometric identifying technology in both public and 
private schools). 
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use the information freely. This argument would likely fail. The connection between preventing 
the use of facial recognition technology in schools and the likely government interest of 
protecting child privacy is more closely connected than that between prohibiting on use of 
prescriber-identifying information for marketing purposes and protecting physician 
confidentiality (the justification provided in Sorrell).662 Additionally, even if a court somehow 
determined that New York’s statute was a content-based restriction on speech, the Supreme 
Court has previously accepted child privacy as a compelling government interest sufficient to 
overcome heightened scrutiny.663 New York would need to show that the school-specific 
moratorium was narrowly tailored, perhaps by emphasizing the temporary nature of the 
restriction or noting that the moratorium is to allow the state time to develop guidelines for 
responsible use. Though this particular statute would likely survive a First Amendment 
challenge, other potential sector-specific bans and moratoriums may be harder to justify in the 
face of heightened scrutiny. 
 The First Amendment barrier looms largest when states regulate the use of facial 
recognition technology through restrictions on the collection and dissemination of biometric 
information. These restrictions usually take the form of notice and/or consent requirements for 
capture and disclosure of data. If information is truly speech, as the Supreme Court states in 
Sorrell, regulations controlling how private entities can collect, use, and disseminate biometric 
information would be regulations on speech and would have to survive some level of First 
                                               
662 See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 574 (2011) (noting that physicians have a “contrived” choice 
between consenting to the use of their information or withholding consent, which still allows their information to be 
used by nearly everyone). 
663 See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 758 n. 9 (1982) (suggesting that child privacy interests are part of a 
legislative judgment that “easily passes muster” for First Amendment purposes). 
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Amendment scrutiny.664 Chapter 3 of this thesis uses ACLU v. Clearview AI as a proxy for a 
more general examination of First Amendment applicability to facial recognition technology, but 
the ACLU’s suit under Illinois’ Biometric Information Privacy Act exposes the potential First 
Amendment problems when applying biometric privacy laws to facial recognition technology.  
Clearview AI has argued that laws limiting the capture and dissemination of biometric 
information should be subject to strict scrutiny as a content-based restriction on speech.665 
According to the company, BIPA (and potentially other biometric privacy laws) cannot survive 
strict scrutiny because states has no compelling interest in protecting the biometric privacy of 
individuals who publicly post images of themselves online.666 Clearview AI frames the public 
photographs and the biometric data collected from them as “already-published public 
information,” a far cry from the “sensitive” information biometric privacy laws are designed to 
protect.667 Volokh and Bambauer echo this sentiment, arguing that United States privacy laws 
cannot ban the “collection, analysis, or subsequent disclosure of information that is already in 
public view without conflicting with the First Amendment.”668 If strict scrutiny does indeed 
apply, a plaintiff will be hard-pressed to argue that their regulation is truly narrowly tailored to 
meet a precisely-stated compelling state interest.669 
                                               
664 See Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 570 (2011). 
665 See Mem. In Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss at 21, ACLU v. Clearview AI, 2020-CH-04353 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Oct. 7, 2020) 
(“Because BIPA imposes content-based restrictions on Clearview’s speech, it is subject to strict scrutiny.”). 
666 See id. 
667 See id. 
668 See Br. for First Amendment Clinic at Duke Law et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Def. Mot. to Dismiss at 14, 
ACLU v. Clearview AI, 2020-CH-04353 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 2020). 
669 See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Sorrell v. IMS Health: Details, Detailing, and the Death of Privacy, 36 VT. L. REV. 855, 
873 (2012) (“[F]ew laws preventing data disclosure to protect privacy are likely to survive the ‘compelling interest’ 
requirement of the traditional strict scrutiny test.”). 
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Even if, as this thesis concludes, a regulation on the collection of biometric information 
without notice and consent is likely subject to intermediate scrutiny, the law still may not survive 
a challenge by a facial recognition technology provider like Clearview AI that uses publicly 
available photographs. To survive intermediate scrutiny, a regulation on speech must “directly 
advance” and be “narrowly drawn” to a “substantial interest.”670 Clearview AI has argued that 
the unique nature of its facial recognition technology means that BIPA is unconstitutionally 
overbroad.671 Because Clearview AI “scraped” the online images that populate their facial 
recognition database from other websites without any additional information, the company 
asserts that BIPA would require Clearview AI to acquire written consent “from individuals 
whose names are unknown to it and who have already consented to the general public viewing 
their photos,” effectively forcing them to shutter their business.672 Clearview AI’s questionable 
conflation of consent to public viewership of photographs and consent to the collection and use 
of biometric information is based on the third-party doctrine from Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence.673 The company claims that individuals have no reasonable expectation of privacy 
in information (including biometric information) that they voluntarily turn over to third parties, 
                                               
670 See Cent. Hudson Gas and Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 564-65 (1980); see also  
671 See Mem. In Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss at 23, ACLU v. Clearview AI, 2020-CH-04353 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Oct. 7, 2020); 
see also Br. for First Amendment Clinic at Duke Law et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Def. Mot. to Dismiss at 16, 
ACLU v. Clearview AI, 2020-CH-04353 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 2020) (“BIPA sweeps much too broadly by prohibiting 
the faceprinting of publicly available information. As applied to Clearview, BIPA seriously burdens the collection 
and reuse of information that is already available to the public without adequately weighing the benefits of the 
expressive value of faceprinting against the harms to the public. To the extent that BIPA protects privacy interests at 
all (which is modest, given that the information it uses is already publicly available), those interests are outweighed 
by the burden on Clearview’s rights of expression.”). 
672 See Mem. In Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss at 23, ACLU v. Clearview AI, 2020-CH-04353 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Oct. 7, 2020).  
673 See id. at 22 (citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979)). 
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meaning that suppressing the use of the information for facial recognition technology is an 
unconstitutional restriction on speech “fully protected by the First Amendment.”674   
Though the language of Clearview AI’s argument seems sensible, the normative aspect of 
this argument cannot be overlooked. BIPA establishes an opt-in scheme for biometric privacy, 
requiring a private entity to obtain written consent before an individual’s biometric identifier is 
collected or processed.675 By arguing that BIPA is unconstitutionally overbroad, Clearview AI is 
essentially claiming that an opt-in privacy scheme cannot be applied to the company’s facial 
recognition technology. Since Clearview AI is not the original collector of the photographs, the 
company cannot be expected to obtain consent from the subjects of the photographs because it 
does not know the names of the people in the photographs.676 One must acknowledge the 
unintentional irony of a company that literally bases their entire business model off of identifying 
individuals in photographs claiming that they have no way to identify an individual in a 
photograph to obtain consent. Privacy scholars Evan Selinger and Woodrow Hartzog have 
claimed that consent requirements for facial recognition are “fool’s gold,” lulling individuals into 
a false sense of security and eroding privacy norms.677 Regardless, opt-in schemes provide 
greater privacy protection than an opt-out privacy scheme, especially when considering the 
passive nature of facial recognition technology.678 The coding of existing and proposed facial 
                                               
674 See id. at 23. 
675 See Biometric Information Privacy Act, 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 14/15(b) (2008). 
676 See Mem. In Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss at 23, ACLU v. Clearview AI, 2020-CH-04353 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Oct. 7, 2020). 
677 See Evan Selinger & Woodrow Hartzog, The Inconsentability of Facial Surveillance, 66 LOY. L. REV. 33, 53-54 
(2020). 
678 See Br. for Elec. Frontier Found. as Amici Curiae Opposing Def. Mot. to Dismiss at 17, ACLU v. Clearview AI, 
2020-CH-04353 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Nov. 2, 2020) (“Many won’t even know a business collected their faceprint, because 
faceprints can be collected at a distance or from photos. Of those who learn of the faceprinting, many won’t know 
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recognition laws for this thesis revealed that laws limiting the collection and use of biometric 
information are the most common way for states to regulate against the use of facial recognition 
technology; these laws are practically the only way states have regulated against the use of facial 
recognition technology by private, non-government actors.679 Ruling that consent and notice 
requirements for biometric information do not apply to facial recognition technology would 
severely diminish the ability of states to limit the use of facial recognition technology against 
their citizens.  
A potential First Amendment argument against the regulation of facial recognition 
technology is especially potent when arguing that a limitation on use is a burden on 
constitutionally protected speech. Limitations on use of facial recognition technology or 
biometric data are the most likely category of regulation to resemble the “content-based” 
regulation on information that triggered heightened scrutiny in Sorrell. Though the Sorrell 
decision is nebulous about the precise level of scrutiny applicable in Sorrell, content-based 
restrictions on speech are presumptively unconstitutional and nearly always trigger strict scrutiny 
from the Court.680 Bans or moratoriums on use of facial recognition technology are less likely to 
trigger strict scrutiny, especially if they are broad enough to avoid the appearance of a targeted 
restriction of a particular speaker. Restrictions on the collection, use, and dissemination of 
biometric information are the most likely to face a First Amendment barrier despite being the 
                                               
they have the right to opt-out or how to do so. Even an informed person might be deterred from trying to opt-out 
because the process is time-consuming, confusing, or frustrating.”). 
679 See Evan Ringel, Facial Recognition Technology Regulation Database (Jan. 21, 2021) (unpublished Excel 
spreadsheet) (on file with author); but see PORTLAND, OR., CODE, Ch. 34.10 (Sept. 9, 2020) (banning the use of 
facial recognition technology by private entities in places of public accommodation). 
680 See Sorrell v. IMS Health, 564 U.S. 552, 571 (2011) (citing R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 382, 
(1992)); see also Ashutosh Bhagwat, Sorrell v. IMS Health: Details, Detailing, and the Death of Privacy, 36 VT. L. 
REV. 855, 873 (2012) (citing Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 799 (2011)). 
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main tool used by states to regulate non-government use of facial recognition technology. As 
ACLU v. Clearview AI works its way through the courts, states may face a future where they 
cannot utilize traditional regulatory structures of notice and consent to limit the use of facial 
recognition. 
Categories Three and Four: Evaluation of Use and Accountability of Use  
 
 The remaining regulatory categories are not direct restrictions on the use of facial 
recognition technology and therefore are less relevant for First Amendment purposes. Regulatory 
provisions falling under evaluation of use include provisions requiring a use report prior to 
government use of facial recognition technology681 and provisions imposing a minimum 
accuracy standards requirement for facial recognition technology.682 Unlike the limitations on 
use that trigger potential First Amendment concerns, these provisions do not place substantial 
restrictions on the use of facial recognition technology or the collection or processing of 
biometric data. At least one interested party in the ACLU v. Clearview AI litigation has argued 
that BIPA’s requirements of notice and consent should be viewed as content-neutral time, place, 
and manner restrictions that trigger intermediate judicial scrutiny.683 While the debate about 
BIPA’s notice and consent provisions has been discussed extensively throughout Chapters 3 and 
4 of this thesis, the provisions under evaluation of use seem to more clearly fall under 
intermediate scrutiny as incidental restrictions on speech in a content-neutral fashion. In addition, 
                                               
681 See, e.g., Facial Recognition Act, 2020 Wash. Adv. Leg. Serv. 257; Act of July 7, 2017, 2017 Pa. Laws 22 
(requiring a use policy for municipal law enforcement use of facial recognition technology); SEATTLE, WASH., 
CODE, Ch. 14.18 (2018); YELLOW SPRINGS, OHIO, CODE ch. 607 (2018). 
682 See, e.g., Facial Recognition Act, 2020 Wash. Adv. Leg. Serv. 257; Act of July 27, 2020, H.B. 4886, 2020 Leg. 
(Mass. 2020) (reforming police standards and policies); Act of June 1, 2020, A.B. 4211, 2020 Leg. (N.J. 2020) 
(regulating law enforcement use of biometric information and technologies). 
683 See Br. for Mandel Legal Aid Clinic as Amici Curiae Opposing Def. Mot. to Dismiss at 4, ACLU v. Clearview 
AI, 2020-CH-04353 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Nov. 2, 2020) 
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rather than directly affecting how the facial recognition technology provider can collect and use 
biometric information, these provisions institute requirements that a government agency must 
follow to legally use facial recognition technology. To the extent that these provisions limit First 
Amendment rights at all, they almost certainly mirror the “incidental” limitations found to be 
constitutional via intermediate scrutiny in O’Brien.684 
 The only possible exception to this relatively simple analysis is a requirement in 
Washington’s S.B. 6280 that requires a facial recognition technology provider to turn over an 
“application programming interface” (API) to any state or local government agency using the 
company’s technology.685 Providers are required to give the agency the API so the agency can 
perform “legitimate, independent, and reasonable” tests for accuracy across subgroups including 
race, age, and gender.686 At least one post-Sorrell First Amendment challenge has involved a 
plaintiff’s claim that the mandatory provision of an API represented compelled speech and made 
an Arizona law subject to “exacting” First Amendment scrutiny.687 In CDK Glob. LLC v. 
Brnovich, the District of Arizona flatly rejected the argument that provision of an API is 
compelled speech, ruling that even if Plaintiffs were forced to create code to provide an API in 
compliance with the law, the code was purely mechanical in function and thus did not trigger the 
First Amendment.688 Though the issue has not been adjudicated at the Supreme Court level, a 
                                               
684 See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (“This Court has held that when ‘speech’ and 
‘nonspeech’ elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in 
regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms.”). 
685 See Facial Recognition Act, 2020 Wash. Adv. Leg. Serv. 257, § 6. 
686 See id. 
687 See CDK Glob. LLC v. Brnovich, 2020 WL 2559913, at *20 (D. Ariz. May 20, 2020). 
688 See id. at *21-22. 
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facial recognition technology provider would likely fail in an argument that being forced to 
provide an API triggers strict scrutiny, or indeed any additional First Amendment scrutiny 
whatsoever. 
 Regulatory provisions falling under accountability of use include disclosure and notice 
provisions and provisions increasing public involvement in the regulatory process.689 Notice and 
consent provisions fall within both accountability of use and limitations on use, but the 
constitutionality of this type of provision is discussed extensively in the “Limitations on Use” 
section. Outside of notice and consent provisions, accountability of use provisions have little 
effect on the use of facial recognition at all. Though each of the provisions within the 
accountability of use category increase public awareness in how facial recognition technology is 
used, only notice and consent provisions establish any sort of precondition for use of the 
technology. The provisions requiring government agencies to produce yearly reports of facial 
recognition searches or cooperate with government audits do not provide a preemptive barrier to 
use of facial recognition technology. Rather, these provisions ensure public awareness and 
accountability after the technology has already been used. Accordingly, these are regulations on 
conduct (how the technology was used by government agencies) rather than on speech (the 
actual collection, use, and dissemination of information involved in facial recognition 
technology). Regulations solely of conduct receive only rational basis review and a state would 
almost certainly be able to state a rational explanation for accountability-based regulations.690 
There is no realistic argument that this type of regulation would be subject to strict scrutiny; at 
                                               
689 See Evan Ringel, Facial Recognition Technology Regulation Database (Jan. 21, 2021) (unpublished Excel 
spreadsheet) (on file with author). 
690 See Ruling on Def. Mot. to Dismiss at 9, State of Vermont v. Clearview AI, Docket No. 226-3-20 (Vt. Sup. Ct. 
Sept. 10, 2020) (“[A] restriction on non-speech or non-expressive conduct does not implicate the First Amendment 
and receives only rational basis scrutiny.”). 
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worst, these regulations would be subject to intermediate O’Brien scrutiny as regulations of a 
mix of speech and nonspeech, which they would survive as merely incidental burdens on 
speech.691  
 Regulations in the evaluation of use and accountability of use sections are the most likely 
to survive a First Amendment challenge. They will likely face review under either the rational 
basis standard or intermediate scrutiny, and they are almost certainly permissible under either 
standard. While these regulations are likely constitutional, they provide little legitimate barrier to 
the use of facial recognition technology. While other regulations establish situations where the 
use of facial recognition technology is legally impermissible, regulations within the evaluation of 
use section merely require government agencies to establish some sort of standard to govern 
different aspects of facial recognition use.692 Washington’s S.B. 6280 lists several suitable 
elements of an agency use policy, but there is no enforcement provision establishing actual 
penalties for noncompliance.693 Citizens are left in the position of expecting government 
agencies to act in good faith by complying with the relevant statutory provisions despite a 
complete lack of punishment if they do not. 
 Accountability of use provisions are similarly toothless. Though provisions creating task 
forces and requiring community review periods are ostensibly helpful in raising public awareness 
about use of facial recognition technology, they do little to actually limit use of the technology 
by either government or private actors. Though requiring notice and consent creates a more 
significant barrier to unrestricted use, ACLU v. Clearview AI suggests that consent provisions 
                                               
691 See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). 
692 See, e.g., Facial Recognition Act, 2020 Wash. Adv. Leg. Serv. 257, § 3. 
693 See id. 
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may be unworkable for facial recognition technologies that rely on publicly available 
photographs. Opt-out privacy schemes that require the provision of notice without a 
corresponding consent requirement are notoriously ineffective in limiting invasions of privacy,694 
but even requiring consent may not provide sufficient protection against the potential privacy 
harms of facial recognition technology. While users are led to believe that they have individual 
autonomy in the privacy decision they make, their consent environments are shaped by 
“manipulators” who mislead users in a way that they do not perceive.695 Though consent is a 
“prominent” part of American privacy jurisprudence, regulators have utilized notice and choice 
models in ways that “do more harm than good.”696 Ultimately, the applicability of the First 
Amendment to facial recognition technology sets up a situation where the regulations of facial 
recognition technology that are most likely to survive a First Amendment challenge are the least 
likely to impose an actual restraint on how the technology is used. 
Category Five: Enforcement of Permitted Use 
 
 Regulatory mechanisms allowing the enforcement of permitted use are important to 
ensure that government and private actors actually follow the restrictions statutes and ordinances 
place on use of facial recognition technology. These regulatory provisions include procedural 
                                               
694 See Br. for Elec. Frontier Found. as Amici Curiae Opposing Def. Mot. to Dismiss at 17, ACLU v. Clearview AI, 
2020-CH-04353 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Nov. 2, 2020). 
695 See Daniel Susser, Beate Roessler & Helen Nissenbaum, Online Manipulation: Hidden Influences in A Digital 
World, 4 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 1, 38 (2019). 
696 See Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, The Pathologies of Digital Consent, 96 Wash. U.L. Rev. 1461, 1464 
(2019). 
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remedies like suppression of unlawfully collected evidence697 and administrative discipline.698 
Other statutes and ordinances create mechanisms to enforce civil and criminal penalties, which 
Chapter 2 of this thesis divides into three categories: (1) a private right of action to bring a civil 
suit against a private entity;699 (2) a private right of action to bring a civil suit against a 
government officer or agency;700 and (3) an exclusive assignment of enforcement to a state or 
local attorney general who brings a civil action on behalf of citizens of the state.701 These 
penalties can include injunctive relief702 or monetary damages ranging from $1-$50,000.703 
 These provisions are an important part of regulations limiting the use of facial 
recognition technology but, as post-use punishments, likely have little practical impact on a 
potential First Amendment argument that a regulation is an unconstitutional burden on speech.  
Clearview AI has claimed in a suit against it in Vermont state court that the allegedly 
                                               
697 See Act of May 16, 2020, 2020 Minn. Ch. Law 82 (preventing police from using a drone with facial recognition 
unless “expressly authorized by a warrant”); Act of June 24, 2016, 2016 N.H. Ch. 322 (relating to the use of facial 
recognition technology in officer-worn body cameras); Act of Nov. 24, 2020, 2020 N.J. Pub. L. No. 129 (regulating 
the use of officer-worn body cameras); Act of June 25, 2015, 2015 Ore. Laws 550 (relating to the use of officer-
worn body cameras). 
698 See Act of June 24, 2016, 2016 N.H. Ch. 322 (relating to the use of facial recognition technology in officer-worn 
body cameras); see also BOSTON, MASS., CODE, Ch. 16-62 (2020); BROOKLINE, MASS., CODE, Art. 8.39 (2019); 
SOMERVILLE, MASS., CODE, art. III, div. 1, § 9-25 (2019). 
699 See, e.g., Biometric Information Privacy Act, 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 14/20 (2008). 
700 See, e.g., Act of Nov. 24, 2020, 2020 N.J. Pub. L. No. 129 (regulating the use of officer-worn body cameras); Act 
of May 16, 2020, 2020 Minn. Ch. Law 82 (preventing police from using a drone with facial recognition unless 
“expressly authorized by a warrant”). 
701 See, e.g., Act of June 30, 2015, 2015 Conn. Pub. Acts 142(g) (relating to data security for private state 
contractors). 
702 See, e.g., California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, 2018 Cal. Stat. ch. 55; Act of May 29, 2018, 2018 Colo. 
Sess. Laws. Ch. 266 (strengthening protections for consumer data privacy by including “biometric data” in 
definition of “personal information”); Biometric Information Privacy Act, 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 14/20 (2008); 
OAKLAND, CAL., CODE, Ch. 9.64.045 (2019); BOSTON, MASS., CODE, Ch. 16-62 (2020); CAMBRIDGE, MASS., CODE, 
ch. 2.128 (2018). 
703 See OAKLAND, CAL., CODE, Ch. 9.64.045 (2019); PORTLAND, ME., CODE, Ch. 17, Art. XI, § 17.129 (2020); 
California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, 2018 Cal. Stat. ch. 55. 
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discriminatory enforcement of Vermont’s Consumer Protection Act is sufficient to make the Act 
a content-based restriction on speech, triggering strict scrutiny.704 The Vermont state court 
rejected Clearview AI’s arguments that the state “target[ed] only Clearview and none of the other 
search engines” even though Google had also developed facial recognition technology.705 
Clearview AI has not used a similar argument of an “as applied” content-based restriction in the 
suit against the company for violations of BIPA, likely for two distinct reasons. First, BIPA has 
been the impetus for massive financial settlements by other companies specifically for improper 
use of facial recognition technology.706 Second, unlike the Vermont suit, which was brought by 
the state attorney general, the BIPA litigation is the result of a private right of action from Illinois 
residents.707 These factors suggests that any potential argument centered around a content-based 
disparity in enforcement is dependent on enforcement being the exclusive responsibility of the 
state. Any available private right of action defeats the argument of disparate and speaker-based 
enforcement. If a state puts enforcement for a regulation targeting the use of facial recognition 
technology in the hands of citizens who have been wronged, a facial recognition technology 
provider cannot then claim that the regulation is being enforced in a discriminatory fashion.  
 
  
                                               
704 See Ruling on Def. Mot. to Dismiss at 15, State of Vermont v. Clearview AI, Docket No. 226-3-20 (Vt. Sup. Ct. 
Sept. 10, 2020). 
705 See id. 
706 See Patel v. Facebook, Inc., 932 F.3d 1264, 1268 (9th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 937 (2020); David 
Oberly, Impact of Facebook $650 Million Patel BIPA Settlement, BIOMETRIC UPDATE (Aug. 20, 2020), 
https://www.biometricupdate.com/202008/impact-of-facebook-650-million-patel-bipa-settlement. 
707 Compare Ruling on Def. Mot. to Dismiss, State of Vermont v. Clearview AI, Docket No. 226-3-20 (Vt. Sup. Ct. 





 The majority decision in Sorrell v. IMS Health, issued in 2011, included two lines in dicta 
that may shape the regulation of emerging technologies, like facial recognition technology. By 
stating a rule that “information is speech” for purposes of the First Amendment,708 Justice 
Anthony Kennedy created a situation where a facial recognition technology provider could 
plausibly argue that a regulation limiting the use of facial recognition technology violates the 
provider’s First Amendment right to create and disseminate information. The Sorrell decision 
left plenty of unanswered questions about the level of constitutional scrutiny that may apply to a 
First Amendment claim based on the dissemination of information. But the decision made it 
clear that the more targeted a regulation on speech was, the more likely the Court would consider 
it a “content-based” regulation subject to heightened judicial scrutiny. This creates a First 
Amendment needle for legislators to thread: the regulation must simultaneously be broad enough 
to avoid allegations of content-based discrimination, while also be focused and “narrowly 
tailored” enough, in case strict scrutiny is applied during judicial review. The Court’s suggestion 
of a potentially constitutional privacy law resembles HIPAA, where nearly all uses of 
information are prohibited bar a few “well-justified” exceptions.709 
The unclear First Amendment environment created by Sorrell has now intersected with 
the regulation of facial recognition technology, a surveillance mechanism that for the 
identification of an individual by matching the individual’s facial image to images in a 
centralized database. At present, facial recognition technology is largely underregulated. There 
are no federal laws regulating use of the technology, and only a patchwork of state and local laws 
                                               
708 See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 570 (2011). 
709 See id. at 573. 
 168 
that provide limited regulatory protection. Following a national outcry about police brutality and 
systemic racism, concerns about use of facial recognition have come into sharper focus. At least 
three major providers of the technology have stopped providing the technology to law 
enforcement while awaiting action by Congress. Despite industry and public pressure, no federal 
legislation has progressed beyond the committee stage. This makes state and local regulations 
especially important. 
 In January 2020, the New York Times published an article about facial recognition 
provider Clearview AI and the provider’s innovative approach to facial recognition technology 
by “scraping” publicly available images from social media networks and allowing scanning 
through a cellphone application.710 A flurry of litigation emerged in the wake of the article, 
including at least eleven lawsuits under Illinois’ Biometric Information Privacy Act.711 In 
response to the lawsuits, Clearview AI has enlisted prominent First Amendment advocates to 
make the argument that their activities are protected by the First Amendment after Sorrell,.712  
In Chapter 2, this thesis started by examining the state- and local-level regulatory 
landscape governing government and private use of facial recognition technology. The author 
developed a coding protocol and aggregated and coded each proposed state statute from the 2020 
legislative session that involved facial recognition technology and biometric data.713 The author 
                                               
710 See Kashmir Hill, The Secretive Company That Might End Privacy as We Know It, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/18/technology/clearview-privacy-facial-recognition.html. 
711 See 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 14/10 (2008); see also Compl. of Pl., ACLU v. Clearview AI, 2020-CH-04353 (Ill. 
Cir. Ct. May 28, 2020); see also Kashmir Hill, Your Face Is Not Your Own, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE (Mar. 18, 2021), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/03/18/magazine/facial-recognition-clearview-ai.html (noting that 
Clearview AI is “fighting” eleven different lawsuits in the state of Illinois). 
712 See Kashmir Hill, Facial Recognition Start-Up Mounts a First Amendment Defense, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 11, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/11/technology/clearview-floyd-abrams.html. 
713 See Evan Ringel, Facial Recognition Technology Regulation Database (Jan. 21, 2021) (unpublished Excel 
spreadsheet) (on file with author). 
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also coded enacted state statutes from pre-2020 and local ordinances regulating or prohibiting 
facial recognition technology for a total of 376 coded state and local regulations.  
The regulatory landscape shows minimal enacted regulation of facial recognition 
technology. Only three states have passed laws broadly limiting or regulating government use of 
facial recognition technology: Washington, Massachusetts, and Vermont.714 Other states have 
limited prohibitions on specific uses of facial recognition technology in police surveillance tools, 
like drones and body cameras.715 Three states have biometric privacy laws imposing notice and 
consent requirements that would apply to private use of biometric data: Illinois, Texas, and 
Washington.716 
The author divided regulatory provisions into five categories for analysis purposes. The 
first, “Agents of Use,” established a dichotomy between regulations controlling government use 
of facial recognition technology and regulations controlling private use of facial recognition 
technology. Fewer than 10% of the coded regulations applied to both public and private actors. 
The second category, “Limitations on Use,” examined the varying ways in which regulations 
prohibited specific uses of facial recognition technology or biometric information. This category 
also explored the affirmative grants of use that many regulations provide. 
The third category, “Evaluation of Use,” included statutory provisions intended to 
increase accuracy and responsibility when using facial recognition technology or collecting 
biometric data. These provisions were less common, as many were exclusive to legislation 
focused on facial recognition technology. The fourth category, “Accountability of Use,” included 
                                               
714 See supra Chapter 1, notes 152-165 and accompanying text. 
715 See supra Chapter 1, notes 166-169 and accompanying text. 
716 See supra Chapter 1, notes 170-190 and accompanying text. 
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provisions designed to increase public awareness and engagement with use of facial recognition 
technology or biometric information. The most common of these provisions were notice and 
consent provisions, which were also categorized as limitations on use. The final category, 
“Enforcement of Permitted Use,” discussed the relatively rare availability of private rights of 
action for individuals to bring suit against entities using facial recognition technology. Instead, 
many regulations reserve enforcement exclusively for state attorneys general. 
In Chapter 3, this thesis then transitioned to discussing the potential applicability of the 
First Amendment to facial recognition technology. Despite arguments from a handful of 
scholars, the plain language of Sorrell suggests that at least some level of First Amendment 
protection would apply to the use of facial recognition technology.717 The thesis then examined 
whether intermediate or strict judicial scrutiny would apply to regulations limiting facial 
recognition technology, using ACLU v. Clearview AI as a proxy for a larger discussion about the 
First Amendment’s applicability. There are no direct judicial analogues applying either 
intermediate or strict scrutiny, a problem exacerbated by Sorrell’s repeated reference to 
“heightened” scrutiny without any final indication of what level of scrutiny actually applies.718 
Ultimately, this thesis concluded that intermediate scrutiny is likely to apply to facial recognition 
technology. Clearview AI’s arguments that BIPA is a content-based restriction on speech as 
applied to facial recognition technology rely heavily on distinguishable aspects of Sorrell v. IMS 
                                               
717 See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 570-71 (2011) (“This Court has held that the creation and 
dissemination of information are speech within the meaning of the First Amendment . . . . The State asks for an 
exception to the rule that information is speech . . . .”). 
718 See id. at 564 (“[The Act] is designed to impose a specific, content-based burden on protected expression. It 
follows that heightened judicial scrutiny is warranted.”). 
 171 
Health719 and Reed v. Town of Gilbert,720 cases where regulations were more narrowly targeted 
and caused more individualized burdens on speech.721 The normative issues with placing 
regulations of facial recognition technology in a category where they are presumptively invalid 
must also be acknowledged. This categorization would make it nearly impossible for a 
legislature to regulate any use of facial recognition technology, as state and local regulations 
triggering First Amendment concerns rarely survive strict scrutiny.722 
Chapter 4 laid out the problems that states and municipalities encounter when they try to 
regulate facial recognition technology in a constitutional manner. Two types of regulations of 
facial recognition are the most likely to survive a First Amendment challenge post-Sorrell. The 
first option is a broad ban or moratorium on the technology’s use, with minimal exceptions that 
can be justified by a state in court. This approach is likely constitutionally permissible but may 
not be politically attractive.  Facial recognition technology is a valuable investigative tool, 
allowing law enforcement to identify suspected criminals and trafficking victims. Prohibiting the 
technology’s use may be unpopular with government employees and even with the general 
public.723 For example, facial recognition technology’s ability to identify both perpetrators and 
                                               
719 See id. at 570. 
720 See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 163 (2015). 
721 See supra notes 525-533 and accompanying text.  
722 See Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal 
Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 856 (2006) (finding that courts applying strict scrutiny in First Amendment cases 
upheld only 21% of state regulations and 4% of local regulations between 1990-2003). 
723 See Aaron Smith, More Than Half of U.S. Adults Trust Law Enforcement to Use Facial Recognition Responsibly, 
PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Sept. 5, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2019/09/05/more-than-half-of-u-s-
adults-trust-law-enforcement-to-use-facial-recognition-responsibly/ (finding that more than half of U.S. adults 
support law enforcement use of facial recognition technology and trust law enforcement officers to use the 
technology responsibly). 
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victims of child sexual abuse724 may make the technology more popular, especially in light of 
prominent social media campaigns decrying child trafficking.725  
The second option is regulations within the “Evaluation of Use” and “Accountability of 
Use” categories, allowing the state to impose procedural requirements for use of facial 
recognition technology or biometric information without preemptively burdening speech. This 
type of regulation is less likely to trigger strict scrutiny, making it more likely to survive a First 
Amendment challenge. However, government agencies and private actors have little incentive to 
comply with procedural requirements, especially with the relatively toothless nature of many 
enforcement provisions. Washington’s S.B. 6280 is one such bill made up primarily of 
regulations within these two categories; when the bill was enacted, it was praised by industry 
insiders726 but immediately criticized by civil society organizations as a “weak” attempt to limit 
the use of facial recognition technology.727 While this type of regulation may trigger (and is more 
likely to survive) a lower level of constitutional scrutiny, it is unclear whether procedural 
requirements like a use policy or notice requirement provide a sufficient barrier against more 
intrusive uses of facial recognition technology. 
                                               
724 See Kashmir Hill, Your Face Is Not Your Own, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE (Mar. 18, 2021), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/03/18/magazine/facial-recognition-clearview-ai.html (describing the use 
of Clearview AI’s facial recognition technology to identify a previously unidentified abuser). 
725 See Amanda Seitz, QAnon’s ‘Save the Children’ Morphs into Popular Slogan, Complicating Efforts of 
Nonprofits Working to Help the World’s Needy Children, CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 28, 2020), 
https://www.chicagotribune.com/election-2020/ct-qanon-save-the-children-slogan-20201028-
abguujubbngmfhhyuibjkxzniq-story.html. 
726 See Brad Smith, Finally, Progress on Regulating Facial Recognition, MICROSOFT (Mar. 31, 2020), 
https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2020/03/31/washington-facial-recognition-legislation/. 
727 See Jennifer Lee, We Need a Face Surveillance Moratorium, Not Weak Regulations: Concerns about SB 6280, 
ACLU (Mar. 31, 2020), https://www.aclu-wa.org/story/we-need-face-surveillance-moratorium-not-weak-
regulations-concerns-about-sb-6280. 
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If states or municipalities try to regulate specific uses of facial recognition technology 
while allowing other uses to continue, they risk infringing upon the same unconstitutional 
territory as Sorrell. Sector-specific bans of facial recognition technology risk classification as 
content-based, like when Vermont attempted to restrict marketers from accessing prescriber 
identifiable data.  As discussed in Chapter 4, bans or moratoriums on particular uses of the 
technology will struggle to survive strict scrutiny, especially if the regulation cannot be 
conceivable tied to a compelling state interest like student privacy.728 The unique nature of 
Clearview AI’s data acquisition methods may also raise additional constitutional issues; the 
company claims that their use of publicly available photographs places them outside the scope of 
many focused biometric privacy laws because the images were made available to the public 
before Clearview AI collected them. The company also argues that only providing their services 
to law enforcement agencies makes them a “government contractor” exempt from BIPA’s 
requirements.729 
Biometric privacy laws like BIPA appear to be most vulnerable to being struck down in a 
First Amendment challenge, regardless of whether strict or intermediate scrutiny is ultimately 
applied. Ignoring the normative consequences of potentially eliminating opt-in consent schemes 
as a regulatory option for facial recognition technology, Clearview AI correctly notes that a 
consent requirement may not be narrowly tailored to a substantial government interest when the 
photographs were publicly posted. The litigation around Clearview AI also flags the importance 
                                               
728 See supra Chapter 4, notes 644-646 and accompanying text (discussing the justification for a sector-specific 
moratorium on use of facial recognition technology in schools while also acknowledging that the state may lack a 
compelling government interest in other areas). 
729 See Mem. In Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss at 5, ACLU v. Clearview AI, 2020-CH-04353 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Oct. 7, 2020). 
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of definitional clarity for legislative drafters; when facing a First Amendment challenge, 
legislators must be clear about what they are regulating and the limits of that regulation.  
Any legislatures targeting private use of facial recognition technology through notice and 
consent mechanisms will be closely watching the Clearview AI suits work their way through the 
judicial system, as much is unclear about what states can do to stop private actors from using the 
technology and how their regulations can survive judicial scrutiny. As a potential regulatory 
alternative, journalists have praised Massachusetts’ recently enacted law placing substantial 
restrictions on law enforcement ability to use facial recognition technology.730 The bill still 
allows law enforcement use, but only after providing a written request to the DMV, State Police 
Department or FBI; the department is not allowed to run the search themselves.731 A search is 
only allowed with either a court order signed by a judge or under narrowly defined exigent 
circumstances.732 A February 2021 article refers to the bill with the headline, “How One State 
Managed to Actually Write Rules on Facial Recognition.”733 In terms of restrictions, the 
Massachusetts law sits in between Washington’s S.B. 6280734 (which provides few substantive 
barriers to government use of facial recognition technology) and Vermont’s S.B. 124735 (which is 
a moratorium on essentially every law enforcement use of facial recognition technology). While 
                                               
730 See An Act Relative to Justice, Equity and Accountability in Law Enforcement in the Commonwealth, 2020 
Mass. Acts 253, § 26 (2020). 
731 See id. 
732 See id. 
733 See Kashmir Hill, How One State Managed to Actually Write Rules on Facial Recognition, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 27, 
2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/27/technology/Massachusetts-facial-recognition-rules.html. 
734 See 2020 Wash. Adv. Leg. Serv. 257 (requiring use policies and accuracy standards but lacking prohibitions on 
non-real time use of facial recognition or any sort of enforcement mechanism). 
735 See Act of Oct. 7, 2020, 2020 Vt. Laws 166 (placing a moratorium on most uses of facial recognition technology 
by law enforcement officers). 
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the constitutionality of the Massachusetts statute is still questionable in the face of potential First 
Amendment concerns, the law prohibits most law enforcement uses of facial recognition 
technology while allowing use in two explicit circumstances (with a court order or under exigent 
circumstances). This statutory construction seems similar to the HIPAA-like construction that 
Sorrell implies would be constitutional, where a bill restricts most uses of information save a few 
“well-justified” exceptions.736  
Consider the two scenarios presented at the beginning of this thesis. The first scenario 
involved Candice, a young woman who takes an evening trip to the bar. As she sits at the bar, 
Hank, a man sitting at the bar, covertly takes a photograph of her and runs it through a facial 
recognition technology application located on his cell phone. The second scenario involved 
Thomas, a young activist who marched through the streets in support of social change. Thomas 
received a visit from law enforcement officers who identified him through a warrantless facial 
recognition scan using an image collected by a police-worn body camera. There is no federal law 
that prevents either of these uses of facial recognition technology, but what regulatory options 
might place limits on these types of uses? 
Thomas’s situation is relatively straightforward. The facts make it clear that the use of 
facial recognition was by a government officer, an area where states and municipalities seem far 
more likely to regulate. Other than biometric privacy laws and Portland, Oregon’s ordinance 
restricting the use of facial recognition technology by private entities in places of public 
accommodation, the majority of the coded statutes and ordinances collected for this thesis 
regulate government use of facial recognition technology, especially by law enforcement. The 
three focused facial recognition statutes passed during 2020 all limit or prohibit use of facial 
                                               
736 See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 573 (2011). 
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recognition technology by law enforcement agencies,737 as do most of the enacted local 
ordinances limiting use of the technology. Two of these state regulations738 and each of the 
enacted local ordinances would likely prevent this use of facial recognition technology. 
What type of limitation on use might work in Thomas’s situation? A ban or moratorium 
would likely prevent police officers from using facial recognition technology to identify Thomas. 
Vermont S.B. 124, the first successful attempt by a state legislature to prohibit law enforcement 
use of facial recognition technology, any law enforcement officer “shall not use” facial 
recognition technology or information acquired through use of facial recognition technology.739 
This type of prohibition is clear; the law enforcement officer would not be permitted to use facial 
recognition technology to identify Thomas regardless of whether the officer used an application 
like Clearview AI off-the-clock on his personal device.740 Even if an officer claimed that they 
were acting as a private citizen when they actually ran the facial recognition search, the 
department would still be barred from investigating Thomas based on the results of information 
obtained from facial recognition technology. Local ordinances have also tried to avoid this 
potential ambiguity by allowing law enforcement officers to use facial recognition technology on 
their personal cell phone only for “user authentication” purposes. Even in the absence of an 
absolute prohibition on government use of facial recognition technology, a warrant or court order 
                                               
737 See An Act Relative to Justice, Equity and Accountability in Law Enforcement in the Commonwealth, 2020 
Mass. Acts 253, § 26 (2020); Facial Recognition Act, 2020 Wash. Adv. Leg. Serv. 257 (2020); Act of Oct. 7, 2020, 
2020 Vt. Laws 166, § 14 (placing a moratorium on most uses of facial recognition technology by law enforcement 
officers). 
738 See id. 
739 See Act of Oct. 7, 2020, 2020 Vt. Laws 166, § 14 (placing a moratorium on most uses of facial recognition 
technology by law enforcement officers). 
740 See BOSTON, MASS., CODE, Ch. 16-62(b)(2)(b) (2020). 
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requirement for use would theoretically force a police officer to articulate some sort of probable 
cause before running a facial recognition search.741 
Thomas’s scenario is also one where regulatory provisions within the “Evaluation of 
Use” category may actually be a helpful tool. Washington’s S.B. 6280 has a use policy 
requirement for any state agency using facial recognition technology, mandating that the agency 
establish protocols to determine “where, when, and how” facial recognition technology is 
deployed.742 Since the police officer’s search to identify Thomas was “off-the-books” entirely, he 
likely failed to use facial recognition technology in conjunction with any department use policy. 
A regulation with a use policy requirement provides limited protection against broad government 
use of facial recognition technology, but it does at least require an agency to articulate some 
limits to their use.  
For these provisions to have any effect, however, a statute must contain enforcement 
provisions punishing government actors for improper use of facial recognition technology. 
Several of the provisions discussed in Chapter 2 may function as a limitation on the law 
enforcement officers’ use to identify Thomas. Multiple enacted statutes have provisions 
requiring the suppression of any unlawfully collected facial recognition technology evidence.743 
                                               
741 See, e.g., Act of May 16, 2020, 2020 Minn. Chap. Law 82 (preventing police from using a drone with facial 
recognition unless “expressly authorized by a warrant”); Capture or Use of Biometric Identifier Act, TEX. BUS. & 
COM. CODE § 503.001(2009) (requiring a warrant as one justification for the unconsented disclosure of biometric 
information); Facial Recognition Act, 2020 Wash. Adv. Leg. Serv. 257 (2020) (imposing a court order requirement 
for real-time use of facial recognition technology); An Act Relative to Justice, Equity and Accountability in Law 
Enforcement in the Commonwealth, 2020 Mass. Acts 253, § 26 (2020) (requiring police to have a court order or 
exigent circumstances before submitting a request for a facial recognition search). 
742 See Facial Recognition Act, 2020 Wash. Adv. Leg. Serv. 257, §3(2)(c)(i) (2020). 
743 See Act of May 16, 2020, 2020 Minn. Ch. Law 82 (preventing police from using a drone with facial recognition 
unless “expressly authorized by a warrant”); Act of June 24, 2016, 2016 N.H. Ch. 322 (relating to the use of facial 
recognition technology in officer-worn body cameras); Act of Nov. 24, 2020, 2020 N.J. Pub. L. No. 129 (regulating 
the use of officer-worn body cameras); Act of June 25, 2015, 2015 Ore. Laws 550 (relating to the use of officer-
worn body cameras). 
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Other regulations allow for administrative discipline when agency use procedures have been 
violated.744 A civil suit using a private right of action would also be an appropriate deterrent for a 
use of facial recognition technology that violates a regulation. Without these provisions, any 
statutory requirements are limited in their effectiveness; S.B. 6280 has been criticized in part due 
to the lack of any enforcement provision punishing agencies or officers for improper use of facial 
recognition technology.745  
While Thomas’s issues with law enforcement use of facial recognition technology can be 
resolved by existing statutory mechanisms that likely do not violate the First Amendment, 
Candice’s situation is much more complicated. Candice’s bar encounter seems to involve use of 
facial recognition technology by a private party, rather than use by a government agent. Based on 
the state-level regulations on use of facial recognition discussed in Chapter 2, the type of 
regulation that is most likely to apply to Hank’s use of facial recognition technology is one of the 
biometric privacy laws; any existing bans or moratoriums on use of facial recognition technology 
focus solely on use by government agencies or law enforcement officers.746 The one exception, 
Portland’s ban on use of facial recognition technology by private entities in places of public 
accommodation, applies to businesses but not to individual actors.747  
                                               
744 See Act of June 24, 2016, 2016 N.H. Ch. 322 (relating to the use of facial recognition technology in officer-worn 
body cameras); see also BOSTON, MASS., CODE, Ch. 16-62 (2020); BROOKLINE, MASS., CODE, Art. 8.39 (2019); 
SOMERVILLE, MASS., CODE, art. III, div. 1, § 9-25 (2019). 
745 See Jennifer Lee, We Need a Face Surveillance Moratorium, Not Weak Regulations: Concerns about SB 6280, 
ACLU (Mar. 31, 2020), https://www.aclu-wa.org/story/we-need-face-surveillance-moratorium-not-weak-
regulations-concerns-about-sb-6280. 
746 See Evan Ringel, Facial Recognition Technology Regulation Database (Jan. 21, 2021) (unpublished Excel 
spreadsheet) (on file with author). 
747 See Kashmir Hill, Activists Turn Facial Recognition Tools Against the Police, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/21/technology/facial-recognition-police.html (referencing remarks from a lawyer 
for the City of Portland where he stated that the regulations do not apply to individual actors). 
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Even all of the biometric privacy laws discussed in this thesis may not apply to Hank’s 
use of facial recognition technology. Two of the three laws (in Texas and Washington) only 
apply to the collection of a biometric identifier for a “commercial purpose,” a category to which 
Hank’s use almost certainly would not apply.748 Quickly, the only available regulatory option 
becomes BIPA, emphasizing both the regulatory importance of Illinois’ biometric privacy law 
and the potential ramifications for use of facial recognition technology if courts rule in favor of 
Clearview AI. Unlike the biometric privacy laws in Texas and Washington, BIPA has no 
requirement of a commercial purpose, instituting an absolute prohibition the capture of biometric 
information unless both notice and written consent are provided by the subject. Hank’s use of 
facial recognition technology to identify Candice would be in violation of BIPA unless she 
provided him with written consent before he obtained her biometric information through a facial 
recognition technology search. BIPA does not prevent the taking of Candice’s photograph (in 
fact, photographs are explicitly excluded from the definition of “biometric identifier”); however, 
by taking Candice’s photograph and then running it through a facial recognition program without 
her consent, Hank has violated the consent requirement in BIPA.  
The effectiveness of BIPA (and only BIPA) in this situation emphasizes the necessity of a 
federal biometric privacy law with similarly broad restrictions on use of biometric information. 
At least one empirical study has shown that courts are nearly three times more likely to defer to a 
compelling state interest in a First Amendment case when the challenged regulation is from the 
federal government than when the challenged regulation is from a state (21%) or local (4%) 
                                               
748 See Capture or Use of Biometric Identifier Act, TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 503.001(2009) (providing no 
definition of commercial purpose); WASH. REV. CODE § 19.375.010(4) (2017) (defining commercial purpose as “a 
purpose in furtherance of the sale or disclosure to a third party of a biometric identifier for the purpose of marketing 
of goods or services when such goods or services are unrelated to the initial transaction in which a person first gains 
possession of an individual’s biometric identifier”). 
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government.749 Even if the application of BIPA to Clearview AI’s facial recognition technology 
is struck down under strict scrutiny, similar statutes have been proposed on the federal level and 
may be more likely to survive a First Amendment challenge.750 
Regulations targeting government and law enforcement use of facial recognition 
technology are an important mechanism to regulate the use of facial recognition technology, and 
the ability of states like Massachusetts to pass statutes in this area should be lauded.751 However, 
biometric privacy laws play a crucial role in preventing unregulated use of facial recognition by 
private entities. As the general public continues to express worry about the use of facial 
recognition technology by non-government actors, attitudes are shifting and private use of facial 
recognition technology is perceived as a larger threat than government use.752 Hank’s use of 
facial recognition technology may simultaneously be most concerning to the general public and 
almost impossible to limit using existing regulatory mechanisms. Biometric privacy laws, 
especially BIPA, represent “the biggest remaining legal hurdle” for facial recognition technology 
providers like Clearview AI.753 If Clearview AI successfully argues that their First Amendment 
rights are violated by BIPA, the most effective regulatory tool to limit the use of facial 
                                               
749 See Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal 
Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 856 (2006) (finding that 59% of federal regulations facing strict scrutiny survived a 
First Amendment challenge, as compared to 21% of state regulations and 4% of local regulations). 
750 See Loeb & Loeb LLB, FTC, Federal and State Lawmakers Signal Focus on Biometric Data, LEXOLOGY (Feb. 1, 
2021) (detailing an unsuccessful effort by Sens. Bernie Sanders and Jeff Merkley to pass federal biometric privacy 
legislation similar to BIPA during the 2020 legislative session). 
751 See Kashmir Hill, How One State Managed to Actually Write Rules on Facial Recognition, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 27, 
2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/27/technology/Massachusetts-facial-recognition-rules.html. 
752 Aaron Smith, More Than Half of U.S. Adults Trust Law Enforcement to Use Facial Recognition Responsibly, 
PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Sept. 5, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2019/09/05/more-than-half-of-u-s-
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753 See Kashmir Hill, Your Face Is Not Your Own, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE (Mar. 18, 2021), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/03/18/magazine/facial-recognition-clearview-ai.html. 
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recognition technology will no longer be an option. Until federal legislation protecting biometric 
privacy754 or regulating use of facial recognition technology755 is passed, government and private 
actors would be able to use facial recognition technology without any constraints at all, an 
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756 See Drew Harwell, Both Democrats and Republicans Blast Facial-Recognition Technology in a Rare Bipartisan 
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